AS STALEMATE CONTINUES ON DPA, MINAWI ASKS FOR

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 002029 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV SU SA LY SUBJECT: AS STALEMATE CONTINUES ON DPA, MINAWI ASKS FOR U.S. SUPPORT THROUGH SPLM REF: A. KHARTOUM 02004 ¶B. KHARTOUM 02013 Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Nafie Demands SLM Integration- -------------- ¶1. (C) In a recent meeting with senior representatives of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM),Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie underscored that any previous timetable for implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) agreed between the SLM and late-Presidential Advisor Maghzoub al Khalifa is void and that he will not discuss power or wealth-sharing issues until the SLM integrates its military into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF),SLM Chairman and Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi told Poloff on December 18. Minawi, who did not attend the meeting, explained that the SLM will not consider integration of its forces until the Government disarms the Janjaweed; appoints the Security Advisory Team (SAT) stipulated in the DPA, including acceptance of a foreign general as the SAT chairman; and the SLM role in the military High Command is specified. ¶2. (C) Despite positive press reports, the meeting--pitting Nafie and Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner Ahmed Haroun against senior SLM officials, including chief military commander Jumaa Hagar and Secretary General of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority Mohammed Soliman--was inconclusive. According to Minawi, Nafie scoffed at the suggestion that the Government can disarm the Janjaweed, saying that "they are no longer under our control." His proposal for integration rebuffed, Nafie then dismissed the SLM's military capacity as negligible. ¶3. (C) By tying further implementation of the DPA to an unreasonable demand for the SLM to integrate its forces--contrary to the timetable set-out in the agreement--Nafie is further negating the accord, said Minawi. He claimed that even Vice President Ali Osman Taha had admitted to him that NCP hardliners will never implement an effective peace agreement for Darfur. "Even if Khalil Ibrahim and Abdulwahid joined a peace deal, we would still have problems because the bad guys in Khartoum will never hold to the deal," Minawi quoted Taha as predicting. -------------- SLM Fighters: Top Priority -------------- ¶4. (C) Minawi remains concerned, however, about the loyalty of his forces, many of whom lack any means of sustenance. Estimating the SLM's current force strength at between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters, Minawi said that the NCP used the SLM's lack of resources to pressure political and military leaders to defect from the movement, as in the case of SLM Secretary General Mustafa Tirab (Refs. A and B). Despite Minawi's attempts to secure financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the NCP has always managed to outflank him, dispatching Defense Minister Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein to Riyadh and National Intelligence and Security Service Director General Salah Ghosh to Doha after Minawi's trips to the Gulf to negate any inroads he had made. "You can't depend on the Arabs," said Minawi, less enthusiastic about the success of a trip to Libya than during an earlier conversation (Ref. A). -------------- Request for Renewed U.S. Support Through SPLM -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) The best way to assist the SLM would be for the U.S. to provide financing for food and medical services through the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) as was done in the spring of 2007, said Minawi. "The SPLM mechanism is our best hope," he explained. Minawi reiterated his intention to make support for the SLM's military wing and for the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF) the focus of his next trip to Washington, which he expects to happen in January. ¶6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. POWERS