CDA MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHAZI SALAH

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000239

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM AU UN SU US
SUBJECT: CDA MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHAZI SALAH
ED-DINE


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4. (b) and (d)


1. (C) On February 18, CDA Hume met with Presidential Advisor
Ghazi Salah ed-Dine to discuss the situation in Darfur, the
threats to humanitarian operations, and peace-keeping. Hume
said the USG was deeply concerned about trends in Darfur and
about President Bashir's recent statements criticizing the
United Nations. The fact was that Sudan's own unilateral
military plan to pacify Darfur had failed in the past six
months and that the situation could only be saved by
continued humanitarian operations, strengthened
peace-keeping, and renewed political dialogue with the
rebels. The USG was not alone in its concerns, as evident by
the recent resolution approved by the European parliament.


2. (C) Ghazi acknowledged that the Sudanese government was
facing a serious problem in Darfur. Prior plans had not
worked. Sudan, like the USG, hoped that the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) could be the basis for real solutions, and it
was ready to make a further effort. He described the recent
Franco-African summit as ill-prepared. The French had too
many people involved in the talks, which therefore did not
resolve core issues. Ghazi said that the Libyans were
sending significant resources to Chad, which in turn was
supporting the Darfur rebels who were rejecting talks based
on the DPA. In his view, it would be essential to deal with
this aspect of the problem, or there could be no peace in
Darfur.


3. (C) On humanitarian operations, Ghazi said Sudan welcomed
these operations but was concerned that some INGOs fueled the
media campaign against Sudan. Hume countered that while the
USG was aware that most attacks against the INGOs were
committed by the rebels, the government often made the
situation worse through a daunting load of red tape and
unjust police actions, such as the recent case in Nyala.
Hume asked if Ghazi thought the GOS would be willing to meet
with a group of INGOs, perhaps accompanied by a few
ambassadors and the UN, to work through such issues. Ghazi
welcomed the idea for a small group to meet regularly with
the government to resolve such issues and asked Hume if he
could consult with the INGOs to propose arrangements.


4. (C) On peace-keeping, Ghazi said that the government of
Sudan would implement the Addis Ababa/Abuja agreements. He
asserted that political opposition to a UN role was
decreasing, but President Bashir had to stay in touch with
his base. Hume said that the UN needed a positive reply from
President Bashir on the Heavy Support Package now, and it
would be better if President Bashir desisted from
discouraging other governments from contributing troops.
Hume said he was about to visit Darfur to get ground truth on
how the UN, the AU, and the Sudanese government were
performing their agreement on the three-phase plan.


5. (C) On political dialogue, Ghazi admitted that the
situation had gotten worse in the past year. The Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA) had splintered, and the government knew
it needed help in getting a political solution. The backing
of Libya and Chad for rejectionist elements was one part of
the problem. Hume commented that for the present the best
course of action was to cooperate with the process organized
by the UN/AU mediation team of Jan Eliasson and Salim Ahmed
Salim, and that cooperation had to be evident in support of
the three phase plan for peace-keeping, including the light
support package, the heavy support package, and the hybrid
operation.


6. (C) Hume informed Ghazi that Special Envoy Natsios was
planning a visit to Sudan in early March. Ghazi welcomed
such a visit but noted that on February 28 and March 1 senior
officials would be busy with a visit by Iranian President
Ahmadi-Nejad.


7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
HUME