DENG ALOR ON THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001996 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: DENG ALOR ON THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Senior Adviser to Assistant Secretary Frazer for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley met with future GNU Foreign Affairs Minister Deng Alor to update him on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA),recent developments in Garamba Park, and to ask for his assistance in ending the 21-year war waged by the LRA. After the briefing Alor asked for suggestions on additional ways in which the GoSS could help. Shortley outlined four items for GoSS consideration: (1) President Kiir should call President Museveni to coordinate directly; (2) The GoSS should take a position in the Juba peace talks and work with Chief Mediator GoSS VP Riek Machar to decide on the way forward; (3) SPLA should increase surveillance and security between Garamba/Rikwamba and CAR; and (4) The GoSS should increase the effectiveness of the LRA peace talks in Juba to ensure a peace agreement is reached by end of January 2008. Alor asked Shortley to continue to brief GoSS President Kiir on the developments in Garamba and the LRA peace talks through a parallel track -- to ensure the GoSS can develop a further approach on ending the LRA conflict peacefully. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Shortley provided an update on the LRA to Deng Alor on December 9, highlighting recent defections of the Chief of Operations and other senior commanders and the information gained from the debriefs. Shortley provided Makasi's defection interview to Alor who subsequently passed it on to President Kiir. Shortley explained that recent defectors detailed Kony's new location (70 km west of Garamba) and his recent plans to break his troops into four task forces to abduct up to 500 girls, to create new terror in West Nile, Uganda, to send an advance team to the Central African Republic (CAR),and to pick up arms hidden in a cache in southern Sudan. Shortley also noted U.S. concern that the LRA leadership in Garamba and the delegation were not serious about finalizing a peace agreement and that the GoSS could be helpful in finding a peaceful solution or help contain the LRA. ¶3. (SBU) Alor was shocked to hear this information and asked how the GoSS could help. Shortly outlined four items for GoSS consideration: (1) President Kiir should call President Museveni to coordinate directly; (2) The GoSS should take a position in the Juba peace talks and work with Chief Mediator GoSS VP Riek Machar to decide on the way forward; (3) SPLA should increase surveillance and security between Garamba/Rikwamba and CAR; and (4) The GoSS should increase the effectiveness of the LRA peace talks in Juba to ensure a peace agreement is reached by end January 2008. Alor agreed with all four points. ¶4. (SBU) Shortley explained that GoSS Vice President Machar has not been fully transparent and that the U.S. is concerned about Machar's role in raising funds for the LRA, covering up LRA Vincent Otti's death, extending the talks unnecessarily, promoting an anti-Museveni line, and possibly benefiting from the talks in some way. Alor said that he and President Kiir are also worried and said he would appoint an "inside man" on the GoSS Mediation Team. He said that he would also try to increase coordination with President Chissano and ask him to increase his participation and representation during the talks. ¶5. (SBU) Alor asked Shortley to limit the scope of his briefings to VP Machar to assess his understanding on the ground and probe for discrepancies. Alor then asked Shortley to continue to brief him on the LRA peace talks through a parallel track to ensure the GoSS is fully informed and can develop a unified GoSS approach to help end the LRA conflict peacefully. Alor explained that President Kiir had been looking to replace Machar for some time, but decided not to act as it would be "too offensive." Alor explained that Machar has created many problems for the GoSS on Darfur, the LRA and other issues, and the GoSS is often in the dark on his affairs. ¶6. (SBU) Shortley closed the LRA update by highlighting to Alor that President Chissano will arrive in Juba on Thursday and travel to Rikwangba on Saturday or Sunday. Shortley asked the GoSS to fully participate in his visit to help bring the Juba peace talks back on track and to a speedy conclusion. Alor appreciated the briefing and asked that Shortley brief the President with the same points. He stressed that President Kiir would like to be helpful on the KHARTOUM 00001996 002 OF 002 LRA issue, but that he has a tough week ahead of him and finding time would be difficult. ¶7. (C) Comment: In addition to showing clearly how little information GoSS Vice President Riek Machar shares with President Kiir, and drawing further attention to possible corruption on the part of Machar, Shortley's meetings in Juba also highlight the ongoing internal discipline problems facing the SPLM. GoSS President Kiir is reticent to remove senior SPLM officials who, despite undermining the SPLM and demonstrating outright insubordination, have been with the movement for years and have standing in the South within their own tribal groups. This should not come as a surprise as the SPLM realizes that the shortest path to its demise is disunity in the face of a ruthless and well-organized National Congress Party (NCP),its partner and rival in the Sudanese Government. End comment. FERNANDEZ