WISE WORDS FROM FREED OPPOSITION LEADER MUBARAK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002019

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, S/E NATSIOS, DRL,
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2012
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UN AU SU
SUBJECT: WISE WORDS FROM FREED OPPOSITION LEADER MUBARAK
AL-FADIL

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a wide-ranging meeting with CDA Fernandez
on December 17, Umma Renewal and Reform leader Mubarak
al-Fadil al-Mahdi urged the US to encourage widening the CPA
to include parties other than the NCP and SPLM. Al-Fadil
described President Bashir as essentially a 'fall guy' for
the figures actually making decisions in Khartoum. His recent
prison experience had exposed the weaknesses of Khartoum's
security apparatus, he said. Al-Fadil advocated for an
SPLM-northern alliance as well as the international community
(chiefly the US) giving the government, and Bashir, an
ultimatum: the accommodating Muamar Qaddafi model or the
isolating Saddam Hussein model. End summary.

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SALAH GHOSH BEHIND AL-FADIL'S DETENTION
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2. (C) Detailing his recent imprisonment, al-Fadil said that
he'd always been politically active in opposing past Sudanese
dictatorships, "but this time I didn't do anything!" He
recounted being blindfolded at an interrogation center south
of the airport in Khartoum while a juvenile account of his
supposed plot to overthrow the government was read aloud to
him. Why would he write anything like that? he asked his
interrogators; the alleged statement didn't include anything
about Darfur, democratization, economic problems, the CPA or
any of his party's critical issues. Al-Fadil said that his
interrogators accused him of trying to "market" his plan to
Egypt, Libya and the United States. "I told them that US
policy was based on change occurring through the CPA, not a
coup," he told CDA. A coup depended on the element of
surprise and the cooperation of the military, not on a group
of retired officers who were "too old to overturn a car, much
less a government."


3. (C) Intelligence chief Salah Ghosh was the driving force
behind his prolonged imprisonment, al-Fadil said, because
Ghosh wanted to prove his zeal to his NCP masters. The
government's legal council had advised Ghosh to drop the
matter, but he had refused. According to al-Fadil, Ghosh
wanted to keep the case active in order to avoid being
transferred to the Ministry of Interior. There had been talk
of a coup by an ex-officer named Hasan al-Basha, al-Fadil
said, but his plans were solely in the realm of fantasy -- he
had no weapons or fighters. The government seized on this to
distract attention from its problems in Darfur, he said,
essentially creating something out of nothing. When CDA asked
if he thought the other detainees would be released, al-Fadil
was not optimistic. Some would be acquitted and others
indicted, he assumed. The judge assigned to the case, Mutasim
Taj al-Sir, was the same judge who had ordered the group be
held in detention during the investigation, he was a creature
of the intelligence service. There was no independent
evidence and only confessions extracted under torture, but
the security apparatus would insist that the trial proceed,
al-Fadil predicted.

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CENTRAL SECURITY APPARATUS WEAK, POORLY TRAINED
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4. (C) Al-Fadil said that his experience in prison had proven
the inefficiency and unprofessionalism of the security
forces. Why interrogate someone blindfolded, he wondered, so
that you couldn't see their facial reactions when they
responded? Chuckling, he said that he learned where he was
being held when he overheard a soldier making a rendezvous
appointment with his girlfriend, telling her the where
nearest bus station was. In Nimeiri's time, political
detainees weren't surrounded by guards and given such an
exaggerated security profile, he said. Al-Fadil also noted a
lack of trust among the security forces. His guards were
rotated every three hours, always in pairs so as to keep an
eye on each other. They had no job loyalty, he charged, but
only wanted the salary. There was no fighting spirit or
resolve among the security forces, he said; even diehard
Islamists from the forces had privately told him that
Sudanese political leaders from all parties needed to "sit
down together and work things out before it was too late."
CDA concurred, noting that while the NCP was relatively
strong in some ways (access to money, intelligence and
control over much of the media),it was very weak in others.
After 18 years, there was no agenda other than remaining in
power.

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SPLM AND NORTHERN OPPOSITION: STRENGTH IN UNITY
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5. (C) Describing his future plans, al-Fadil told CDA that
his goals were Umma party reunification and achieving some
kind of national political consensus. Just before his arrest,
he said, he and GoSS president Salva Kiir had agreed to bring
northern political opposition leaders to a workshop in Juba.
The workshop would help allay any fears the SPLM had about
northern antipathy towards the CPA and provide a starting
point for formulating a common position on Darfur and
political transformation. The end goal was to be a "Juba
Declaration," signed by figures such as Kiir, Sadiq al-Mahdi,
Hassan al-Turabi and himself. NCP "doves" would also be
invited, al-Fadil said. When CDA asked what the US could do
to support such an initiative, al-Fadil suggested that the US
encourage groups in the north to align with the SPLM and the
SPLM not to be so distrustful of Northerner Sudanese. The
U.S. could also offer proposals for CPA/political
transformation. The CPA needed to be much broader, al-Fadil
said, and not be the property of only two parties. The SPLM
had accomplished much but was politically weak and needed the
skills and backing of more established northern opposition
figures to confront a malevolent NCP. The death of John
Garang had left a vacuum, he pointed out, but the SPLM was
"afraid" of working with northern parties with Salva Kiir
nervous about being cheated by tricky politicians from
Khartoum. IGAD partners could be included, he suggested later
in the conversation, even though the NCP "wants to eat its
cake alone."


6. (C) CDA agreed with the need to "nationalize" a political
strategy, telling al-Fadil that such larger issues as the
elections and democracy had been overshadowed by the CPA,
which in turn had been overshadowed by Darfur. Al-Fadil said
that he had warned the SPLM to be wary of the NCP, who were
expert game-players; the SPLM had allowed presidential
advisor Nafie Ali Nafie to personally choose the fourteen
percent opposition representation as mandated by the CPA. The
current reconciliation between the NCP and SPLM would not
hold, he thought, since "make or break" issues such as Abyei
and the oil fields were at stake. The NCP would never share
USD 600 million in annual oil revenues, he asserted,
especially as it was already borrowing from the oil companies
and in debt to the Central Bank, "and even still it cannot
pay all its expenses and bribes needed to stay afloat".

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BASHIR A WEAK LEADER, DEPENDENT ON INNER CIRCLE
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7. (C) The NCP was wreaking havoc in Darfur, al-Fadil said,
even though it probably hadn't meant things to go so far. CDA
agreed, noting that the government had created the conditions
prevalent in Darfur, but that their creation had now turned
against them. The janjaweed would retaliate, al-Fadil said,
and the rebel movements were no more than tribal protest
groups, not political entities. Al-Fadil suggested that the
international community should back a strong security force
in Darfur, then a multi-party conference on reconciliation
and native administration, and only then address the issues
of compensation and political representation in Khartoum. CDA
cautioned al-Fadil that the NCP would reject such a strategy,
noting its fear of any strong international force in Darfur
and of other political parties using Darfur for partisan
advantage since the NCP is so hated in Darfur.


8. (C) The ruling triumvirate in Khartoum was composed of VP
Ali Osman Taha, party leader Nafie Ali Nafie and Awad al-Jaz
(Minister of Energy - who controls the oil wealth),al-Fadil
said (though perhaps intelligence chief Ghosh was also a
contender). President Bashir was "passive, apolitical and
lazy," he doesn't like to read memos and is interested only
in delegating. He was actually more reasonable than the
triumvirate committing crimes in his name. CDA concurred,
saying that a strategy Washington could look at was to
separate Bashir from those around him who were actively
engaged in perpetuating crises in the country. Al-Fadil
suggested telling Bashir that he had two choices: the
international community would come after him personally, or
he should find a resolution in Darfur and democratization.
There were two scenarios, al-Fadil said -- the "Qaddafi"
option or the "Saddam Hussein" option. Al-Fadil said he'd
told General al-Hadi (chief NCP-janjaweed liaison and subject
of ICC inquiry) this in 2004, only to then be fired from his
government position by Taha when he traveled to the US. "I
told Bashir that when I travel people ask me, 'Who runs your
country, Ali or Bashir?' and it's embarrassing," al-Fadil

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said. The National Islamic Front was also feeling alienated
by hardliners in the NCP, he added. The NCP was tactically
brilliant but strategically disastrous, CDA said; "we tell
them that you have 4-6 months to fix things, that this is a
rare opportunity to correct your mistakes and future
administrations may not be so forgiving."


9. (C) Comment: An informed, experienced interlocutor and
long-time player in Sudan's political arena, al-Fadil's
analysis of Bashir's weak leadership style rings true, and is
in line with post's previous reporting. An SPLM-northern
opposition alliance would be a natural fit, though extremely
unpalatable to the National Congress Party; al-Fadil and his
co-detainees were arrested as much to discourage any party
unification or alliance-building as to provide cover for
Salah Ghosh. Al-Fadil has expressed a desire to make a return
trip to the US to build on his 2004 visit, which post would
strongly support (possibly some time next year). End comment.

FERNANDEZ