NCP SEES SPLM AS INCREASINGLY HARDLINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001761 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: NCP SEES SPLM AS INCREASINGLY HARDLINE REF: A. KHARTOUM 1758 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1709 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: NCP officials participating in negotiations with the SPLM on a way out of the current political crisis complained that the SPLM has reneged on past agreements during the negotiations, and that the SPLM has become more hardline in its tactics with each meeting. Based on Embassy meetings with both sides, it appears that the SPLM is jockeying to gain as much as possible from the current political crisis to preempt inevitable NCP backsliding when and if the SPLM fully rejoins the government. Work on the CPA Assessment and Evaluation Commissions (AEC) appears to have stopped while the two sides focus their attention almost exclusively on their closed-door negotiations. End summary. SPLM "INCREASINGLY HARDLINE", SAYS NCP -------------- ¶2. (C) Polchief met separately November 10 with NCP insiders Dirdeiri Mohamed Ahmed Al Dukri, NCP spokesman for the current NCP-SPLM negotiating team known as the "six-member committee" (Yasir Arman is the SPLM spokesman for the committee) and Dr. Sayed Al Khateeb, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, an NCP-funded think tank. Both are meeting almost daily with their SPLM counterparts in an effort to bridge current differences so that the SPLM may rejoin the Government of National Unity after their October 11 walkout. Dirdeiri and Khateeb complained that one week ago the SPLM agreed to the general principles document under which the committee would operate, leaving the implementation details for the next two months (reftel b). They claimed that both sides had agreed initially that the work of the committee would be to "add more detail" to the plan and draw up "matrices" to measure progress. They claimed both sides had agreed this would allow the SPLM to rejoin the government and claimed they had even agreed on a document that would be shared with the press after Bashir and Kiir's meeting last week. ¶3. (C) The two NCP officials reported that after the negotiating team reached their agreement folowing an all-night session on November 2, the SPLM came back the following day for further discussions and indicated that they 
could not announce that the SPLM would rejoin the government before President Bashir left for South Africa and First VP Kiir left for the U.S. Dirdeiri claimed that SPLM negotiators Pagan Amum and Yasir Arman demanded to reach final resolution on all points, including Abyei, before the SPLM would announce any agreement. (Note: Arman told us the SPLM believes the NCP will not follow through on any of its commitments unless the SPLM is able achieve an air-tight solution on a "complete package" of points, as reported in reftel a). Khateeb claimed the SPLM leadership is divided, but for now is allowing hardliners Amum and Arman to hold the entire agreement "hostage" to the Abyei issue. Khateeb said that all issues had been agreed, with the exception of Abyei. He said to expect to fully solve the Abyei issue now is unrealistic. He claimed the NCP is ready to move forward with the census, border demarcation, troop redeployments, and deployment of Joint Integrated Units. However, he claimed Abyei cannot be solved now and the only solution is to put a temporary administration in place (which he said had been agreed to by the SPLM initially only to be rejected later) pending final status negotiations. ¶4. (C) Italian DCM Adreina Marsella told polchief November 10 that the NCP has refused to schedule any meetings of the Border Committee for the last two months, despite numerous attempts on the part of the Italian Embassy to move this critical part of the CPA forward. Although a meeting had been scheduled two weeks ago, the meeting was later canceled, with both parties focused on their current closed-door negotiations. OIL AND ETHNICITY -------------- ¶5. (C) Khateeb said both sides have proposed solutions based on oil revenue sharing. The SPLM wants the "blue line" border in exchange for sharing future oil profits with the north. The NCP wants the current "de facto" border in exchange for sharing future oil profits with the south. KHARTOUM 00001761 002 OF 002 Dirdeiri said the issue has become highly personalized, given that he himself is a Misseriya from Abyei and Deng Alor is an Ngok Dinka from Abyei. Dirdeiri claimed he never would have participated in the six-man committee if he knew that it would be focused almost exclusively on Abyei. NCP NEEDS SPLM, BUT DOES SPLM NEED NCP? -------------- ¶6. (C) Khateeb views the partnership between the NCP and the SPLM as critical for the survival of both parties. He pointed out that if the CPA collapses, the constitutional basis for the current government is removed. He noted that if the two partners can work together both before and after elections, they can prevent other parties from "reopening" all of the CPA agreements. Khateeb repeated previous statements that if the SPLM can reassure the NCP that their objective is not secession, an agreement on Abyei will be easily reached. Khateeb reiterated that the NCP would be open to outside arbitration on the Abyei issue if the two sides cannot reach agreement. The next step will probably be further consultation between Kiir and Al-Bashir upon the former's return, focusing on what they agreed upon in those November 2 discussions. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) In our meetings with SPLM officials such as Arman (reftel a) the SPLM makes no such conciliatory comments about the importance of its relationship with the NCP. On the contrary, SPLM officials seem increasingly intransigent and emboldened by the leverage this crisis has brought them. With various factions in the SPLM seeking to gain primacy - those who want unity vs. those who want independence - it appears that the SPLM may now view the current stalemate as a final test of the NCP's willingness to make concessions and follow through on earlier agreements. At least, the SPLM appears to view the next two months as its best chance of forcing progress on the CPA on all fronts, particularly when it saw the NCP's apparent eagerness to resolve the crisis quickly. This no doubt accounts for the SPLM's change of strategy mid-negotiation and subsequent rejection of the earlier agreement. The obvious risk, however, is that the SPLM will overplay its hand and allow more extreme secessionist and confrontational elements in its ranks to gain hold, while increasing the chances of skirmishes along the border. The SPLM has also positioned itself poorly with Northern public opinion by making it seem that "most problems were resolved" in public statements by Kiir and Biong Deng. Finding a right balance between perfectly understandable skepticisim on the NCP, and the give and take of negotiation with the North has not been easy for the SPLM, riven by its own factions. And the NCP is much more skilled at giving the impression of flexibility and moderation - while practicing ruthless deception - than its Southern "junior partner". FERNANDEZ