UNAMID PLANNERS RECOMMEND DELAYING DEPLOYMENT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001804 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: UNAMID PLANNERS RECOMMEND DELAYING DEPLOYMENT ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In separate conversations with FieldOff on November 15 and November 18 in El Fasher, two UN senior military transition planners shared the joint recommendation they had made to UNAMID Force Commander GEN Agwai that deployment of UNAMID police elements be put on hold until the infrastructure necessary to sustain them could be put in place. This recommendation will specifically impact the Bangladeshi formed police unit (FPU),which is scheduled to arrive in Nyala on November 20. The planners blamed the UN's Department of Mission Support, specifically Assistant-Secretary-General (A/SYG) Jane Holl Lute, for UNAMID's current logistical standstill. They reported that visiting Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) A/SYG Mulet had confirmed neither the Norwegian nor Swedish engineering units would deploy following President Bashir's recent remarks to the press. The only engineering unit currently slated to arrive is from China, and the main body of this company is inexplicably delayed until mid-December, consequently delaying deployment of major UNAMID elements until January 2008 at the earliest. The planners requested U.S. assistance in forcing some answers from the Department of Mission Support; now might be the time to ratchet up the pressure on China as well. END SUMMARY. EL FASHER ULTIMATUM FOR NEW YORK -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In separate conversations with FieldOff on November 15 and November 18 in El Fasher, two UN senior military transition planners shared the joint recommendation they had made to UNAMID Force Commander GEN Agwai that deployment of UNAMID police elements be put on hold until the infrastructure necessary to sustain them could be put in place. The two planners - one the Chief of the Transition Planning Unit, the other the Acting Chief of Integrated Support Services - admitted that this recommendation, formally transmitted to Agwai in New York on November 17, would not win them any allies in the UN's Department of Mission Support, which the Acting CISS head blamed for UNAMID's current logistical standstill. ¶3. (SBU) The recommendation stipulates that the Force Commander and Police Commissioner warn UN Headquarters that deployment of UNAMID units must be paused until two main criteria are satisfied: first, that mission support contracts (specifically aviation, operating and maintenance [O&M], catering and ground fuel) are signed; and second, that contractors will have resources, equipment and trained staff in place on time. The recommendation further stipulates that staff commence contingency planning to withdraw the force into staging areas to ensure adequate support in the event that the criteria outlined above are not satisfied. The planners recommended a November 30 deadline for the UN to decide on the critical aviation contract, since the Canadian Government will give the AMIS aviation support contractor (Skylink PA&E Aviation Inc.) one month's notice to close down its Darfur operations. MISSION SUPPORT OUT OF STEP WITH TROOP DEPLOYMENT -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Acting Head of CISS was emphatic that the contrary posturing exhibited by the Department of Mission Support, specifically A/SYG Jane Holl Lute, was causing UNAMID deployment to falter. He highlighted Holl Lute's refusal to seek a Letter of Assist (LOA) with the Government of Canada to extend Skylink's contract for the sake of UNAMID, effectively ruling out the possibility of the UN's putting in place an aviation capability by Transfer of Authority (TOA) at the end of the year. The Canadian Government has reportedly agreed to extend and fund Skylink's contract until March 31 with an option to extend to June 30, but, according to the CISS rep, this arrangement must be formalized as quickly as possible to give UNAMID the initial capability to sustain current forces on the ground. (Note: Our UN contacts in El Fasher reported rumors that Skylink is on a UN blacklist for involvement with the Fujimori regime in Peru, though this is not confirmed.) ¶5. (SBU) Similarly, the CISS rep reported that Holl Lute had refused to seek an LOA with the USG to extend the O&M and catering and ground fuel contracts currently in place to service AMIS troops. Lack of clarity on the O&M contract is particularly deleterious, as this contract provides support for the incoming police and military Heavy Support Package (HSP) units which are now deploying to transit staging areas in Nyala, Zam Zam and El Geneina, and its effects can be seen in the predicament of the initial cadre of unsupported Chinese engineers currently in Nyala. Given these engineers' reliance on makeshift arrangements with PA&E to sustain them, arrival of the Chinese engineers company's main body has been delayed until mid-December. ¶6. (SBU) Since these engineers are to prepare the ground for the Bangladeshi FPU (set to deploy November 20) to prepare its own camp, the planners note that the FPU deployment may now have to be delayed until the Chinese arrive and complete their construction. The CISS rep warned that if the FPU deploys on time, it will occupy the KHARTOUM 00001804 002 OF 002 transit accommodation set aside for the Chinese main body, thus creating another dilemma once that company ultimately gets on the ground. "The whole sequence of deployment has been interrupted by the Chinese delay," he lamented. The UNAMID Planning Chief added that Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions are pushing to deploy but would likely suffer the same fate as the Bangladeshi FPU, since the camps into which they are supposed to move are as of yet non-existent. ¶7. (SBU) The planners add that the UN also has no contracts in place to provide catering and ground fuel services for incoming HSP units prior to and after TOA. The planners accordingly recommend an LOA to the USG extending current arrangements under PA&E and it sub-contractor for catering, AMZAR, until at least June 30, with an option to extend by two three-month blocks. ¶8. (SBU) Both planners report that in their meetings with visiting DPKO A/SYG Mulet, Mulet had a good grasp of both big and small picture issues associated with the HSP and Early Effects deployment, but that he was in listening, rather than acting, mode only, as this was his first visit to Sudan. The UNAMID Planning Chief noted that Mulet seemed "squeezed" by pressure from troop-contributing countries (TCCs) on one side to get their assets on the ground and by El Fasher UN personnel on the other, who were advocating a more go-slow approach, given the logistical constraints of honoring the TCCs' wishes. Mulet had highlighted the difficulties encountered in dealing with the Government of Sudan in the wake of President Bashir's November 17 press remarks in which he accused the UN of trying to infiltrate UNAMID's ranks with CIA and Mossad officers in the guise of Norwegian and Swedish engineers. Mulet told both planners that the Nordic units would not/not deploy. The Planning Chief considered this loss a blow to the mission, as he saw the Nordic company as stronger than the others earmarked for the same job. ¶9. (SBU) COMMENT: UNAMID planners verged on cynical as they discussed the circumstances surrounding UNAMID's deployment standstill, speculating on every possible cause, from A/SYG Holl Lute's hidden political agenda behind refusing outside assistance on UN contracting (one planner sniffed that it would be the Secretary-General who would "take the embarrassment" on this),to SIPDIS China's collusion with the GoS that led to its sudden inexplicable postponement of engineer deployment. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that UNAMID deployment is being put on hold, and more egregiously, by the very organization mandated to effect it. It would seem a good time, less than six weeks away from TOA, to clear up any misunderstandings with the Department of Mission Support on the LOA issue, as well as to ratchet up the pressure on China, which, given its public attempts to do the right thing on Darfur, would not want to be seen as the reason things are now falling apart. END COMMENT. ¶10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ