JEM/CL CLAIMS ZAGHAWA UNIFYING, WARNS UN/AU LOSING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001889 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: JEM/CL CLAIMS ZAGHAWA UNIFYING, WARNS UN/AU LOSING CREDIBILITY KHARTOUM 00001889 001.2 OF 002 -------------- ZAGHAWA GROUPS APPROACH UNITY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Meeting with Poloff on November 29, cadres of the Justice and Equality Movement/Collective Leadership (JEM/CL) were optimistic that it will finalize its consolidation with the other major Zaghawa military elements in Darfur after upcoming field consultations and will be ready to resume negotiations within two weeks. Following the conclusion of the rebel unification talks in Juba, JEM/CL representatives will travel to Darfur in the coming days to brief the commanders on the results of the meetings sponsored by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and on the Sirte process. The consultations will focus on solidifying the momentum generated by the establishment of the United Revolutionary Front (URF),which formed in Juba and consists of JEM/CL, the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD),and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) affiliated with Adam Bakheit. They urged the UN/AU to capitalize on the momentum in the process, saying that the problems of Darfur "were bigger than the upcoming holidays" and should take precedence. ¶2. (SBU) JEM/CL is coordinating politically and militarily with SLA/Unity, which, the representatives claim, is posed to join the URF and is committed to participating in resumed peace negotiations in Sirte. They emphasized, however, that SLA/Unity is "not one movement" and confirmed independent reports that Suleiman Jamous, Sharif Harir, and Abdullah Yehia each control different power centers within the faction. Pressed by Poloff on which SLA/Unity leader will soon join the URF, they hesitantly admitted that Jamous had just allied with them. (Note: JEM/CL's reticence to disclose this information is likely indicative of the tentative nature--and sensitivity--of this alliance. End note.) -------------- UN/AU Consultations Essential -------------- ¶3. (SBU) JEM/CL cautioned that all-inclusive invitations to the next round of talks will legitimize movements with no military or political influence and will result in further splintering. "The UN/AU should revise the strategy for invitations," one of the JEM/CL representatives explained. "It could lead to one-man movements." They suggested that priority be given to factions that maintain formidable military forces. Acknowledging the risk that excluding some groups could also be detrimental to the process, JEM/CL said that the UN/AU can only "do the invitations right" if they launch consistent, direct discussions with the field commanders and political leaders in Darfur. -------------- CFC Demands -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Sudanese Government violates its unilateral declaration of a cessation of hostilities on a daily basis, according to the JEM/CL representatives, and they called on the UN/AU to establish a more effective cease-fire monitoring mechanism, characterizing the current arrangement as "useless." Nonetheless, JEM/CL demanded that, as a signatory to the N'djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire, it be allowed to participate in the Cease-fire Commission (CFC) and claimed that AU Chief Mediator Sam Ibok had promised them seats. (Note: Having denied JEM/CL representation on the CFC, Agwai told international observers on November 28 that participation by JEM/CL would open the door for other splinter movements to request the same status. End note.) -------------- Deferring to Sudan, UN/AU Risks Credibility -------------- ¶5. (SBU) JEM/CL criticized the UN and AU for their deference to the Sudanese Government, on both the political and peacekeeping tracks. "We understand that we can't get all we want," said one cadre, "but the UN/AU cannot just accommodate the Government--they must also compromise." Mentioning China and Pakistan, they said the Government is only accepting troop contributions for the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) from allies that were complicit in the "genocide." While they acknowledged that the Chinese and Pakistani troops will come under international authority, they questioned both countries' motives and said that their troop contributions needed to be balanced by Western forces--or UNAMID risked a backlash from the volatile IDP population. The "people" had respected the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) from 2004 to 2005, but it had later lost all of its credibility due to its own inefficacy. They warned that a similar fate could befall UNAMID and asked for the U.S. to intervene KHARTOUM 00001889 002.2 OF 002 politically to ensure a balanced force. ¶6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ