S/E NATSIOS' MEETING WITH SPLA SENIOR LEADERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001723 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS SU SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS' MEETING WITH SPLA SENIOR LEADERSHIP REF: A. KHARTOUM 1557 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1709 Classified By: Charge Alberto Fernandez, reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: During a November 1 meeting in Juba, the senior leadership of the Sudan People,s Liberation Army (SPLA),told U.S. Special Envoy Andrew Natsios that the SPLA is showing restraint in the face of provocations by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) along the North-South border and avowed the South,s commitment to peace. S/E Natsios said that the U.S. supports the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Southern Sudan Transformation (SST) program. He will continue his efforts to get Khartoum to accept his proposed package of confidence building measures (reftel a). SPLA Chief of Staff Deng also praised the recent high-level SPLA visit to the U.S. Immediately after the meeting, Southern and Northern negotiators reach a possible compromise to lower these tensions between the two forces (reftel b). End Summary. -------------- Praise for U.S. Visit -------------- ¶2. (SBU) SPLA Chief of Staff Lieutenant General (LTG) Oyay Deng Ajak began by praising the recent U.S. visit of senior SPLA officers. S/E Natsios asked Deng to summarize what he had gotten out of his visit. Deng replied that their tours of U.S. Army training and academic centers had provided insights that will help guide the SPLA,s transformation. They also had been impressed with the quality of the U.S. equipment they had seen. Finally, the SPLA delegation had an opportunity to meet face-to-face with key USCENTCOM officers who would be invaluable contacts in the future. ¶3. (SBU) S/E Natsios commented that 20 percent of the peacetime U.S. defense budget is devoted to training, demonstrating the importance of training and education in a modern military force. He suggested that the SPLA follow the U.S. example and emphasize training and education. He noted that many SPLA soldiers today are illiterate and that General Deng had identified this as a possible area of emphasis for training. General Deng regretted that most of the SPLA budget now is spent on salaries but said that "we will spend what we can on training". S/E Natsios suggested that the SPLA ask its soldiers if they would be willing to take a pay ;cut to fund better training and education. -------------- SPLM Wants Peace -------------- ¶4. (SBU) S/E Natsios said that the U.S. remains worried about the North-South dispute and asked the SPLA commanders for their assessment of the situation on the ground. Minister of SPLA Affairs LTG Dominic Dim Deng replied that SPLA actions are based on the decisions made by Sudan People,s Liberation Movement (SPLM) political leadership. The SPLM withdrew its Ministers from the Government of National Unity (GNU) on October 11 to pressure the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and is concentrating on a political solution to the dispute. The SPLA is trying to keep the situation on the ground under control and avoid a return to war. The Minister emphasized that the SPLM has no interest in returning to war. Rather, it seeks economic development, which only peace can provide. -------------- Two Incidents -------------- ¶5. (SBU) LTG Dim described two recent incidents along the North-South border. According to LTG. Dim, on October 15 ten people (1 SPLA and 9 SAF including an officer) were killed in an incident at Numakel-Rumiker in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal state. When an SAF unit had deployed to the border, the SPLA had advanced to its side of the border in response. The SAF attacked the SPLA unit as it advanced but was eventually repelled and it fled. LTG Deng noted that he had attempted to contact his SAF counterpart when the incident was happening but was told "he is unavailable because it is a Friday." In a second incident on October 24 at Kwek, in Upper Nile State, the SAF had again advanced on the border preparing to attack an isolated SPLA platoon. The SPLA had responded by ordering its units to remain calm and show restraint and conflict had been avoided. In the second incident, the SAF major in charge of the advancing forces had apologized to the SPLA KHARTOUM 00001723 002.3 OF 003 unit, noting that he had been told that "the SPLA was mistreating and killing civilians." ¶6. (SBU) The Special Envoy praised this show of self-restraint. He commented that these incidents demonstrate why the two sides need to implement his earlier proposals for a set of confidence building measures. There must be a mutual withdrawal from the border, with UN peacekeepers in between the two forces. If NCP is smart, he commented, it will accept his proposal. ¶7. (SBU) Generals Dim and Deng objected that the SAF keeps moving farther south, encroaching into South Sudan. A mutual withdrawal would leave the SAF in possession of Southern territory. S/E Natsios responded that the UN could be allowed to establish a provisional border, from which the two sides would withdraw. This would be temporary expedient only, not the permanent North-South boundary. ¶8. (C) General Dim said that the solution to the dispute is in the hands of the NCP. S/E Natsios commented that the NCP is like an alcoholic and cannot control itself. It keeps repeating the same self-destructive behavior that it has practiced for the last twenty years. -------------- Peace is the Right Policy -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The Special Envoy said he came to Juba to deliver two messages. First, that peace is the right policy. He disagreed with those who say CPA is dead or &on life support.8 He agreed that the CPA is off track, but it still is salvageable and action must be taken to restart it. Both North and South will lose the benefits of peace if they return to war. General Deng agreed that the CPA is good for the South, and needs to be implemented. In this regard, he said, much work needs to be done. -------------- Problems with the SST Program -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The Special Envoy said that his second message is that the U.S. supports SST program. He noted U.S. disappointment with Kenya,s failure to support the program to train the SPLA in South Sudan, to which the three governments had agreed. U.S. and SPLA both have invested a lot of money in the Kenya training program with te US printing the training manuals. It may become necessary to find a new country in which to carry out the training. Deng reported that recently the Kenyans have been more cooperative. S/E Natsios remarked that then perhaps the U.S. complaints were being heard in Nairobi but feared that Sudanese Intelligence had somehow gotten to the Kenyans. ¶11. (C) S/E Natsios then raised the need to rotate the two U.S. Colonels who are advising the SPLA. S/E Natsios said that the U.S. expects the NCP to attempt to prevent the issuance of visas to their successors. In strict confidence, he told the SPLA leaders that within one week of Deng Alor,s taking office as GNU Foreign Minister, the U.S. will deliver to him personally the passports of the two new U.S. advisors. Minister Deng should then expedite the issuance of their visas, before the NCP has an opportunity to block them. He asked that Deng Alor be advised of this plan beforehand. -------------- Pulling Back from the Brink -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Returning to the CPA, S/E Natsios warned the SPLA to be wary of possible Northern provocation or a miscalculation leading to conflict. He urged the SPLA leadership to control their field level commanders, and to be careful of the actions the SPLA takes in order to avoid making a provocation or providing the SAF with an excuse. ¶13. (SBU) The Special Envoy said that the two keys to pulling back from the brink are: first, resolving the Abyei border and second, mutual withdrawal of forces from the North-South border. He would continue to work to convince the North to accept his proposals. If they refused, he was prepared to go public with a strong statement. He asked if there are now any UN Peacekeepers in Abyei. The SPLA leaders replied that there is one company, but it is restricted to its garrison. The Special Envoy commented that they need to be able to get out and patrol. KHARTOUM 00001723 003.2 OF 003 ¶14. (SBU) Within hours of this meeting, during a six hour meeting of the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) and with UNMIS mediation, the SAf proposed a series of security arrangements which could, if fully implemented and monitored, decrease the tension along border regions between the two armies. ¶15. (U) S/E Natsios did not have an opportunity to review this message before his departure. FERNANDEZ