GIVE "PLAN A" A CHANCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000232

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
NSC FOR HADLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU US
SUBJECT: GIVE "PLAN A" A CHANCE


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) In the past six months Khartoum has grudgingly shifted
toward acceptance of the UN/African Union (AU) three-phase
peace-keeping plan. President Bashir knows that the plan of
regime hard-liners for a military solution to the problems of
Darfur has failed, and persistent efforts by the USG, Kofi
Annan, and several other governments has moved him toward
accepting UN troops in Darfur. Now Bashir needs to be tested
by UN/AU action, and the USG should try to move that test
forward as vigorously as possible.


2. (C) Regarding AU/UN peace-keeping, action is needed on
several fronts. Bashir has given a green light for the light
support package -- but the UN has deployed only half of the
186 personnel because of its own bureaucratic issues. The AU
has incorporated into its operations only two of the 38 UN
military officers already in Darfur. Sudan has yet to
respond to the UN/AU proposal on the heavy support package.
We should: 1) Push the Sudanese to resolve any remaining
bureaucratic impediments, such as our successful request this
week regarding land for the UN in El Fasher; 2) Work with the
UN and AU to remove their own blockages to deployments,
without which there can be no testing of Bashir's position;
3) Insist that the Sudanese give a positive response to the
UN/AU heavy support package within ten days and then resolve
any remaining issues promptly; 4) Maintain a high-level
dialogue with Bashir on planning for the hybrid operation
that should begin later this year.


3. (S/NF) Sudan has demonstrated its willingness to take
action at the request of Western governments in support of
the global war on terror. On February 12, Sudan detained an
individual who was part of a group planning to attack UN
facilities here. The government is investigating additional
leads in this case.


4. (C) Activity is picking up to restart political dialogue
concerning Darfur. The internal non-signatory commanders
have been gathering in North Darfur this week, and the
Sudanese government has not impeded this gathering. Other
non-signatory leaders are gathered in Chad, but this group
seems to be controlled by Libya (with money) and Chad (with
arms). This second group is rejecting negotiations based on
the DPA and retaining a demand for regime change in Khartoum.
Meanwhile, three months after the Addis Ababa AU/UN meeting,
Salim Salim and Jan Eliasson have finally appeared for their
first joint visit to Sudan. The long-delayed political
process is beginning. The United States should increase the
tempo of its own engagement on this dialogue with the AU/UN
envoys, with the Sudanese government, and with the rebels.
We need to work out a way to dissuade Libya from continuing
its 30-year policy of destabilizing Darfur.


5. (C) Salva Kiir and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM) have just decided to make another effort at launching
a dialogue between the Darfur rebels and Khartoum. They want
to urge the non-signatory groups to adopt a common position
within the framework of the DPA and to participate in a
political process managed by the AU and UN. The USG should
welcome the SPLM role and give it explicit, high-level
support.


6. (C) The rising level of violence against humanitarian
workers is a significant problem. Most of this violence is
caused by rebels, but some is caused by the government.
Regarding the assault on humanitarian workers in Nyala, which
the UN here does not believe represented government policy,
the USG should insist that Sudan drop charges against the NGO
workers and discipline those responsible. Furthermore, the
U.S. should make a sustained effort, including during visits
by S/E Natsios and A/S Lowenkron, to press Khartoum to
resolve impediments to humanitarian work. (FYI: During this
period, the State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs may be
one of the two Sudanese officials indicted by the ICC for war
crimes.)


7. (C) The next two months are an important period for moving
forward implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA). The SPLM's recent decision to shift its headquarters
from Juba to Khartoum is a symbol of its national role. When
the Sudan Consortium meets in Khartoum on March 20,
implementation of the CPA will be the issue on the table. A
prior decision by the USG to impose stringent financial
sanctions will deflect the discussion from what the parties
and other donors are doing to support the CPA. That meeting
presents an opportunity for a strong USG delegation to direct
attention to those items of CPA implementation that have been

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lagging.

8. (C) Comment: The Sudanese government can always be
difficult to deal with, but now there are some openings to
pursue. We should take advantage of these developments to
engage with those elements of the regime that want to work
with us to stabilize Darfur, advance CPA implementation, and
normalize relations. End comment.
HUME