SHINING AN AMERICAN LIGHT ON ABYEI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001813 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE NATSIOS, D (GDELGADO),NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON, ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS TO USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2017 TAGS: KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SOCI UN AU SU SUBJECT: SHINING AN AMERICAN LIGHT ON ABYEI REF: A. KHARTOUM 1812 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1803 ¶C. KHARTOUM 1709 ¶D. KHARTOUM 1463 ¶E. KHARTOUM 1307 ¶F. KHARTOUM 1189 ¶G. KHARTOUM 1157 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: With the ongoing political crisis between the National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in its second month, the conflict over the oil-rich Abyei region takes center stage once again as the key irreconcilable difference between the two parties, the one Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) protocol which has seen zero progress since the CPA was signed in January ¶2005. With both sides retreating into maximalist rhetoric and inflexible positions, the Gordian knot of Abyei could derail the whole accord and even conceivably lead to armed conflict, without pro-active international, and especially American, attention to the problem. End summary. A LONG FESTERING PROBLEM -------------- ¶2. (C) The Abyei dimension to North-South Sudanese tensions is nothing new. Home of many of the SPLM's political elite, the region was cursed with the discovery of large oil deposits in 1979. The 2005 CPA was almost deraileQuntil then U.S. Special Envoy Danforth came up with the December 2004 Abyei Protocol which set up an Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) to arrive at a compromise. In July 2Q5, Sudanese President Al-Bashir and the Misseriya Arab tribe, who are part of the controversy, rejected the ABC Experts Report as having exceeded its mandate. The international community, busy with Darfur and the death of SPLM leader John Garang did nothing. ¶3. (C) In September 2006, ABC Chairman Donald Petterson cautioned about ignoring Abyei and suggested "the United States should take the lead in forming a coalition of states...to work together to craft a joint diplomatic approach to the Sudanese government on the vexing and volatile Abyei standoff." Inaction on Abyei and other CPA issues finally led to an SPLM walkout from the Government of National Unity (reftel c) in October 2007. Despite some earlier flexibility, the SPLM's current position is that only the recommendations of the ABC Commission are acceptable, while the NCP, in President Al-Bashir's pithy comment, tells the world that "they can take the ABC Report and choke on it," and will never accept it. ¶4. (C) While the USG (and Embassy Khartoum, see reftels) has been well aware of the Abyei debacle for years, no comprehensive approach has been undertaken since the ABC compromise in 2004. Sudan is a land of many crises and attention has been focused on those crises that have been exploding, like Darfur, rather than the ticking time bomb which has yet to go off. While the issue is complex and both sides have continuously maneuvered, we believe that the main cause of the conflict over Abyei is, not surprisingly, NCP intransigence and bad faith. An acceptable compromise solution will have to resolve the basic concerns about oil wealth and land rights, and not just borders and local administration (reftel a). This cable proposes a series of measures to try to shine a bright light on Abyei, but also makes clear that the one real way to solve the issue is high-level consistent engagement by the USG and a concomitant bold use of American diplomatic capital. This is the one part of the CPA which had sole American "ownership" and to which both sides (the NCP reluctantly) acknowledge American leadership. POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶5. (C) A Presidential statement on Abyei (December 2007): We suggest that a stand alone statement on the Abyei issue be issued from the White House as a necessary first step highlighting American concern and engagement on the issue. Such a statement would briefly state the reasons for our interest and commitment to seeing the issue solved as soon as possible. ¶6. (C) Either included in the statement, or after a brief interval, the United States, as the party which obtained the Abyei compromise in 2004, would call for a US-based meeting KHARTOUM 00001813 002 OF 002 or conference (January 2008) with senior SPLM and NCP delegations, the ABC experts, scholars, and former officials like Senator Danforth. It is quite likely that the NCP would resist such a measure but it would be difficult for them to boycott given the historical record and also the NCP's thirst for an improved relationship with the United States. One goal of the conference would be address the key rejection by the NCP that the ABC experts exceeded their mandate by ignoring the issue of the 1905 borders of the Ngok Dinka. ¶7. (C) As outlined recently (reftel b),other international fora supporting CPA implementation generally, such as an IGAD Summit, IGAD Partners Forum (probably to be held in Rome), and higher level Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) meeting (to be held in Amsterdam, since the Netherlands chairs the AEC's "Three Areas" working group) should be scheduled for spring 2008. This could be coupled with the formation of an Abyei Contact Group to further highlight the issue, keep the pressure on (this is obviously just a repackaging of various CPA-related sessions already occurring internationally) and suggest compromise language, especially on the oil issue. ¶8. (C) As a final enticement, the U.S. could propose, at a later date in 2008 (but no later than summer 2008),a "package deal" of incentives towards a partial improvement of relations with Sudan, tied to tangible and definitive progress on a core number of issues of major concern to us, such as full, early and unambiguous UNAMID deployment and a definitive solution on Abyei. ¶9. (C) While Abyei by itself could perhaps limp along unresolved for years, as has been the case since 2004, it will block full resolution of the rest of the CPA and its vision of a transformed Sudan. Its unresolved status keeps open all the other unfulfilled promises of the CPA, while thousands of heavily-armed SPLA and SAF troops face off in border areas and the oil fields of the South month after month. The NCP states, probably disingenuously, that it is willing to move forward with the rest of the CPA leaving Abyei aside. The SPLM, rightly fearing NCP duplicity, is unwilling to move forward on the possibility of other CPA provisions (such as the all-important SAF troop deployments from the Southern border areas) without Abyei being solved. The NCP proposes to solve "everything but Abyei," the SPLM counters that it is either "a resolution on Abyei or nothing." Only American leadership can break this dangerous stalemate. FERNANDEZ