DARFUR APPOINTMENTS: A HOLLOW GESTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000228

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/SE
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR APPOINTMENTS: A HOLLOW GESTURE

REF: KHARTOUM 00170

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) In a February 12 meeting with poloffs, Ibrahim Madibbo
-- a signatory to the Declaration of Commitment (DoC) and
Rizeigat leader -- admitted that the January 4 announcement
of his appointment as chairman of the Darfur Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Commission was unexpected (reftel). Madibbo
learned of the appointment on television, and he has had no
further communication from the Sudanese government since the
announcement. He was "pessimistic" that the government would
empower the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority as
envisioned under the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). He has
not been given an office or other logistical support for the
commission, and the Government has not identified an official
interlocutor for the TDRA appointees. By consequence,
Madibbo has not decided to accept the appointment, though he
hoped to meet with Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie later
in the week and would seek clarification. "Right now, I
don't even know what I'm entitled to," said Madibbo.

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TDRA Progress Positive
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2. (C) Despite his complaints on the Government's approach,
Madibbo supported the idea of moving forward with 75 percent
of the appointments stipulated in the DPA, including the
governor of North Darfur and the chairman of the Compensation
Commission. He indicated that the remaining 25 percent of
the government positions allocated for Darfurians -- to
include a minister in the Government of National Unity (GNU)
-- would be sufficient to entice the DPA non-signatories to
join the peace process. He also said that the Darfur-Darfur
Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) should proceed, which would
contribute to stabilizing the security situation on the
ground. He cautioned, however, that the DDDC needed to
include traditional tribal leaders who command the respect of
their constituencies, not those who have been co-opted by the
Government. Madibbo believed that DDDC chairman Abdel
Mohammed understood that this was the correct approach.

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Minawi, AU Must "Stand Up"
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3. (C) Madibbo asked that the USG use its influence with the
African Union (AU) and Senior Assistant to the President and
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi to
encourage them to be more assertive with the Sudanese
government. He stressed that Minawi needed to "stand up,"
"bring life to his job," and use his position as the fourth
highest ranking member of the GNU to re-invigorate the peace
process. When POLOFF reminded Madibbo that he and Minawi
faced a similar lack of logistical support and access to
influential members of the National Congress Party (NCP),
Madibbo responded that Minawi could engage with civil society
groups and prominent Darfurian leaders to mobilize support.
He also said that Vice President Ali Osman Taha was open to
helping Minawi advance the peace process. "The Darfur
leaders in Khartoum are more important than the people in the
field," said Madibbo. "If he works with them and with the
DoCs, we can bring more support for him from the people in
the field. Now, he doesn't talk to us." Madibbo added that
Minawi's veiled threats to pull out of the DPA made him look
uncommitted to peace and further contributed to the erosion
in his support.

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Comment
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4. (C) Madibbo just returned from 17 years of self-imposed
exile in November 2006, and his assessment of the current
Sudanese political environment may be outdated: 1) His
recommendation that Taha could serve as a useful point of
engagement for Minawi may be optimistic given Taha's
marginalization within the NCP. 2) Though the Rizeigat are
an exception, the break-down in Darfur's social fabric is due
in large part to a chasm between traditional tribal leaders
and their youth, which the DDDC would be hard pressed to
correct in the current security environment. Nonetheless,
the USG should continue to press Minawi and the AU to pursue
more strategic political engagement with the Sudanese
government and the Darfur public. End comment.
HUME