Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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07KHARTOUM224 | 2007-02-14 12:33:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Khartoum |
VZCZCXRO7496 PP RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #0224 0451233 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 141233Z FEB 07 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6121 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY |
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000224 |
1. (C) In a February 13 meeting with Mutriff al Siddiq, Under Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CDA Hume SIPDIS explained the U.S. position with respect to Darfur rebels who had not yet signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The United States, along with other members of the international community, encouraged disparate non-signatory commanders to unite. In so doing, however, they must renounce their goal of regime change and negotiate in good faith with the Government of Sudan under the auspices of the DPA. Special Envoy Natsios, in his recent meetings with commanders in Chad, had pressed these same points. AU Special Envoy Salim and UN Special Envoy Eliasson would soon travel to Darfur in an attempt to further reach out to non-signatory commanders. The Government of Sudan must not block this effort. 2. (C) CDA Hume also addressed the Light Support Package, noting the Government's green light to the ongoing UN deployment. However, the Governor of North Darfur objected to the selection of federal land adjacent to the PAE warehouse for the UN's main camp, despite MFA approval. Hume also urged a speedy reply to the joint AU/UN letter regarding the Heavy Support Package. In coming days, the Bush Administration would convene high-level meetings to discuss Sudan. A positive reply from President Bashir would be a welcome addition to that discussion. Hume encouraged the Government to closely examine opportunities to ease bureaucratic restrictions on NGO workers in Sudan, referenced his planned trip to Darfur and announced the upcoming visit of Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Lowenkron to Sudan. Hume also pressed the Government on the issue of the New Embassy Compound (NEC) containers, addressed reftel. 3. (C) Mutriff agreed to follow-up with the Governor of North Darfur on the land issue. Saying the Government needed time to study and prepare its response, he nonetheless took onboard the urgency of a positive reply to the AU/UN letter. With respect to Darfur rebels, Mutriff argued that Libyan and Chadian support to DPA rejectionists was the real issue, one that was completely ignored. The rebels armed and fed by neighboring countries had goals diametrically opposed to the people in the camps in Darfur. If the rebels now in North Darfur struck a deal and united, what good would it accomplish? Such an outcome would actually be counter-productive. Mutriff said he was not confident the effort by Salim and Eliasson would be successful. Furthermore, the Government of Sudan did not have much more to give; if it promised more to Darfur, other regions of the country would demand the same. 4. (C) Mutriff continued, saying the Government of Sudan was often perplexed by mixed signals coming from the international community. He acknowledged that Sudan was facing "real heat" and sought ways to work cooperatively and bridge differences by means of sincere discussions. Special Envoy Natsios had delivered on his promise of a Presidential Statement (PRST); the Government of Sudan wanted his help to move an additional step forward. The visit of Governor Richardson, while helpful, did not hold concrete ways to achieve progress. President Bashir was sincere, but needed trusted interlocutors. The Government of Sudan recognized that it would attract increasing blame as the conflict festered and wanted to avoid "dire steps." The Government welcomed a future visit by Special Envoy Natsios at any time. HUME |