MINAWI PUSHES FOR DPA IMPLEMENTATION, SUSPICIOUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001904 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: MINAWI PUSHES FOR DPA IMPLEMENTATION, SUSPICIOUS OF GOS INTENTIONS IN CHAD REF: A. KHARTOUM 1846 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1131 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Sole signatory to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) Mini Minawi told CDA Fernandez he plans to work through regional partners and the international community to pressure the Government to implement the agreement. Despite sitting in a regal office on the grounds of the Presidential Palace, Minawi can't get meetings with GOS officials and was first told to coordinate meetings on DPA implementation with Minister of Humanitarian Affairs (and indicted ICC suspect) Ahmed Haroun, then told the portfolio had been moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minawi is suspicious of GOS intentions in Chad and suspects that Khartoum has supported the current fighting just across the border to delay the arrival of MINURCAT. End summary. ¶2. (C) Isolated in his gilded cage on the grounds of the Presidential Palace (massive government-issued black Mercedes parked outside) a frustrated SLM leader Mini Minawi told CDA December 2 about his plans to pursue implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Despite being the Senior Advisor to the President, Minawi said that members of the GOS essentially have refused to meet with him, unless it is to discuss security issues and the integration of forces. Since the death of DPA negotiator Magzoub al-Khalifa, the NCP doesn't even make much of an effort to hide its disinterest in the DPA. Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie reportedly told Minawi that he is "very busy" and Minister of Humanitarian Affairs (and ICC indictee) Ahmed Haroun has been "given the DPA portfolio" though the two have yet to meet. Later, Nafie refused to meet with Minawi but passed the message that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has responsibility for the DPA. In a subsequent meeting with African Union (AU) mediator Sam Ibok, Ibok reportedly told Minawi that the GOS doesn't want to discuss DPA implementation with him either, and told Ibok to work through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What little interest the regime has on the DPA is focused on security arrangements which have as an ultimate goal the defanging of Mini's remaining forces, either by disarmament or incorporation in the regular SAF. ¶3. (C) Minawi said his recent meetings in Qatar to seek financial support for the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) did not bear any fruit, although he was hopeful that the Qataris would be more forthcoming than the Saudis. (Note: Minawi sought to ensure that Arab donor funds be funneled through the TDRA, which he said is nothing more than an empty building at this point.) Minawi said he will insist that the UN/AU negotiating team use the DPA as the basis for the next Darfur agreement, and plans to publicize how little has been implemented in the DPA. He said he had suggested to Ibok that the AU convene a meeting of the DPA signatories to review status of implementation of the agreement. He asked for American help in keeping the AU focused on DPA implementation. CDA Fernandez said a good way to highlight lack of implementation would be to publish a report showing which parts of the agreement had been implemented and which parts are still outstanding - which would be instructive for the next round of talks and shine a light on the NCP's broken promises. ¶4. (C) Since few of the decrees have been passed to implement the DPA (except those appointing SLM members to government jobs),Minawi plans to attend the next round of Darfur talks separately from the government and has prepared a legal document to justify this position (Note: The AU/UN team suggested this approach and Embassy Khartoum has provided Minawi with advice on the document.) CDA Fernandez noted that when the SPLM refused to sit with the GOS delegation at the Sirte talks, the GOS initially threatened to walk out of the talks if the SPLM was not with them, but was obviously bluffing because the talks went forward anyway and it is in the interests of the GOS not to be viewed as blocking the talks. ¶5. (C) At times distracted during the meeting by news highlights of the ongoing battles in Chad between President Deby and Chadian rebel groups based in Darfur, Minawi said he is suspicious of GOS intentions in Chad and believes that the NCP is pushing these attacks to delay the arrival of the KHARTOUM 00001904 002 OF 002 European Union peacekeeping force (MINURCAT). Minawi said the GOS fears having the EU force on its border, just as it does not want European forces in UNAMID. He suggested this is possibly to avoid intervention by forces who could bring Sudanese war criminals to the ICC. He expected that the Chad fighting could lead to an up-tick in fighting inside Darfur in the next few weeks. ¶6. (C) Comment: Minawi's objective is to ensure that the DPA be the basis for the next Darfur peace agreement, and to be a player at the next round of peace talks. Whether he will be able to achieve this depends on where the talks are held and if the AU/UN team is willing to publicly support his position. It is unlikely that a distracted and overwhelmed AU/UN team can do that. Libya would not issue a visa to Minawi (presumably at the request of the GOS) once he said he wanted to be represented separately at the talks in Sirte. We will continue to support Minawi whenever possible, recognizing the pressure that the U.S. placed on him to sign the DPA in the first place but it is clear that, having gained whatever benefit there was from his participation, the NCP is focused on other matters now. End comment. FERNANDEZ