Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM1994
2007-12-13 09:15:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

CORRECTED COPY - DEPUTY WALI AND POLICE COMMANDER WELCOME

Tags:  PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU PHUM 
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VZCZCXRO0803
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1994/01 3470915
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 130915Z DEC 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9551
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001994 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU PHUM
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY - DEPUTY WALI AND POLICE COMMANDER WELCOME
CDA IN SOUTH DARFUR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001994 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU PHUM SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY - DEPUTY WALI AND POLICE COMMANDER WELCOME CDA IN SOUTH DARFUR ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a December 10 meeting with the Charg d'Affaires (CDA) and USAID Mission Director, South Darfur Deputy Wali (Governor) Farah and South Darfur Police Commander Mohamed encouraged the CDA and Mission Director to see the "reality" in South Darfur as the first step in solving Darfur's problems. The Deputy Wali characterized the intensity of fighting between Arab tribes as having eclipsed that between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the rebel movements. He hoped that the USG would be able to assist in bringing Darfuri parties together to reconcile these differences. The Deputy Wali was receptive to the Mission Director's plan to visit original home locations and possible resettlement locations around Darfur in January to assess security and developmental factors affecting prospects for IDP returns during the proposed visit of USAID Assistant Administrator Michael Hess (AA/DCHA). On Kalma disarmament, the Police Commander agreed with the CDA that unilateral GoS action in the form of forcible disarmament was not the answer and instead indicated GoS concurrence with the latest disarmament plan put forward by UNAMID Joint Special Representative Adada. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Participants in December 10 meeting with South Darfur Deputy Wali (Governor) Farah and South Darfur Police Commander Mohamed were CDA Fernandez, USAID Sudan Mission Director Fleuret, USAID Darfur Team Leader Khandagle, USAID Nyala FieldOff Richer, USAID El Fasher FieldOff Stroschein and FieldOff (notetaker). NEED ASSISTANCE IN TRIBAL RECONCILIATION -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The South Darfur Deputy Wali on December 10 encouraged the CDA and USAID Mission Director to see for themselves the "reality" of what was happening on the ground in South Darfur, particularly with regard to problems between and among Darfur tribes. He said that although Darfur tribes "know themselves" and the differences between them, tribal lines in the current situation were blurred, as tribes were fractioning and fighting amongst themselves. He asserted that inter-tribal fighting had resulted in more deaths in Darfur than had violence between the GoS and the rebel movements, thus disproving, in his estimation, the theory that the Darfur conflict was African versus Arab. The Deputy Wali remi
nisced about traditional times when sheikhs sat together to resolve these types of tribal disputes, and he solicited the CDA's assistance, as well as that of the international community as a whole, in taking up the mantle to bring Darfuri parties together to reconcile these differences. SAKALI INDICATIVE OF GOS VISION OF RETURNS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Previewing the CDA's and USAID Mission Director's visit to Sakali Relocation Site, the Deputy Wali discussed four options on the table for dealing with the 200 families relocated there after October violence in Kalma IDP camp. First, the Deputy Wali said that Sakali residents could return to their original villages prior to Kalma settlement; second, they could settle in Sakali Town; third, they could go to another IDP camp besides Kalma; or fourth, they could settle with relatives in Nyala Town. The Deputy Wali indicated a GoS readiness to provide free land and basic services for those Sakali residents willing to settle around Nyala [NOTE: This offer could explain the scores of "squatters" in the areas immediately surrounding the Sakali South site who are attempting to get a piece of this GOS land-grab. END NOTE]. ¶5. (SBU) The CDA warned that incentivizing returns was not far removed from forcing returns, especially to areas where security concerns prevailed. The Deputy Wali replied that no returns would occur without a GoS police presence, such as that which had been established in Sakali before the arrival of IDPs from Kalma. The USAID Mission Director applauded this three-fold message linking returns to security and police presence and indicated that with effective security, in locations chosen by IDPs themselves for return, USAID could plan assistance to help make the plan a reality. He mentioned the planned visit in January by USAID Assistant Administrator Michael Hess to tour original home locations and resettlement locations around Darfur to assess security and developmental possibilities. Mission Director highlighted the need for this delegation to get beyond regional capitals and IDP camps and to access more remote locations. The Deputy Wali assured that security permitting, this type of access would be granted. KALMA'S BIGGEST PROBLEM IS PRESENCE OF ARMS -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Turning to the topic of Kalma IDP camp, the CDA referred to a letter sent to the USG alleging civilian deaths in the camp, which was the basis of his current visit to Nyala. The CDA agreed with the Deputy Wali's assertion that the presence of arms in Kalma was the greatest threat to the camp, not least because of the potentially great collateral damage that could result from any outbreak of fire, whether from IDPs or from GoS police. The CDA KHARTOUM 00001994 002 OF 002 warned that any forcible disarmament of the camp could be construed as a GoS "invasion," for which the GoS police would ultimately be blamed. To avoid this unintended consequence, the CDA urged the GoS to cooperate with the African Union (AU) and to let that organization take the lead on Kalma disarmament. ¶6. (SBU) The Deputy Wali said the GoS police have a duty to address Kalma's problems, regardless of their "politicization," and to this end, the GoS police had conducted numerous meetings with IDP representatives, including the Kalma sheikhs. He assured that the GoS police were proceeding in lockstep with the AU, even requesting in writing that the AU oversee and investigate Kalma weapons allegations. The Deputy Wali and Police Commander confirmed GoS concurrence with the latest disarmament plan put forward by UNAMID JSR Adada, saying they had notified the Ministry of the Interior and the Khartoum Police Commissioner once the GoS police in Nyala had signed off. ¶7. (SBU) Still, Kalma problems persisted, according to the Deputy Wali, due in large part to conflict between Darfur Peace Agreement signatories and non-signatories, especially supporters of Abdelwahid. He added that "thieves" in Kalma who wreak havoc on the town seek refuge in the camp, a trend which he said the GoS was working with the AU and UNAMID to stem. He reiterated the need for USG and international assistance to find a solution to this aspect of the Kalma problem as well. ¶8. (SBU) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ

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