MILITANT DARFUR IDP LEADERS: NO CHINESE, ARABS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001989 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE NATSIOS, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON, ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS TO USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017 TAGS: EAID KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL UN AU SU SUBJECT: MILITANT DARFUR IDP LEADERS: NO CHINESE, ARABS NEED APPLY FOR UNAMID REF: A. KHARTOUM 1970 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1888 ¶C. KHARTOUM 1795 ¶D. KHARTOUM 1680 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Leaders of Kalma IDP camp disavow having any weapons while at the same time admitting that they successfully drove out thousands of fellow IDPs in an October uprising. The Kalma sheikhs claimed AMIS was a failure and UNAMID would also fail if it consisted only of African, Arab and Chinese units, claiming the Chinese were as bad as the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum. They asked for increased international help on educational opportunities for the camp and pleaded that, if the international community cannot solve Darfur, that IDPs in Darfur be moved safely to a neighboring country as refugees. End summary. -------------- THE OCTOBER 2007 INTIFADA -------------- ¶2. (C) CDA Fernandez and USAID/POL colleagues spent four hours at Kalma Internally Displaced Person (IDP) Camp on December 11, a few days after UN SE Jan Eliasson was prevented from visited the same site which is one of the most organized and radicalized camps in Darfur. The highlight of the visit was a frank discussion in Arabic between the Charge and 50-60 camp leaders and elders. The leaders were unapologetic about what they called the October 18 "Intifada" (Uprising) that drove out thousands of fellow IDPs, mostly ethnic Zaghawa (some allied to the SLM-Mini Minawi faction). The camp leaders (who are mostly Fur like the camp population as a whole) said that the clashes had been instigated by the Sudanese regime (especially the NISS - Sudanese Intelligence) who had planted and recruited agents to commit criminal acts in the camp, serving as "agents provocateurs" and brandishing weapons. They had even stolen camels from passing Arab tribes to incite hatred against Kalma. ¶3. (C) The elders said that the uprising was directed against four categories of "criminals": SLM-Minawi members, agents from the JEM (Justice and Equality Movement, also a largely Zaghawa-based rebel group),common "mercenaries and criminals" and GOS spies. The camp leaders had formed a committee to exclude weapons from the camp and the people had risen up and expelled the troublemakers. The elders insisted that the clash had not been ethnically based, noting that there are 28 different ethnic groups in the camp and that some of those expelled had shown their true colors by immediately going to work for the GOS police or NISS in Nyala. ¶4. (C) The American visitors later toured the burnt out and desolate sectors 7 and 8 of the camp and saw hundreds of destroyed and damaged shelters and mudbrick walls stretching across the horizon. The well-organized uprising leaders had also dug trenches and prepared log barriers to prevent vehicles from entering in case outsiders had tried to intervene (Sudanese police wanted to but were prevented by angry IDPs). Despite the camp leaders claims of having no firearms, "only sticks and stones," it is hard to believe that this expulsion was accomplished without serious violence. ¶5. (C) The IDP leaders noted that the Sudanese regime wanted ._Qas. The GOS had kicked out the Norwegians, and Medecins du Monde (MDM) and had recently pressured the Sudanese Red Crescent Society to end its contract with the Spanish Red Cross by the end of the year. They had recently expelled the UN OCHA Director for South Darfur. The regime also used its control over the Sudanese media to defame IDP camps as centers for "terrorists" (rebel groups) and criminals. There were absolutely no weapons in the camp, this was being used as a pretext for armed intervention by the GOS (Note: even the sympathetic, expelled OCHA Director admitted to us - reftel b - that not only are there arms in the camp but also informal prisons). The GOS wanted to divide Kalma camp into 9 smaller camps but this was totally rejected by the IDPs, "this would be like creating 9 mass graves for us." The camp was willing to accept an AU/UN presence in their environs, for objectives such as weapons searches, but no Sudanese police would be allowed in. KHARTOUM 00001989 002 OF 003 -------------- AFRICAN, CHINESE TROOPS ARE NO GOOD -------------- ¶6. (C) The leaders commented on an alleged rape that had occurred the day before, noting that they had called AMIS civilian police to come and investigate but they had yet to show up. "Sometimes they come 3-4 days later, or not at all," noted Sheikh Ali, the paramount sheikh of the camp. They complained that they had been asking for protection for 4 years now and if the UN was incapable of protecting them, as is their right, then the IDPs should be given safe passage to a neighboring countries where they could become refugees (this particular theme, a new one for us, was repeated 4 or 5 times). In their estimation, the AU was a total failure which can't protect itself and was compromised by corruption and payoffs from Khartoum. Chinese troops are not wanted, "they are here either to look for oil or to serve Khartoum's interests as spies, they are as bad as the NCP." They added that the money from this oil is used to buy weapons which the Sudanese Government uses to kill its own people. Troops from Arab countries were just as bad because of their complicity with the regime and their silence on abuses in Darfur. The only solution was Western troops from Europe and the U.S. or resettlement outside Sudan. Those troops should arrive today and not tomorrow. ¶7. (C) CDA answered that the UNAMID troops would most certainly not be Western, but mostly African as agreed to in UNSCR 1769 but that everyone was very concerned about doing what was needed to make it an effective force. Deployment was much too slow to suit us and we are constantly pressing to accelerate deployment. The full implementation of 1769 should improve things in Darfur but it is not a panacea, for example, disarmament of the janjawid is not part of the UNAMID mandate. The camp leaders bitterly criticized both Libyan leader Muammar Al-Qaddafi and the AU's Salim Ahmed Salim "who is biased against us and is the executor of the Sudanese regime's program against this silent patient people weho are killed and raped inside the displaced camps." They added that in their eyes, "AU troops are almost as bad as NCP supporters." -------------- - VOLUNTARY RETURN EQUALS INDIVIDUAL ELIMINATION -------------- - ¶8. (C) CDA asked the camp leaders about the issue of "voluntary return," a concept the GOS is now touting. The leaders said that "voluntary return is individual elimination," how can one hope to return when those who made us IDPs in the first place are still out there? They noted that Kalma is actually a "prison without walls," but it is the only place in Darfur where they feel even remotely safe. The sheikhs expressed their conviction that food assistance is being stolen by the GOS to promote voluntary returns and to further squeeze the IDP camps. No one wanted to return home more than them but IDPs needed guarantees to do so, these included the presence of credible international forces, real janjawid disarmament, and the establishment of a rule of law system in Darfur which would include compensation and reconstruction. ¶9. (C) The camp elders pleaded for more schools noting that there were only 9 primary schools (no secondary schools) for a minimum of 30,000 children in the camp (credible camp population estimates range from 60,000 to 90,000). The schools were extremely modest, with no budgets, almost no books and unpaid, volunteer teachers. Charge and USAID said that they would look into this issue to see what is possible, They also complained that there was not enough food in the camp, stating that the last food distribution was five months ago (Note: This is not true. USAID partner World Vision completed a food distribution in Kalma camp less than a week ago. End note.) ¶10. (C) Comment: Kalma camp today is an object lesson of victims becoming victimizers. Whatever the justification or excuse may have been, there is no doubt that the majority Fur population drove out thousands of fellow IDPs, many of them women and children, in October. And while the Sudanese Government certainly has ulterior motives towards the camp and IDPs in general (tempered right now by frequent international monitoring),Kalma remains a highly politicized IDP camp with vocal, savvy and aggressive community leaders, KHARTOUM 00001989 003 OF 003 most of whom pay blind allegiance to Abdul Wahid Nur. It is unlikely that the international community can meet the lofty and, in some cases, very unrealistic expectations the IDPs have of UNAMID. This is troubling because it will lead to even greater dissatisfaction among a traumatized and demanding IDP population, increasing tension and insecurity in the camp. ¶11. (C) Comment continued: Humanitarian agencies have been unable to provide consistent services to IDPs in Kalma due to the Humanitarian Assistance Commission's (HAC) pattern of arbitrarily deciding which agencies can go to the camp on which days. While a certainly level of relief has been maintained, full, unfettered access to the camp must be regained in order to normalize an already volatile situation. This requires maneuvering carefully between suspicious IDPs, brutalized by their ordeal, and suspicious HAC officials, fearing that Kalma is actually a dangerous and radicalized safehaven for rebel movements. End comment. FERNANDEZ