JEM DENIES RADICALISM, EXPLAINS UNAMID CONTROVERSY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001964 SIPDIS SENSITIVE, SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: JEM DENIES RADICALISM, EXPLAINS UNAMID CONTROVERSY KHARTOUM 00001964 001.2 OF 002 REFTEL: KHARTOUM 01918 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The NCP has falsely painted Khalil Ibrahim's JEM as an Islamist movement, two of the group's representatives told Poloff in a recent El Fasher meeting. Rather than pursuing a radical agenda, they asserted, JEM seeks to transform the country through "revolution," end the marginalization of the peripheral regions, and maintain Sudanese unity. The JEM leadership supports a peacekeeping force that can protect civilians, but some of the rank-and-file believe UNAMID is deploying to combat terrorism and will arrest them because of international misperceptions of JEM's aims. Casting doubt on the credibility of the UN and AU peace process, JEM representatives underscored that negotiations will not succeed without the inclusion of SLM leader Abdulwahid al Nur and further unification of Darfur's rebels. They also downplayed the significance of the breakaway JEM/Collective Leadership faction. End summary. -------------- Misperceptions of JEM -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Sudanese Government has distorted the international community's views of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),which is not Islamist and does not have ties to radical groups, two of Khalil Ibrahim's operatives in El Fasher told Poloff on December 5. They characterized Ibrahim's recent call for self-determination for Darfur as a tactic to pressure the National Congress Party (NCP) and to re-invigorate international focus on the crisis. In fact, JEM is a movement "for all parts of Sudan," they said, and aimed to end Khartoum's exploitation of the other regions of the country, including the South. ¶3. (SBU) "We don't have the resources, the development, or the infrastructure to be independent," said Abdullah Adam Ali, a JEM security operative from the Tunjur tribe who is charged with IDP mobilization and who admitted that he was imprisoned from 2004-2006 for participation in a JEM-inspired coup plot in Khartoum. "We will get lost if we ask for separation. We would be disconnected from the world." ¶4. (SBU) Ali asserted that Sudan will only be transformed through "revolution," as the NCP will never willingly relinquish power. Even members of Hassan al Turabi's Popular Congress Party (PCP)--long viewed as the inspirational force behind JEM--had moved from the PCP ("a political movement") to JEM ("a military movement") as it became clear that "politics was not leading anywhere," said Ali. -------------- JEM Controversy on UNAMID -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Ali acknowledged that the deployment of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is controversial within the JEM rank-and-file, blaming the controversy on the international community's "false perception" of the movement. "We welcome any force that comes to protect civilians," he said, "but some believe that UNAMID is coming to combat terrorism and will arrest them, even though they are not radicals." He continued that the apathy of African forces and the complicity of Arab nations and China in the conflict through their support for Khartoum required European troops for an effective peacekeeping mission. -------------- JEM/CL Insignificant -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Ali downplayed the political and military significance of the JEM/Collective Leadership (JEM/CL) faction led by Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda. They claimed that Ibrahim had engineered the expulsion of Abu Gharda and the movement's principal military commander, Abdallah Banda, after their ambitions had grown out of proportion and had interfered with JEM's "normal, internal consultative process." ¶7. (SBU) The JEM representatives claimed JEM/CL is composed only of Abu Gharda and Banda's relatives, such as field commander Adam Bakhiet, who lack political sophistication and will never command the prestige of the mainstream JEM. Despite recent assertions by JEM/CL (reftel),the diaspora remains supportive of Ibrahim's leadership, Abdulhamid stated, noting that his brother was the political secretary in JEM's London Bureau. Robust fundraising KHARTOUM 00001964 002.2 OF 002 efforts for JEM in the U.S. also continue. -------------- Lacking Faith in UN, AU -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Both Ali and Abdulhamid had little faith in the UN/AU-led peace process. "The UN and AU should not be on the side of the Government," said Ali, describing the UN as too weak to press the NCP to compromise. In addition, they explained that the AU and Salim Ahmed Salim--who IDPs view as having "Arab origins"--support the agenda of the NCP and are therefore "not qualified to run the negotiations." Libyan leader Moammar Qaddhafi's relationship with President Bashir and his remarks before and during the recent Sirte negotiations also necessitate a change in venue to a "neutral location." -------------- Abdulwahid, Rebel Unity Essential for Peace -------------- ¶9. (SBU) "There can be no peace without Abdulwahid," said Ali, referring to Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader Abdulwahid al Nur. Due to IDPs' support for his proposals on compensation and disarmament of the Arab militias, these issue now shape the agenda, and JEM supports Abdulwahid's policy positions, said Ali. In addition, the UN/AU must give the splintered rebel movements more time to organize themselves and propose a more concrete agenda for talks that includes civilian voices and opposition parties. ¶10. (SBU) Parroting past comments by Ibrahim, Ali said that negotiations can only include two factions--JEM and a re-united SLM--and should then involve a "step-by-step" review of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). "Political leaders" (a euphemism for the PCP) are trying to meet with Abdulwahid to support unification efforts, according to Ali. Abdulhamid proposed that the international community organize a "comprehensive conference" of factions outside Sudan to press the rebel leaders toward unification. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Irrespective of the degree of JEM's Islamist tendencies, the movement has given no indication that it has renounced regime change in Khartoum--though its rhetoric may be more subtle in recent months. While Ali and Abdulhamid provided a more nuanced position on UNAMID than recent comments by Ibrahim, it is important to note that concern about the force's composition and whether the troop contributors are beholden to Khartoum is widespread through the rebel ranks (and IDPs) and not limited to JEM. Despite their characterization of JEM/CL as insignificant, independent sources continue to indicate that a considerable part of Ibrahim's military strength has defected to the breakaway faction and left JEM in a weakened state--for now. End comment. ¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ