DENG ALOR ON THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001996

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: DENG ALOR ON THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary: Senior Adviser to Assistant Secretary
Frazer for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley met with future
GNU Foreign Affairs Minister Deng Alor to update him on the
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA),recent developments in Garamba
Park, and to ask for his assistance in ending the 21-year war
waged by the LRA. After the briefing Alor asked for
suggestions on additional ways in which the GoSS could help.
Shortley outlined four items for GoSS consideration: (1)
President Kiir should call President Museveni to coordinate
directly; (2) The GoSS should take a position in the Juba
peace talks and work with Chief Mediator GoSS VP Riek Machar
to decide on the way forward; (3) SPLA should increase
surveillance and security between Garamba/Rikwamba and CAR;
and (4) The GoSS should increase the effectiveness of the LRA
peace talks in Juba to ensure a peace agreement is reached by
end of January 2008. Alor asked Shortley to continue to
brief GoSS President Kiir on the developments in Garamba and
the LRA peace talks through a parallel track -- to ensure the
GoSS can develop a further approach on ending the LRA
conflict peacefully. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Shortley provided an update on the LRA to Deng Alor
on December 9, highlighting recent defections of the Chief of
Operations and other senior commanders and the information
gained from the debriefs. Shortley provided Makasi's
defection interview to Alor who subsequently passed it on to
President Kiir. Shortley explained that recent defectors
detailed Kony's new location (70 km west of Garamba) and his
recent plans to break his troops into four task forces to
abduct up to 500 girls, to create new terror in West Nile,
Uganda, to send an advance team to the Central African
Republic (CAR),and to pick up arms hidden in a cache in
southern Sudan. Shortley also noted U.S. concern that the
LRA leadership in Garamba and the delegation were not serious
about finalizing a peace agreement and that the GoSS could be
helpful in finding a peaceful solution or help contain the
LRA.


3. (SBU) Alor was shocked to hear this information and asked
how the GoSS could help. Shortly outlined four items for
GoSS consideration: (1) President Kiir should call President
Museveni to coordinate directly; (2) The GoSS should take a
position in the Juba peace talks and work with Chief Mediator
GoSS VP Riek Machar to decide on the way forward; (3) SPLA
should increase surveillance and security between
Garamba/Rikwamba and CAR; and (4) The GoSS should increase
the effectiveness of the LRA peace talks in Juba to ensure a
peace agreement is reached by end January 2008. Alor agreed
with all four points.


4. (SBU) Shortley explained that GoSS Vice President Machar
has not been fully transparent and that the U.S. is concerned
about Machar's role in raising funds for the LRA, covering up
LRA Vincent Otti's death, extending the talks unnecessarily,
promoting an anti-Museveni line, and possibly benefiting from
the talks in some way. Alor said that he and President Kiir
are also worried and said he would appoint an "inside man" on
the GoSS Mediation Team. He said that he would also try to
increase coordination with President Chissano and ask him to
increase his participation and representation during the
talks.


5. (SBU) Alor asked Shortley to limit the scope of his
briefings to VP Machar to assess his understanding on the
ground and probe for discrepancies. Alor then asked Shortley
to continue to brief him on the LRA peace talks through a
parallel track to ensure the GoSS is fully informed and can
develop a unified GoSS approach to help end the LRA conflict
peacefully. Alor explained that President Kiir had been
looking to replace Machar for some time, but decided not to
act as it would be "too offensive." Alor explained that
Machar has created many problems for the GoSS on Darfur, the
LRA and other issues, and the GoSS is often in the dark on
his affairs.


6. (SBU) Shortley closed the LRA update by highlighting to
Alor that President Chissano will arrive in Juba on Thursday
and travel to Rikwangba on Saturday or Sunday. Shortley
asked the GoSS to fully participate in his visit to help
bring the Juba peace talks back on track and to a speedy
conclusion. Alor appreciated the briefing and asked that
Shortley brief the President with the same points. He
stressed that President Kiir would like to be helpful on the

KHARTOUM 00001996 002 OF 002


LRA issue, but that he has a tough week ahead of him and
finding time would be difficult.


7. (C) Comment: In addition to showing clearly how little
information GoSS Vice President Riek Machar shares with
President Kiir, and drawing further attention to possible
corruption on the part of Machar, Shortley's meetings in Juba
also highlight the ongoing internal discipline problems
facing the SPLM. GoSS President Kiir is reticent to remove
senior SPLM officials who, despite undermining the SPLM and
demonstrating outright insubordination, have been with the
movement for years and have standing in the South within
their own tribal groups. This should not come as a surprise
as the SPLM realizes that the shortest path to its demise is
disunity in the face of a ruthless and well-organized
National Congress Party (NCP),its partner and rival in the
Sudanese Government. End comment.
FERNANDEZ