Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM239
2007-02-18 12:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

CDA MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHAZI SALAH

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM AU UN SU US 
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VZCZCXRO1151
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0239 0491213
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181213Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6152
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0069
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000239 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM AU UN SU US
SUBJECT: CDA MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHAZI SALAH
ED-DINE


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4. (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000239 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM AU UN SU US SUBJECT: CDA MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHAZI SALAH ED-DINE Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4. (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) On February 18, CDA Hume met with Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salah ed-Dine to discuss the situation in Darfur, the threats to humanitarian operations, and peace-keeping. Hume said the USG was deeply concerned about trends in Darfur and about President Bashir's recent statements criticizing the United Nations. The fact was that Sudan's own unilateral military plan to pacify Darfur had failed in the past six months and that the situation could only be saved by continued humanitarian operations, strengthened peace-keeping, and renewed political dialogue with the rebels. The USG was not alone in its concerns, as evident by the recent resolution approved by the European parliament. ¶2. (C) Ghazi acknowledged that the Sudanese government was facing a serious problem in Darfur. Prior plans had not worked. Sudan, like the USG, hoped that the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) could be the basis for real solutions, and it was ready to make a further effort. He described the recent Franco-African summit as ill-prepared. The French had too many people involved in the talks, which therefore did not resolve core issues. Ghazi said that the Libyans were sending significant resources to Chad, which in turn was supporting the Darfur rebels who were rejecting talks based on the DPA. In his view, it would be essential to deal with this aspect of the problem, or there could be no peace in Darfur. ¶3. (C) On humanitarian operations, Ghazi said Sudan welcomed these operations but was concerned that some INGOs fueled the media campaign against Sudan. Hume countered that while the USG was aware that most attacks against the INGOs were committed by the rebels, the government often made the situation worse through a daunting load of red tape and unjust police actions, such as the recent case in Nyala. Hume asked if Ghazi thought the GOS would be willing to meet with a group of INGOs, perhaps accompanied by a few ambassadors and the UN, to work through such issues. Ghazi welcomed the idea for a small group to meet regularly with the government to resolve such issues and asked Hume if he could consult with the INGOs to propose arrangements. ¶4. (C) On peace-keeping, Ghazi said that the government of Sudan would implement the Addis Ababa/Abuja agreements. He asserted that political opposition to a UN role was decreasing, but President Bashir had to stay in touch with his base. Hume said that the UN needed a positive reply from President Bashir on the Heavy Support Package now, and it would be better if President Bashir desisted from discouraging other governments from contributing troops. Hume said he was about to visit Darfur to get ground truth on how the UN, the AU, and the Sudanese government were performing their agreement on the three-phase plan. ¶5. (C) On political dialogue, Ghazi admitted that the situation had gotten worse in the past year. The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) had splintered, and the government knew it needed help in getting a political solution. The backing of Libya and Chad for rejectionist elements was one part of the problem. Hume commented that for the present the best course of action was to cooperate with the process organized by the UN/AU mediation team of Jan Eliasson and Salim Ahmed Salim, and that cooperation had to be evident in support of the three phase plan for peace-keeping, including the light support package, the heavy support package, and the hybrid operation. ¶6. (C) Hume informed Ghazi that Special Envoy Natsios was planning a visit to Sudan in early March. Ghazi welcomed such a visit but noted that on February 28 and March 1 senior officials would be busy with a visit by Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad. ¶7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. HUME

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