GULF BETWEEN AFRICAN AND ARAB TRIBES IN DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001807

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: GULF BETWEEN AFRICAN AND ARAB TRIBES IN DARFUR
WIDENING

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) During his November 13-14 visit to El Fasher, Darfur,
both African and Arab tribal representatives told CDA
Fernandez that they have historical grievances that are not
being addresses adequately by the UN/AU peace process. Both
groups feel marginalized by the process and believe that
neither the insurgents nor the Government represent their
views. Both view themselves as victims having inferior
access to services and expressed frustration with the
government. More ominously, despite their common grievances,
both groups expressed a sense of desperation and a
recognition of the widening gulf between them, which will
complicate any efforts at reconciliation. End summary.

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Arab Tribes: "Driven into the hands of the Janjaweed"
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2. (C) CDA met November 13 with the leaders of the four major
Abbala Arab tribes in Darfur: Mahamit, Mahariyya, Ireiqat,
and Etafat. These are the tribes from where the majority of
the notorious janjaweed militia have been drawn. They
welcomed the hours that CDA spent with them noting that
"Americans, and the international community in general, were
rather late in wanting to listen to them." The Arab tribal
leaders said they had been in and out of Darfur for the last
600 years as camel herders. They claimed that sixty percent
of the population in greater Darfur is either Abbala (camel
herding) or Baggara (cattle herding) Arab tribes (Note: The
Fur also make a similar claim of accounting for sixty percent
of the population of Darfur. No one knows for sure).


3. (C) The Arab representatives described a history or
marginalization in Darfur, without land rights and without
access to services such as education and health care, in part
due to their nomadic lifestyle. They expressed frustration
that a majority of their population continues without access
to these services, even though many have settled with family
members in El Fasher and other larger towns due to ongoing
violence and insecurity outside of the towns and destruction
of infrastructure in their traditional lands.


4. (C) The Arab tribal leaders freely acknowledged that many
of their men had been recruited by the militias and
government-sponsored security services. However they said
that after the insurgency started, they had little choice but
to arm themselves and had been driven into the hands of the
government security services to protect themselves from
attacks by the insurgents, especially the Zaghawa who often
raided and stole their camels. They said many of their men
had been recruited into the government sponsored camel police
and border intelligence units. Moreover, once their seasonal
infrastructure such as wells had been destroyed by the
insurgents, and their camels had been stolen, there was
nothing to go back to and they had been forced to settle in
the towns.


5. (C) The Arab leaders complained of a lack of
representation at the peace talks in Arusha and at Sirte.
Since the talks were primarily between the insurgents and the
government, the Arab tribes did not have a voice. The Arab
leaders complained that neither the international community
nor the Government is consulting with them at all in advance
of the peace talks. They also complained that international
NGOs and the UN are discriminating against them when hiring
for jobs, partly due to the lack of education among their
people, misplaced solidarity with African IDPs, and showing a
preference for leasing property from Fur rather than Arab
landlords and landowners. They also expressed deep concern
that they continue to be targeted by insurgent groups even
now that they have been forced to resettle in towns, and that
their men see no alternative to recruitment into
government-sponsored security services. They complained that
the international community listens too much to IDPs, many of
whom are not actually displaced. One noted driving through
the Jebel Si (majority Fur) area and said that there was no
reason these people could not return home.


6. (C) CDA replied that the depredations caused only last
month by a pro-government Arab militia (the Maaliya in South
Darfur) in Al-Muhajeria showed that IDPs have good reasons to
seek security before returning. He noted that the U.S. is not
opposed to the Arab tribes of Darfur and sees them as part of
the future of the region but peace will not come to Darfur

KHARTOUM 00001807 002 OF 002


until IDPs return home in safety and dignity to the property
from which they were driven. Neither UNAMID nor the
international community were anti-Arab but the tribes should
be careful that they are not made scapegoats for actions
ordered by the government in Khartoum. He welcomed continued
dialogue and look forward to visiting them in their
encampments. The tribal leaders asked for a more balanced
U.S. position and for U.S. development assistance for roads,
schools, hospitals and water. CDA noted that development can
only come when there is peace in Darfur and refugees and
displaced persons return.

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Fur: Marginalized in the IDP Camps
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7. (C) CDA met November 14 with the Fur senior Sheikh from
the Abu Shouk IDP camp, Abu Bashir Ali Ahmed, and the native
administration king of the Fur in El Fasher, Rahamtalla
Mahmoud. Both were grateful for the support of the United
States in helping their people and contrasted it with the
indifference of their fellow Muslims from Arab countries. The
concerns of the Fur leaders were surprisingly similar to
those expressed by the Arab leaders. They complained that
their people do not have adequate access to education and
other services in the IDP camps, and that the UN/AU peace
process does not take their views into account. They both
said that SLA leader Abdelwahid Nur represents their views,
since the Government does not respect peace agreements,
including the now unraveling CPA, and therefore the Fur must
receive guarantees before attending talks. They complained
that neither the government nor the international community
listens to them, and lamented that the only way to be heard
is to join the rebel movements in order to gain seats at the
negotiating table. They said they will never trust the
government because the government has killed so many of their
people. They expressed great hope for the UNAMID mission,
because the AMIS mission has not been able to protect them,
even in the camps. The Fur Shiekh from the IDP camp said
that the IDPs receive information from satellite TV in the
camps, rather than relying on radio. US-owned Al-Hurra is
popular followed by the less trustworthy Al-Jazeera but no
Sudanese media outlet is taken seriously.

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Comment
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8. (C) Our discussions with the Arab and Fur groups show deep
divisions based on historical grievances, but also revealed
new grievances based on their own views of the current
landscape in Darfur. Both groups see themselves as victims,
increasingly marginalized and discriminated against, unheard
by the international community and their own government. The
Arabs see themselves as marginalized emigrants on the margins
of larger towns in Darfur, discriminated against by the
social structures in these towns, isolated from their land,
and without a voice in the peace process. Ominously, they
see themselves as having no option but to arm themselves and
join the government-sponsored camel police and border units.
Meanwhile the Fur see themselves as isolated in camps,
removed not only from major towns but also from their own
lands. They are frustrated by the international community's
focus on armed insurgents at the peace talks, without any
representation from IDPs, and see that their only recourse
may be to take up arms. Their virtual blind support for SLM
leader Abdelwahid al Nur is linked to his repeated calls for
the two issues that are most meaningful to them: disarmament
of the Arab security services and compensation for the
displaced Fur tribes. While they share a common heritage and
many similar complaints, the widening gap between Arabs and
Fur in Darfur will make reconciliation attempts difficult as
both see Darfur's reality as a zero-sum game.
FERNANDEZ