CDA AND MFA UNDER SECRETARY MUTRIFF DISCUSS

1. (C) In a February 13 meeting with Mutriff al Siddiq, Under
Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CDA Hume

SIPDIS
explained the U.S. position with respect to Darfur rebels who
had not yet signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The
United States, along with other members of the international
community, encouraged disparate non-signatory commanders to
unite. In so doing, however, they must renounce their goal
of regime change and negotiate in good faith with the
Government of Sudan under the auspices of the DPA. Special
Envoy Natsios, in his recent meetings with commanders in
Chad, had pressed these same points. AU Special Envoy Salim
and UN Special Envoy Eliasson would soon travel to Darfur in
an attempt to further reach out to non-signatory commanders.
The Government of Sudan must not block this effort.



2. (C) CDA Hume also addressed the Light Support Package,
noting the Government's green light to the ongoing UN
deployment. However, the Governor of North Darfur objected
to the selection of federal land adjacent to the PAE
warehouse for the UN's main camp, despite MFA approval. Hume
also urged a speedy reply to the joint AU/UN letter regarding
the Heavy Support Package. In coming days, the Bush
Administration would convene high-level meetings to discuss
Sudan. A positive reply from President Bashir would be a
welcome addition to that discussion. Hume encouraged the
Government to closely examine opportunities to ease
bureaucratic restrictions on NGO workers in Sudan, referenced
his planned trip to Darfur and announced the upcoming visit
of Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
Lowenkron to Sudan. Hume also pressed the Government on the
issue of the New Embassy Compound (NEC) containers, addressed
reftel.



3. (C) Mutriff agreed to follow-up with the Governor of North
Darfur on the land issue. Saying the Government needed time
to study and prepare its response, he nonetheless took
onboard the urgency of a positive reply to the AU/UN letter.
With respect to Darfur rebels, Mutriff argued that Libyan and
Chadian support to DPA rejectionists was the real issue, one
that was completely ignored. The rebels armed and fed by
neighboring countries had goals diametrically opposed to the
people in the camps in Darfur. If the rebels now in North
Darfur struck a deal and united, what good would it
accomplish? Such an outcome would actually be
counter-productive. Mutriff said he was not confident the
effort by Salim and Eliasson would be successful.
Furthermore, the Government of Sudan did not have much more
to give; if it promised more to Darfur, other regions of the
country would demand the same.



4. (C) Mutriff continued, saying the Government of Sudan was
often perplexed by mixed signals coming from the
international community. He acknowledged that Sudan was
facing "real heat" and sought ways to work cooperatively and
bridge differences by means of sincere discussions. Special
Envoy Natsios had delivered on his promise of a Presidential
Statement (PRST); the Government of Sudan wanted his help to
move an additional step forward. The visit of Governor
Richardson, while helpful, did not hold concrete ways to
achieve progress. President Bashir was sincere, but needed
trusted interlocutors. The Government of Sudan recognized
that it would attract increasing blame as the conflict
festered and wanted to avoid "dire steps." The Government
welcomed a future visit by Special Envoy Natsios at any time.
HUME