CONVERSATIONS ABOUT DARFUR'S "GREATEST WARLORD"

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002028 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU SU SUBJECT: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT DARFUR'S "GREATEST WARLORD" ¶1. (SBU) The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UN DSS) told FieldOff in late November that the threat it feared most in Darfur comes from a Mahariya Arab called Mohamed Hamdan, aka "Hamety." He is at the helm of a Darfur Peace Agreement non-signatory group which includes disaffected janjaweed and whose ties to the Government of Sudan (GoS),its traditional means of support, are currently reported to be in flux. Hamety has been making the rounds with high-profile Darfur players to inform them of his plans for his own movement, but whether his capacities and his sincerity match his rhetoric remains to be seen. Despite these ambiguities, he is not for the moment a force to be ignored. ¶2. (SBU) Hamety has been active over the past month throughout Darfur: his group has been accused of carjacking INGO vehicles in the north and reportedly engaged the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) November 29 in a show of defiance against what Hamety considers the GoS' broken promises of money and power in exchange for the crimes Hamety exacted against Darfur African tribes on the GoS' behalf. However, skeptics, not least among them prominent Fur leaders in North and South Darfur, sniff at this alleged confrontation between Hamety and the GoS that had armed him, calling the incident an "imaginary battle," as it resulted in no casualties on Hamety's side, despite heavy aerial bombardments by the GoS. These leaders consider that GoS-janjaweed ties are not so easily broken and suspect that this alleged hostility between the sides is part of an elaborate ruse to further overwhelm Darfur populations. ¶3. (SBU) UNDSS in Nyala, however, is not so quick to dismiss Hamety's sincerity in his bid to assert himself as independent from the GoS. UNDSS believes that the GoS would not waste the time, money, effort and potential troop losses fighting Hamety if there were indeed some sort of collusion between the sides. UNDSS, which has contact with Hamety, reported that 14 of Hamety's vehicles were in fact destroyed in the November 29 bombing, and point out that Hamety's group suffered enough casualties for Hamety himself to report the figures to the International Committee of the Red Cross. ¶4. (SBU) According to UNDSS, Hamety is actively consolidating his support on the ground. In late October/early November, Hamety reportedly signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Sudan Liberation Army of Abdelwahid, providing for, among other things, treatment of each side's respective wounded and safe passage of each side's personnel through respective areas of control. The MOU also contained a provision under which Hamety assured safe passage for other organized armed elements to travel from Kalma to Jebel Marra. "No one in the SLA would have signed an MOU with Hamety if this were a Government conspiracy," UNDSS asserted. ¶5. (SBU) UNDSS believes Hamety when he says that he is now planning to bring his struggle to El Daein, noting that 15 of Hamety's vehicles were spotted 30 km south of Abu Matariq (site of an IDP camp) within the past week. Hamety may enjoy the support of the Popular Defense Forces in Asalaya, as they hail from the same Mahariya tribe and as they are similarly disillusioned with the GoS for failing to fulfill its monetary promises to them (in the Asalaya PDF case, they have been seeking compensation since July for their role in the GoS' conflict with the Sudan People's Liberation Army). Finally, UNDSS considers that a link exists between Hamety and the United Revolutionary Force Front (who represent Arab-led groups opposed to the GoS),the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and the Oppressed/Unknown Soldiers of Sudan (a group of disaffected former Arab soldiers) in the Kass region of South Darfur, all of whom Hamety has allegedly begun referring to as "my brothers" after they incurred losses in the "imaginary battle" of November 29. ¶6. (SBU) UNDSS Nyala further considers that Hamety is working to consolidate support from South Darfur tribal leaders, namely the Zaghawa, the Mahariya and the Sa'ara. He is reportedly having discussions with sheikhs of these tribes about helping them if the South Darfur Wali fails to deliver on promised services in the region, including education and free passage from one area to another. ¶7. (SBU) Not all are so easily won over by Hamety, however. A JEM Commander in El Fasher reports that Hamety contacted him personally within the past days as part of an overall outreach effort to the main Darfur rebel movements, informing that Hamety had no intentions of joining their movements but rather of forming one of his own. The JEM rep noted that Hamety's strength (estimated as 52 vehicles and heavy arms) was procured entirely from the GoS, a channel which Hamety, who the JEM rep said had no political aspirations, would never sacrifice. The JEM rep predicts that the GoS will indeed honor the demands Hamety is seeking and that once that happens, Hamety will abandon his struggle against the GoS. ¶8. (SBU) COMMENT. Over the course of the past year, much has been reported on the phenomenon of fluctuating allegiances among former janjaweed and about their loyalty (or lack thereof) to the GoS. The KHARTOUM 00002028 002 OF 002 GoS has tried throughout these cases to woo its footsoldiers back, and more often than not, has done so successfully. However, what makes Hamety significant so far is that to date he has not succumbed to the GoS' incentives, which, if Hamety proves sincere, could be a first for this supposed janjaweed conversion trend. Furthermore, Hamety commands a significant military presence against the GoS, not typically the case with such splinter groups. It is not therefore out of the realm of possibility for him to seek a "partnership" with Abdelwahid in an attempt to bring Hamety's military weight and Abdelwahid's political agenda collectively to bear against the GoS. POWERS