DARFUR: A REVIEW OF RECENT SECURITY TRENDS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000203 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2017 TAGS: MOPS PGOV PHUM PREF AU UN SU SUBJECT: DARFUR: A REVIEW OF RECENT SECURITY TRENDS Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Sudanese government has scaled back the execution of sustained military operations in Darfur since the beginning of Ramadan in the fall of 2006. From Ramadan to present, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) appears focused on troop rotation, garrison activities, and logistical stock-piling operations. West Darfur continues to remain volatile with the ongoing Chadian Armed Opposition Group (CAOG) action against Chadian National Forces (ANT). Tribal fighting and general banditry remains significant in all three Darfur states. End summary. ¶2. (C) Government of Sudan Military Operations: The SAF military offensive that started in the fall of 2006 aimed at pushing Darfur rebel groups out of North Darfur and cutting off supply lines from Chad, appeared to end with the beginning of Ramadan. Since Ramadan, the SAF has concentrated on rotating troops into Darfur and bringing in supplies to stock-pile. The shift of eight SAF battalions to South Darfur appeared to foreshadow a restart of a SAF offensive after Ramadan. However, the SAF has not restarted or started another offensive in Darfur. Its tactics instead seem to be to control the battle space from three major cities in Darfur: El Fasher, Nyala, and El Geneina. These three towns, all provincial capitals, offer the SAF garrison facilities from which it can control the airfields and lines of communication (LOCs) connecting the cities. Although they may control these LOCs, their sphere of influence does not extend past an estimated 20 km radius of these areas. Outside this radius, the SAF has only surge capability for control operations. The SAF tends to impose movement control through the use of checkpoints. The movement control not only impedes rebel movement, but has also hampered the ability of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS),UN humanitarian organizations, international NGOs, and national NGOs to conduct their missions. The aerial bombing operations the SAF has conducted appear to have specifically targeted suspected rebel group strongholds in an attempt to disrupt combined rebel leader conferences. SAF aerial operations have also supported Janjaweed activities aimed at rebel groups. Theses operations have reportedly been highly ineffective due to the techniques used of dropping explosive devices from transport planes. Additionally, the SAF has not committed additional ground forces to these aerial operations in coordinated, combined operations, as they did pre-Ramadan ¶2006. ¶3. (C) Chadian Armed Opposition Group (CAOG) activity in West Darfur: CAOG activity in West Darfur has added to the already volatile security situation in the area. Although it does not appear the SAF is actively supplying the CAOGs, the CAOGs are operating unconstrained in the West Darfur border area. Specifically, from the Fora Baronga area in the South all the way up to Kulbus in the North. The CAOGs freedom of movement has led directly to vehicle hijacking and theft of supplies by the rebels in what appears to be their method of re-supply operations. Many of these activities have been traced directly back to rebel activities in eastern Chad. Although we believe the Sudanese government has not recently provided direct material support to the CAOGs, they have allowed government medical facilities to treat CAOG rebels wounded in fighting. ¶4. (C) Tribal Fighting and Banditry: Tribal fighting and banditry throughout Darfur has significantly contributed to the tense security situation. Although incidents of murder, rape, and theft continue to be numerous, we see these incidents as a product of the Sudanese government's inability to govern and control the vast area in Darfur instead of a directed initiative. The various militias, rebel groups, and common thieves also profit by exploiting the lack of security in areas controlled by the Sudanese government or Sudanese Liberation Army/Minni Minawi rebels. This lack of control allows these groups to hijack NGO and INGO vehicles, steal supplies, or both. These events significantly increased since the start of 2007. HUME