AS SLM FRAYS, MINAWI STANDS BY POSITION ON UN/AU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001798

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AND L
FOR SANFORD
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU SU
SUBJECT: AS SLM FRAYS, MINAWI STANDS BY POSITION ON UN/AU
TALKS, CALLS SPLM UNREALIABLE

REF: KHARTOUM 1785

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Despite NCP demands to the contrary, SLM leader Minni
Minawi insists that his movement will only participate in the
UN/AU-led Darfur peace process as a signatory to the DPA and
not as a member of the Government delegation. Secretary
General Mustafa Tirab defied the SLM's official position by
traveling to Libya with the Government, Minawi said, further
fraying the already weakened the movement. Minawi hopes to
effect a "smooth transition" to remove Tirab from his post by
mid-December. He underscored that the SLM wants to play a
positive role in the peace process and cited his recent
efforts to encourage one JEM faction to participate in the
Sirte talks. Reticent to take a strong position on the
political confrontation between the NCP and the SPLM, Minawi
characterized the SPLM as an unreliable partner that has done
little to support the SLM or to engage in a solution to the
Darfur crisis. Post will follow-up on UN Chief Mediator Taye
Brook Zerihoun's suggestion to assist the SLM in drafting a
legally sound statement outlining its position regarding its
status in the UN/AU peace process. End summary.

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SLM Position on Peace Talks Remains Firm
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2. (C) Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan Liberation
Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi continues to insist that
the SLM be represented in the Darfur peace process as a
signatory to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and not as a
member of the Government of National Unity's (GNU)
delegation, as the National Congress Party (NCP) demands.
Meeting with Poloff on November 17, Minawi said that senior
NCP officials, including Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali
Nafie and Director General of the National Intelligence and
Security Service (NISS) Salah Ghosh, have rebuffed his
requests for consultations to resolve the impasse. He
claimed that by blocking the SLM's participation in the peace
process and fomenting internal fissures in the movement, the
NCP is trying to push Minawi to withdraw from the GNU so that
it can conclude a new agreement with the DPA non-signatories.


3. (C) The SLM remains committed to playing a constructive
role in the peace process, asserted Minawi. In the weeks
leading up to Sirte talks, he visited Justice and Equality
Movement/Collective Leadership's (JEM/CL) Bahar Idriss Abu
Gharda and Abdullah Banda in North Darfur to urge their
adherence to a ceasefire and to press them to participate in
negotiations. While claiming some credit for their eventual
decision to attend the Sirte talks, Minawi said that he was
disappointed by reports that JEM/CL was involved in the
October attack on the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) group site
near Haskanita. SLM sources in the field have observed
JEM/CL fighters with AMIS trucks and uniforms, though Abu
Gharda denied these reports when Minawi confronted him (other
sources have fingered SLM/Unity for the Haskanita attack).

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Yet Internal SLM Fissures Laid Bare
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4. (C) The dispute over the SLM's representation during the
recent Sirte peace talks has further frayed the already
weakened movement. Despite the SLM's official stance,
Secretary General Mustafa Tirab arrived in Sirte with the NCP

SIPDIS
delegation. According to Minawi, Tirab's insubordination is
the culmination of a pattern of disloyalty as he has edged
closer to the NCP. (Note: During the August meeting of the
Revolutionary Leadership Council, the SLM's premier governing
body, Tirab attempted to engineer Minawi's dismissal as SLM
chairman. End note.) While Minawi acknowledged that senior
SLM officials, including those based in Darfur, have called
for Tirab's immediate removal, Minawi said that he wanted a
"smooth transition" to a new secretary general to minimize
Tirab's ability to split the movement. The next
Revolutionary Leadership Council in December will provide an
opportunity to replace Tirab, said Minawi.


5. (C) The SLM leadership is under increasing pressure to
deliver a tangible benefit to its supporters, explained
Minawi, making many SLM members susceptible to NCP

KHARTOUM 00001798 002 OF 002


manipulation and to the rallying call of the DPA
non-signatory rebel factions. The field commanders in
particular are growing impatient with the glacial pace of DPA
implementation and, in the absence of any mechanism for
sustaining themselves, are demanding jobs or livelihood
assistance. The recent defection of 20 SLM commanders in
South Darfur to SLM/Unity exemplifies this trend, according
to Minawi. Questioning the international community's
strategy for bringing Darfur's rebel movements into a peace
process, Minawi asked "if one faction (the SLM) can't
stabilize, how can the others?"

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Doubts on SPLM Commitment to Darfur, SLM
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6. (C) Though desiring greater cooperation with the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM),Minawi is reticent to
take a firm position in the SPLM's ongoing political
confrontation with the NCP. The SPLM has been an unreliable
partner within the GNU, he said, rarely supporting SLM
efforts to empower itself in Khartoum. Minawi recalled that
the SPLM had remained silent--in public and during meetings
of the Presidency and the Council of Ministers--when
Government security services attacked SLM facilities in
Khartoum in March, killing ten SLM members. First Vice
President Salva Kiir has yet to accept Minawi's numerous
invitations to visit Darfur (something we have also
encouraged Kiir to do).


7. (C) Minawi said that the absence of encouragement from the
SPLM and its half-hearted engagement on Darfur--despite its
aspirations as a national political force--have left him
cynical about its motives. "Even if the SPLM came to us now,
I don't think we could trust them because they would drop us
if it helped them," he said. Despite these frustrations,
Minawi has told the NCP that it must either work with the
SPLM or accept the division of the country. In a recent
meeting with Nafie, Minawi suggested that the NCP endorse
Kiir as its presidential candidate for the 2008 elections or
"just give up" on the timetable leading toward the 2011
referendum because Southern secession would be a foregone
conclusion. (Note: In a November 18 meeting with PolCouns
and Poloff, SPLM Secretary General for the Northern Sector
Yassir Arman said that the SPLM had recently appointed a
commission to coordinate with the SLM. End note.)

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Comment
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8. (C) Given that the NCP has refused to negotiate with the
SLM on its participation in the UN/AU peace process, Post
supports the suggestion of UN Chief Mediator and deputy head
of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) Taye Brooke Zerihoun,
reported reftel, to provide discrete assistance to Minawi in
preparing a legally sound public statement of the SLM
position emphasizing: 1) Its commitment to the UN/AU peace
process and 2) Its right to be represented independently from
the GOS as a signatory to the DPA (since the DPA has not been
implemented/ratified). Post will discuss this approach with
the SLM's legal counsel and forward a draft statement to
Washington for consideration. While the NCP claims it will
withdraw from the peace process if the SLM is represented
outside the Government delegation, we view this threat as a
likely bluff. The NCP made the same threat during the Sirte
talks when the SPLM observers refused to sit with the
Government delegation but later relented. End comment.
FERNANDEZ