PREVIEW OF UNAMID'S 2008-2009 BUDGET FRAMEWORK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001940 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: PREVIEW OF UNAMID'S 2008-2009 BUDGET FRAMEWORK ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: UN HQ's budget team presented its initial framework for UNAMID's 2008-2009 budget to JSR Adada December 5. This strategic document lays out goals and outputs for achieving UNAMID's mandate but does not yet include funding requirements. Although a first step in the budget process, the framework provides valuable insights into UNAMID's priorities and hoped-for achievements. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) A six-person team from UN HQ spent a week in Darfur meeting with UN partners and senior UNAMID and AMIS leaders to help prepare UNAMID's 2008-2009 budget request. On December 5, they presented their framework paper to Joint Special Representative (JSR) Rodophle Adada. The framework lays out a strategic blueprint for the JSR to use in achieving UNAMID's mandate. Adada's team will have a week to review and modify the document and then submit it formally to DPKO for consideration. An ABACQ team is expected to come out to Darfur January 7-14 to put figures to the framework activities (although UNAMID staff is requesting a later visit due to the holidays). ¶3. (SBU) The paper breaks UNAMID's mission into five categories, reflecting UNAMID's UNSCR 1976 (2007) mandate: peace process; security; governance, rule of law and human rights; humanitarian assistance, recovery and reintegration; and support. Various highlights under each category include: - Peace: UNAMID will provide assistance and support to the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA),periodically consult with parties to review DPA implementation and convene monthly Joint Commission meetings. - Security: UNAMID hopes to decrease serious violations of the DPA by 50% (from 203 in 2007/2008 to 100 for 2008/2009 - NOTE: it is not clear where the 2007/2008 figure comes from since the CFC has not been keeping track of such violations for several months),reduce the number of civilians killed by UXO by 50% as well (30 in 2007), and increase the number of refugees/IDPs returning to their homes from 0 in 2007/2008 to 200,000 in 2008/2009). It will do this by increasing the number of patrols (3 patrols a day for each of the 38 team sites - NOTE: AMIS, with 6,000 personnel, is often able to mount only 3-4 patrols a day for the entire Darfur region). It anticipates holding weekly CFC meetings at HQ and twice-monthly CFC meetings at the Sector level. It also plans for 3 convoys a day for mission/military operational and logistics transports convoys and in support of humanitarian convoys. (COMMENT: AMIS now provides logistics re-supply by air. With 38 team sites to supply by ground as well as humanitarian and operational convoys to provide for, this planning number looks woefully low. END COMMENT.) UNAMID anticipates increasing demining activity as well as disarmament/demobilization/reintegration activities where UNAMID's mandate is greater than AMIS's was. It will also emphasize reform of security institutions, like the police. - Rule of Law, Governance and Human Rights: Focusing on capacity/institution building, UNAMID will hold numerous workshops on good governance, assist the Darfur state Land Commissions address land use and land tenure issues, facilitate dialogue between local communities, the TDRA and state governments on the planning and budget process, patrol jointly with police and hold training courses for prison guards. UNAMID also plans 8 human rights monitoring mission per month by regional offices and 6 per month by each of the 38 military posts. - Humanitarian Assistance, Recovery and Reintegration: Currently, UNAMID's mandate calls for it only "to facilitate the effective provision of humanitarian assistance and full access to people in need." The UN HQ team recommends the mandate be changed to give UNAMID the lead in humanitarian coordination efforts. - Support: UNAMID is planning to support 19,555 military, 2,620 police, 5,621 civilian (1,435 international, 3,490 national, and 581 UN Volunteer) staff. It will build and maintain 1 Mission HQ, 3 Sector HQ, 2 logistics bases (El-Obeyd, Nyala),1 Customs clearance facility, 1 radio station and 54 other locations. It will construct 4 level-1, 2 level-2 and 1 level-1 hospitals. It will maintain and renovate 1000 km of roads and 35 bridges as well as 3 airfields and 50 helicopter landing sites. It will operate 4,500 vehicles and 19 fixed wing and 39 rotary wing aircraft. It will need 7 million litres of petrol, oil and lubricants for generators, 12.5 million litres for the vehicles and 33 million litres for the aircraft. ¶4. (SBU) These projections are based on the assumption there will be a comprehensive and all-inclusive peace agreement by July 2008. (NOTE: Accordingly, the framework does not provide for any support for the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST). If there is an agreement, its activities will be folded into UNAMID's Political/Civil Affairs Units. If not, the UN will have to find ways to support it, according to the UN HQ team.) It does not anticipate any significant progress in the disarming or KHARTOUM 00001940 002 OF 002 neutralization of the janjaweed. It assumes the HQ structure will be fully operational by July 2008 with 14 of the 18 infantry battalions deployed (remainder by the end of 2008). ¶5. (SBU) The UN HQ team urged Adada and the UNAMID staff to review the framework to make sure all mandated activities were covered. They stressed that indicators had to be measurable and UNAMID should quantify their activities as much as possible. UNAMID needed to make sure there were no duplications (internally or with the work of other UN agencies in the field). The UN HQ team noted it was important the document disclose who does what and what is expected to be accomplished. ¶6. (SBU) There was general concern by JSR Adada and UNAMID staff about the team's assumption of a peace agreement by July 2008. Since the budget document will be public in March or April, they were worried the public would expect an agreement if a deadline is put in the framework and would then blame UNAMID if there wasn't one. Furthermore, the staff thought the timeframe was unreasonable. With no contingency built into the framework, they assumed continued support for the negotiation process and JMST would have to come out of UNAMID's budget. The HQ team admitted the peace agreement assumption was a political decision. The world community expected some sort of agreement by mid-year. The staff also raised doubts about the deployment schedule, noting any deployment would be affected by a peace agreement. JSR Adada said he would have to build more uncertainty and flexibility into the framework and would discuss with UNSG Special Envoy Jan Eliasson, arriving in El Fasher December 6, how UNAMID should support his efforts. ¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: Although a preliminary document, the framework provides an inside view into UNAMID's mission, how it plans to accomplish its goals and the material resources needed. UNAMID staff raises legitimate concerns about the peace agreement assumption, since any agreement will impact their mission. The document also assumes full UNAMID deployment in 2008, which is optimistic and far from assured, especially if the TCC issue is not resolved and helicopter units are not identified. ¶8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ