SLA/UNITY STRIVES FOR "GRAND ALLIANCE"

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001965 SIPDIS SENSITIVE, SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL UN AU SU LY SUBJECT: SLA/UNITY STRIVES FOR "GRAND ALLIANCE" KHARTOUM 00001965 001.2 OF 002 REFTEL: KHARTOUM 01964 KHARTOUM 01785 TRIPOLI 01026 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) SLA/Unity is striving to form a "grand alliance" with Khalil Ibrahim and Abdulwahid al Nur through mobilization of Fur and Zaghawa IDPs, according to several of its representatives in North Darfur. Frustrated with the inertia of the UN/AU-led political process and doubtful that the NCP will honor an eventual peace agreement, SLA/Unity's focus is more on forging a credible political and military force to counter the Sudanese Government and transform Sudan rather than on preparing for negotiations. In addition to the shifting allegiances of the Arab tribes, SLA/Unity's activities are having the most dynamic impact on the situation in Darfur at present. End summary. -------------- A "Grand Alliance" -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Unity must forge a "grand alliance" with Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Fur IDPs led by SLA faction leader Abdulwahid al Nur to create a credible counterweight to the National Congress Party (NCP),six SLA/Unity representatives told Poloff in El Fasher during separate meetings from December 6-9. Without a unified challenge to the NCP's policies, they believe Khartoum will continue to marginalize Darfur's population. "The Government is like a colonizer," said one SLA/Unity cadre. "We will never be allowed to be at the same level of the Arabs in Khartoum." ¶3. (SBU) According to all six representatives of the movement, SLA/Unity shares Ibrahim and Abdulwahid's goals. However, SLA/Unity members differed in their description of these goals. While some cadres viewed Ibrahim and Abdulwahid as supporting self-determination for Darfur, others said that Ibrahim and Abulwahid seek autonomy within a federal system, as in Southern Sudan. Another member of SLA/Unity asserted that the movement, Ibrahim, and Abdulwahid all aim for regime change. "You can't have an agreement with this government," he opined. (Note: Per Ref. A, JEM representatives deny that Ibrahim seeks self-determination for Darfur, focusing instead on transformation of the country's governing system within a unified Sudan. End note.) -------------- Change From Below -------------- ¶4. (SBU) While the SLA/Unity representatives predicted that Ibrahim will soon formalize an alliance with their movement, intensive consultations with the Fur IDPs are necessary to bring Abdulwahid into a coalition. "A political shift must come from below," said one SLA/Unity member. Another cadre cited some progress in mobilizing Fur IDPs to support SLA/Unity, saying that only a vocal minority are blindly in lock step with Abdulwahid. The Fur are beginning to realize that Abdulwahid is militarily weak, he said, and that they must cooperate with SLA/Unity in order to achieve their goals. "The Fur have land rights, not arms." ¶5. (SBU) All of the SLA/Unity representatives conceded that Abdulwahid would be the chairman of a unified movement because a Zaghawa leader would undermine the group's credibility with the Fur. One prestigious SLA/Unity representative acknowledged that Suleiman Jamous, Sharif Harir, and Abdullah Yehia were competing for the leadership of SLA/Unity but predicted that they could not rival Abdulwahid if he agreed to a coalition. (Note: A UN official reported to Poloff that during UN Envoy Jan Eliasson's meeting with the SLA/Unity leadership in Um Rai on December 7, Sharif and Yehia were visibly at odds. End note.) -------------- Government, Minawi Behind Splintering -------------- ¶6. (SBU) SLA/Unity underscored that their efforts to mobilize the Fur must remain *secret* to avoid Government infiltration. The NCP is active in creating splinter movements and preventing other factions from uniting, they said. One example is JEM/Collective Leadership (JEM/CL) led by Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda. SLA/Unity blamed Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi for orchestrating JEM/CL's split from Ibrahim's movement. They claimed that Minawi receives financial backing from Khartoum and wants to consolidate his position as head of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority KHARTOUM 00001965 002.2 OF 002 (TDRA). (Note: Per Ref. B, Minawi disclosed his outreach efforts to Abu Gharda prior to the Sirte talks, reporting that he had attempted to persuade him to adhere to a cessation of hostilities and participate in negotiations. There is no indication that Minawi receives incentives from the NCP to implement their policy objectives, given the SLM's desperate financial situation and political isolation in Khartoum. End note.) -------------- Limited Trust in Arab Militias -------------- ¶7. (SBU) SLA/Unity's unification discussions center on bonds with other African tribes rather than with Arab militias, which SLA/Unity distrusts in spite of reports that these groups are opposed to the Sudanese Government. SLA/Unity characterized Salah Abu Surra's Revolutionary Democratic Forces Front (RDFF) and the recently formed Sudanese Revolutionary Front affiliated with Mahariya commander Ahmed Humaidan (aka Hamati) as "agents of the Government." (Note: The Zaghawa-Arab rivalry is more charged than the Fur-Arab relationship. Given Zaghawa dominance of SLA/Unity, the movement may be more suspicious of an alliance with anti-Government Arab militias than Fur factions such as Abdulwahid's. End note.) -------------- Frustration with UN/AU -------------- ¶8. (SBU) SLA/Unity is frustrated with the pace of UN peace efforts and treated the UN/AU-led negotiating process as tangential to their principal aim: unification of the movements. "We keep talking to the UN Secretary General, to Eliasson, to Salim, and nothing changes," one cadre stated. Distrust of the AU runs deep, and SLA/Unity claimed that AU Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim is an Arab "working on the agenda of the Government." According to one representative, "our confidence is only in the UN, the U.S. and our God." They were also firm in rejecting negotiations in "any Arab country," including Libya. ¶9. (SBU) The international community should focus on supporting the movement's unification efforts by facilitating consultations among the IDPs and the rebel factions, said SLA/Unity. Without elaborating on the structure of this dialogue, they indicated that external mediation will ease the selection of a new rebel leadership. "If the international community helps SLA/Unity to join Abdulwahid and Khalil, all problems will be solved," said one cadre. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (SBU) SLA/Unity's focus on bringing Ibrahim and Abdulwahid into a peace process is similar to Libya's (Ref. C)--one of the faction's premier backers as of late summer 2007--and Tripoli's hand may be behind some of SLA/Unity's efforts to mobilize in the camps. Given the level of previous Libyan financial support for SLA/Unity, objections to a Libyan venue for talks may be mere rhetoric designed to court IDPs. SLA/Unity appears more agile with a wider reach than many of the more static and entrenched factions (including Abdulwahid's),in spite of their fluctuating political objectives (i.e. self-determination vs. a unified Sudan). In addition to its formidable military concentration in North Darfur, SLA/Unity operatives continue to surface in all areas of rebel activity, from Tripoli to Juba, and are planning outreach campaigns in Jebal Marra and in camps throughout Darfur. While the majority of Darfur's rebel factions view the UN/AU mediation as lumbering and too weak to move the NCP to compromise, SLA/Unity's efforts--in addition to the shifting allegiances of some Arab tribes (to be reported septel)--are having the most dynamic impact on the ground at present. End comment. ¶11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ