Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM1938
2007-12-07 11:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SPLM AND NCP SPIN PEACE TALKS PROGRESS, MANUEVER

Tags:  PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6245
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1938/01 3411130
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071130Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9474
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001938 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/SE NATSIOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU
SUBJECT: SPLM AND NCP SPIN PEACE TALKS PROGRESS, MANUEVER
FOR ADVANTAGE

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1894

B. KHARTOUM 1912

C. KHARTOUM 1916

D. KHARTOUM 1930

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001938

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/SE NATSIOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU
SUBJECT: SPLM AND NCP SPIN PEACE TALKS PROGRESS, MANUEVER
FOR ADVANTAGE

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1894

B. KHARTOUM 1912

C. KHARTOUM 1916

D. KHARTOUM 1930

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. (C) Summary: If all outstanding CPA issues including
Abyei are not resolved by January 9, the SPLM may rejoin the
Government of National Unity, but will not partner with the
NCP in the 2009 elections, according to SPLM Deputy SG for
the Northern Sector Yasir Arman. Meanwhile NCP sources
indicate that they recognize their dependence on the SPLM in
the elections, and claim the six-member committee will
present an implementation report (on all issues except Abyei)
to President Bashir by December 10, in advance of the next
meeting between Bashir and First Vice President Salva Kiir.
Neither party seems to be charging toward the census and the
2009 election. End summary.

SPLM HOLDING OUT ON ABYEI, PRESSURING NCP ON ELECTIONS
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Arman told poloffs December 6 that SPLM
representatives were pleased with their meeting with
Secretary Rice in Addis Ababa on December 5 and look forward

SIPDIS
to the IGAD summit that was proposed by Kenya for January.
Arman said he would travel to Addis that evening to join SPLM
colleagues in meetings with the Ethiopian government to
strengthen the SPLM-Ethiopian bilateral relationship. Given
the success of the Darfur mediation in Juba, Arman said the
SPLM would like to continue to play a positive role as a
mediator within the broader region, including between
Ethiopia and Eristrea, and requested that this message be
passed to Washington.


3. (C) Arman reported that the six-person committee will
convene on the evening of December 6 to discuss the
outstanding issues related to security arrangements,
elections and census, and border demarcation. He noted that
Abyei will no longer be discussed in the six-person committee
as the Presidency (Al-Bashir, Taha and Kiir) has taken up the
issue. He stated that SPLM Presidential advisor Luka Biong

Deng will attend six-member meetings as SPLM Secretary
General Pagan Amum is in Addis. He expected State Minister
for Humanitarian Affairs Ahmed Haroun (an indicted ICC war
crimes suspect) and NCP negotiator Dirdeiry Mohammad Ahmed to
attend for the NCP. He said the six person committee will
submit a report to the presidency by December 11.


4. (C) Arman said that by January 9 there must be a
resolution to all unsolved CPA issues, including Abyei, or
the SPLM will change its strategy for the 2009 elections.
Although the SPLM may return its ministers to the Government
of National Unity, he said the SPLM will not to partner with
the NCP in the 2009 elections if Abyei is not resolved. He
claimed that NCP leaders have admitted to the SPLM that they
cannot win the elections without a NCP-SPLM alliance and that
the NCP even proposed that it would benefit both parties if
the 2009 elections did not take place. The SPLM is actively
seeking alliances with political parties from Darfur, the
North, and the East, according to Arman (the NCP is doing the
same). He said that the Umma party and other traditional
parties are "not our cup of tea" but the SPLM will work with
anyone who supports a democratic coalition for a new Sudan.
Arman was reluctant to describe the SPLM's campaign strategy
as the periphery versus the center, as many marginalized
individuals have now moved to Khartoum.

NCP CLAIMS PROGRESS IN JDB AND SIX-MEMBER TALKS
-------------- --


5. (C) Meanwhile the NCP claims it is making progress on CPA
implementation and that the SPLM is merely seeking strategies
to delay the 2009 election. NCP spokesman for the six-member
committee Dirdeiry Mohamed Ahmed told polchief December 5
that the NCP is ready to implement the entire agenda for the
six-man talks. He said that some items had in fact already
been achieved: all funds for the census had been released,
the SPLM had agreed to the national budget, and the Joint
Defense Board (JDB) had agreed earlier that day to the full
redeployment of troops in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and
oil producing areas in the South (to be replaced by Joint
Integrated Units made up of the SPLA and SAF). He said the
Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission (CJMC) and UNMIS have

KHARTOUM 00001938 002 OF 002


been authorized by the respective parties to monitor troop
redeployments.


6. (C) Dirdeiry said the NCP is ready to make concessions on
other items on the agenda, including the way "consultations"
occur before the appointment or dismissal of constitutional
post holders including Ministers and Presidential advisors.
He said the NCP would be willing to define a mechanism for
the way these consultations are carried out. An agenda item
that is increasingly important to the NCP, he said, is
broadly defined as "partnership between the CPA parties."
This would include initiatives aimed at unity and
democratization as well as "joint mechanisms for addressing
strategic challenges." Dirdeiry said this initiative is
based on the NCP's recognition that it wants a partnership
with the SPLM in the 2009 election.


7. (C) Dirdeiry acknowledged that the parties have not made
any progress on Abyei but said the issue must be left to the
3-man Presidency to decide otherwise there would be no
progress on other areas. He resisted the idea of outside
intervention and expressed confidence that the Presidency
would find a way to resolve the issue. He said the important
thing is to get a temporary administration in place in Abyei
so that local governance can proceed. This should also
conceivably release a share in Abyei's oil revenues for the
Misseriya and Ngok Dinka of the region.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) The NCP and SPLM continue to view the CPA not as a
partnership but as an agreement from which to extract maximum
benefit to each party's gain. The SPLM has not made a clear
decision on when its ministers may rejoin the GNU and is
holding out as long as possible, hoping for concessions from
the NCP on Abyei or intervention from a nervous international
community. However the work of the government goes forward
without SPLM Ministers (at all levels of government, in
Parliament, and the commissions) and the NCP and SPLM
continue to consult, most recently on the national budget
which will be approved by the Parliament within the next
week, on the Joint Defense Board, and in other commissions.
The SPLM eagerly awaits the IGAD summit to put additional
pressure on the NCP over Abyei, and would welcome high level
outside intervention on this issue, while the NCP is opposed
to it. The SPLM is also pressuring the NCP with its Darfur
initiative, hoping to mount a threat of "periphery vs. NCP"
in the 2009 election. However neither party seems to be
pushing hard on the organization of the elections, focusing
for now on strategic gains. Both benefit financially from
the status quo and the SPLM will want to resolve the Abyei
border dispute before the election, since it will affect its
strategy leading toward the 2011 referendum. For this reason
the NCP will presumably avoid fully resolving the issue,
holding this out over the SPLM as a trading card for
partnership in the elections. Even if there is a breakthough
next week and a subsequent honeymoon period, we anticipate
continued tension between the two parties condemned to a
dysfunctional, suspicious relationship as each sides
manuevers for material advantage and seeks to politically
undermine their peace partner.
FERNANDEZ