S/E NATSIOS MEETING WITH MFA U/S MUTRIF SIDDIQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001720 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UNSCAPU AU SU SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS MEETING WITH MFA U/S MUTRIF SIDDIQ REF: KHARTOUM 1709 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: S/E Natsios met November 3 with MFA Undersecretary and NCP insider Mutrif Siddiq. Siddiq said that Qaddafi's statement at the beginning of the Sirte talks on Darfur had "spoiled the show" and recommended that the talks be moved to South Africa. Siddiq outlined ways he had facilitated rebel attendance at Sirte including paying for SLM/U rebel Suleiman Jamous' passport fee. On UNAMID deployment, Siddiq claimed the UN complicates processing of paperwork for visas and customs clearances by submitting incorrect or incomplete forms, which often arrive at the last minute, but then blames any delays on the Sudanese. On troop contributions, Siddiq requested that the troops from African countries be allowed to deploy first to see if troops from non-African countries are really required. As a compromise, he suggested strengthening UNAMID with non-infantry contributions from Jordan, South Africa, Russia, or Pakistan and felt that Sudan would be more forthcoming with the deployment of non-African unit once the force is bing set up in earnest.. Siddiq said the impasse on the CPA had been resolved and that a joint implementation committee would follow up on specific points in the coming weeks (reftel). End summary. SIRTE -------------- ¶2. (C) A/E Natsios provided U/S Muttrif Siddiq with a read-out on his meetings with Darfur rebel groups in Sirte and Juba, explaining that he urged them to unify their proposals and designate a lead negotiator as soon as possible. Natsios expressed concern that the talks had failed because of interference from neighboring states. Siddiq agreed, observing that everyone "wants to hold the keys to the process" and that Libyan leader Qaddafi's statement "spoiled the show." Siddiq claimed he had advised Jan Eliasson not to hold the talks in a neighboring state, and suggested that the talks should now be moved to South Africa, while realizing that this may not be possible at this late date. Siddiq also blamed African Union SecGen Konare for the failure of the talks, observing that Konare had probably been overly influenced by "brother leader" Qaddafi. ¶3. (C) Natsios said the rebels told him they don't feel comfortable in Libya, that they fear their commanders are being paid off by Libyan agents. Siddiq said he had information to confirm this, and claimed that Libyan spy chief Musa Kusa told him that he is paying off (and possibly arming) JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim. Siddiq observed that although Abdel Wahid Nur is an obstacle to peace in the region, he is increasingly weakened in the camps, as shown by the fact that there were no large demonstrations in the IDP even though Abdul Wahid had called for them. Siddiq said the GOS and he personally had done everything possible to facilitate rebel participation at Sirte, and claimed the MFA had paid for SLA/U rebel leader Suleiman Jamous' paperwork and passport fee. When challenged that the Sudanese had physically removed some Darfuri civil society reps from a flight to Libya, he explained that this was a mistake exacerbated by suspicious UN procedures. "They had no transparency in the selection of these people, and they had them traveling on UN travel documents as if they were stateless, these are Sudanese citizens and have a right to travel on Sudanese passports which we would gladly facilitate," he fumed. To increase the chances of a peace agreement on Darfur actually sticking, Siddiq recommended broader participation of tribal groups, political parties ("not just the DUP and the Communists which the UN preferred but also the NCP "),and civil society. UNAMID -------------- ¶4. (C) S/E Natsios warned Siddiq that there is a perception in the West that Sudan is trying to slow things down on the implementation of UNSC 1769 and the deployment of UNAMID, pointing out that the resolution says troops should be "predominantly African," and countries therefore question why the Sudanese have raised objections to the Norwegian engineering company when the company would increase the capacity of UNAMID and the vast majority of the troops will still be African. Natsios pointed out that the Sudanese are KHARTOUM 00001720 002 OF 002 making things more difficult for themselves than they have to be, by not facilitating the deployment of UNAMID, and by damaging their reputation further on the international stage by burning Haskanita to the ground when it was entirely unnecessary. ¶5. (C) Siddiq, who is in charge of 1769 implementation, replied that a compromise was possible on foreign troops, and noted their acceptance of engineering units from Egypt, Pakistan, and China. Siddiq also took issue with the claim that Sudan is slowing down the deployment of UNAMID. He claimed the UN had openly told the GOS that they would blame Sudan for delayed deployment, meanwhile the UN submits documents late that are incomplete and don't follow the correct format, which complicates the work of the MFA. He contrasted this with the rapid deployment of new Rwandan peacekeepers with American help. He noted that medical units for UNAMID are to be non-African, engineering units are non-African, the police offered are only one-third African, but that it is in the field of infantry units, where African countries pledged 200 percent of the needed force where the perceived (but not actual) duplicity seems to be. He added that Sudan expected the air assets for UNAMID to be overwhelmingly non-African with possibilities from Russia, India, Jordan and South Africa. He said that Sudan would probably be willing to accept non-African infantry units (like the Thais) later on once the bulk of the force has deployed and Sudanese have seen that it is not an invasion force seeking to overthrow the government, "we have a domestic political problem with this deployment that we are trying to manage." CPA --- ¶6. (C) Turning to the CPA, Siddiq said the NCP had almost reached agreement on Abyei (reftel) and that a temporary administrative area would be established there pending final status negotiations. Siddiq said the resolution of the political crisis would be announced before Bashir departed for South Africa and Kiir departed for the US. (Note: President Bashir and Vice President Kiir did announce late in the day November 3 that they had resolved all outstanding issues on the implementation of the CPA except on Abyei and the demarcation of the North-South border.) COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) As in the other meetings with the GOS, Siddiq laid on a charm offensive designed to demonstrate that the government is doing everything possible to solve the Darfur crisis and implement the CPA. This could be due to the threat of further sanctions in the US (with the Darfur Divestment Act looming),concern about the crisis with the SPLM, or it could be because of increased Chinese engagement. Although there are many reasons to assume the GOS has no good intentions in Darfur, the GOS may actually want to resolve the Darfur crisis, recognizing that the situation there has gotten out of control and could threaten its real concern - power in Khartoum. Siddiq is right that the bulk of the UNAMID force that Sudan has agreed to, amounting to thousands of soldiers representing the majority of the force, is moving slowly because of internal issues related to the UN and AU. When confronted with clear, simple requests for cooperation - such as with the Rwandan peacekeepers and their 18 APCs - they have moved with relative alacrity. ¶8. (U) S/E Natsios did not clear this cable before he left Khartoum. FERNANDEZ