DARFUR: TENSION, MISTRUST CONTINUE TO AFFLICT AMIS-SLM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001892 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: DARFUR: TENSION, MISTRUST CONTINUE TO AFFLICT AMIS-SLM RELATIONSHIP -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander Agwai's proposal to restructure payment of the MSA and the rebel movements' representation in the Cease-fire Commission (CFC) has set off a wave of mutual recriminations between AMIS and the SLM. The incident is just the latest in an unfortunate history of tension and mistrust between both groups that, if left unchecked, will undermine the Darfur peacekeeping operation and political process. Dialogue between AMIS and the SLM and more specificity on the post-January 1 CFC and the peace process can slow the deterioration in the relationship. End summary. -------------- AGWAI BRIEFING EXPOSES RAW NERVE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Racing against the clock, AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai is attempting to put the controversial issue of the monthly subsistence allowance (MSA) for CFC observers behind him so that the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) can deploy with a clear slate. At a November 27 meeting of the CFC, Agwai presented his proposal for payment of the arrears of the MSA, a phased reduction of the allowance until January 1, and a trimming of the number of CFC observers at the headquarters and sector level (septel). His briefing set off a firestorm among the political leaders and the CFC representatives of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)/Minawi, who interpreted the proposal as an attempt to abrogate the DPA. ¶3. (SBU) Later that evening, two panicked members of the SLM's political leadership in Khartoum, including SLM Chairman and Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi, called Poloff to report that Agwai had asked the movement to withdraw its members from the CFC, at both the headquarters and sector levels. Noting that Agwai did not have the power to change the structures of the DPA, Minawi requested direct U.S. intercession to remedy the situation. Poloff advised that he would be traveling to El Fasher the following day and would examine the issue. -------------- Agwai's Version -------------- ¶4. (SBU) At a meeting of the international observers to the CFC on November 28, Agwai denied that he had earlier asked for the SLM to withdraw from the commission. He said he had requested that the movements reduce the number of CFC representatives in El Fasher to one "liaison officer" and return their AMIS IDs and equipment. He tentatively accepted the suggestion from Poloffs that, per the DPA, the movements also be allotted one representative at the sector level. ¶5. (SBU) Noting the inefficiency in reporting streams within the SLM, Poloff recommended that Agwai and Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada speak directly to the SLM leadership, including Minawi, to explain the proposal (CDA Fernandez is also meeting with Minawi on December 2 to emphasize this point). After alluding to SLM banditry and threats against his forces, Agwai curtly replied that he had learned from previous disagreements with the SLM that everything should be in writing as "you couldn't trust what the observers said to Khartoum." -------------- SLM's Version -------------- ¶6. (SBU) At a later meeting on November 28, SLM CFC observers Adam Ali Ware and Ahmed Ghardia told Poloffs that their impression from Agwai's briefing was that he wanted to suspend the CFC until the UN/African Union-led political process resulted in new security arrangements. Ware emphasized that the SLM should be treated in accordance with its legitimate status as a signatory to the DPA and not left in limbo pending the outcome of negotiations with the non-signatories. The SLM had the impression "it was being punished by the headmaster," according to Ware, when it was only trying to adhere to the agreement by continuing its participation in the DPA. Ghardia accepted Agwai's formula for payment of arrears and a reduction in the MSA rate but objected to Agwai "setting the CFC aside, which made it seem like he's ending the peace and giving up on the Abuja agreement." ¶7. (SBU) Ware stated that Agwai had responded angrily to his request for a written explanation of the Force Commander's proposal. "The KHARTOUM 00001892 002 OF 002 proposal of the Force Commander is beyond our authority to decide," said Ware, adding that he wanted to forward such a document to Minawi and the SLM leadership so they can determine the movement's position. He compared Agwai to his predecessor, AMIS Force Commander Luke Aprezi, who the SLM believed colluded with the Government to undermine the movement. Recognizing, however, the importance of cooperation with AMIS, Ware said that the SLM shares Agwai's concerns about the inefficacy of the CFC and is open to dialogue. (Note: When the SLM observers to the CFC went on strike in May, one demand was greater transparency from the AMIS secretariat, including documentation of all proceedings and the SIPDIS decisions of the Force Commander. End note.) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The MSA issue is the symptom of an underlying illness that has afflicted AMIS and the SLM through every Force Commander's tenure: an emotionally charged relationship where AMIS blames the SLM for attacks on its forces and an excessive pre-occupation with money and the SLM resents AMIS for making arbitrary decisions and failing to accord it status as the only DPA signatory. The erosion of trust is exacerbated by two factors. One, in the absence of sound political advice, the Force Commander is ineffective at articulating his plans to a beleaguered movement that feels it is under siege on all sides. Two, the lack of clarity on post-January 1, 2008 UN/AU plans for the political and security tracks makes it difficult for AMIS/UNAMID and the SLM to establish a framework for a more professional relationship. It is unclear whether UNAMID will continue any financial support for the CFC observers--which is stipulated in the Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire and, by implication, in the DPA. In addition, the UN/AU is silent on the endgame for the peace process (i.e. a new agreement? a protocol?) Dysfunctional as the current security arrangements may be, Agwai's mandate, whether with AMIS or with UNAMID, is to implement the existing peace agreements, and the DPA is the only one on the table. ¶9. (SBU) Comment continued: In order for the Darfur peacekeeping and political tracks to move forward, AMIS/UNAMID and the SLM must find a mechanism for at least cautious coordination. During a November 29 meeting in El Fasher, the new UNAMID Director of Political Affairs had no information on the structure of UNAMID's political department or whether it would support Agwai. On November 30, Poloffs stressed to incoming UNAMID Chief of Staff Brig. Gen. Paul Davidson the need for a political advisor to the Force Commander as soon as possible. We will continue to work with AMIS/UNAMID and the SLM to facilitate transparent dialogue and to press the UN/AU to articulate their post-January 1 plans for the CFC and the peace process. End comment. FERNANDEZ