MINAWI: SLM CRIPPLED BY INTRIGUE AS NCP ATTEMPTS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002013 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG, NEA/ARP (ASTEINFELD),NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2012 TAGS: PGOV PREL SU SUBJECT: MINAWI: SLM CRIPPLED BY INTRIGUE AS NCP ATTEMPTS TO FREEZE DPA REF: KHARTOUM 01686 KHARTOUM 00002013 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- NCP Tries to Split SLM, Suspend DPA/TDRA -------------- ¶1. (C) Para 7 contains an action item recommending demarching the UAE government on the appropriate channel for UAE assistance to Darfur. ¶2. (C) The Sudan Liberation Movement's (SLM) political paralysis has grown worse in recent days as Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie is using SLM Secretary General Mustafa Tirab to split the movement, Senior Assistant to the President and SLM chairman Minni Minawi told Poloff on December 15. Tirab participated in the National Congress Party's (NCP) delegation to the UN/AU-organized Darfur peace talks in October, against the official SLM policy, which precipitated the current internal crisis. Nafie is pressing Tirab to establish a breakaway SLM faction based on a willingness to participate in future talks, claimed Minawi. The NCP will then use the split as a pretext for freezing Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) implementation and announcing a suspension of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA). -------------- Assassination Threat -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Intrigue concerning Tirab has reached a critical level within the SLM. Minawi alleged that the Secretary General is planning an assassination attempt against him during his upcoming trip to Al Daein, South Darfur. Though calling the threat "very serious," Minawi was confident that an assassination could be avoided, and his security operatives are already preparing Al Daein for his arrival. Indicating that the SLM may be splitting along ethnic lines, Minawi said that he had learned of the plot via Zaghawa operatives who had overheard Tirab discussing it with a few of his loyalists, who, like Tirab, are Fur. -------------- Tirab's Rhetoric Matches NCP's -------------- ¶4. (C) Tirab's rhetoric has begun to reflect that of key regime figures, explained Minawi. In a recent party meeting, Tirab characterized MP Ali Traio, chairman of the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF) Abduljabar Dousa, legal counsel Abdulaziz Sam, deputy TDRA head Mohammed Al Tijani, and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) liaison (and Minawi's brother) Hussein Arko--among the best minds in the SLM leadership and Minawi's closest advisors--as "U.S. spies." National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director General Salah Ghosh made identical comments to Minawi one month ago. According to Minawi, Tirab is now in Dubai convincing the UAE government to transfer its recent pledge of 12 million USD for humanitarian and development programs in Darfur directly to Khartoum rather than through the DRDF as envisioned in the DPA (reftel). Such a misdirected transfer by the UAE would be a body blow to efforts to strengthen a credible TDRA. -------------- Hoping for Tirab's Resignation -------------- ¶5. (C) In spite of Tirab's subversion, Minawi is resistant to order his expulsion from the movement, fearing that a public dismissal could leave doubt as to who is at fault. Instead, Minawi continues to hope that Tirab will resign. TDRA Secretary General Mohammed Suleiman has orchestrated an SIPDIS internal party "discussion" for December 17 where Minawi believes prominent party leaders will demand Tirab's resignation, leaving the Secretary General little choice but to depart his post. -------------- Minawi-Nafie Go Head to Head -------------- ¶6. (C) Minawi is scheduled to meet with Nafie on December 16 KHARTOUM 00002013 002.6 OF 002 and will demand a clear statement of the NCP's position on DPA implementation and the TDRA. Minawi predicted that Nafie will press the SLM to integrate its military elements into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The SLM has rejected NCP attempts to press for integration because it would take the movement's one piece of leverage off the table and runs contrary to the timeline set out in the DPA, which demands disarmament of the Janjaweed prior to the integration of rebel forces. Minawi plans to travel to Darfur on December 19 and remain there until early to mid-January. Positing that the NCP may use the holiday season--while Western eyes are focused elsewhere--to announce the suspension of the DPA and the TDRA, the SLM chairman said, "it's better for me to be in the field if they freeze the agreement." ¶7. (C) Comment/recommendation: This intrigue is the latest chapter in a very long story, Khartoum's tactic of divide and rule, a tactic which successive regimes have practiced since the inception of Sudan's independence 51 years ago. At the very least, we strongly encourage that a message be passed through Embassy Abu Dhabi that UAE officials only provide assistance through the TDRA and that means through Mini Minawi. To do otherwise is to carry Khartoum's water in seeking to further splinter rebel movements, political parties, IDP camps and civil society which translates into further misery for the people of Darfur. ¶8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ