S/E NATSIOS MEETING WITH NISS CHIEF SALAH GHOSH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001708 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CLASSIFICATION PARA 2) SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UNSC SU SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS MEETING WITH NISS CHIEF SALAH GHOSH KHARTOUM 00001708 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto Fernandez, reasons: 1.4 (b) an d (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: S/E Natsios met with GNU Intelligence Chief Salah Ghosh November 2 during the Special Envoy's visit to Sudan. On UNAMID troops contributions, Ghosh said President Bashir's preference is for African or Muslim troops. He said the Norwegian engineering unit is a problem, but the Thai unit might be acceptable at some later date. On the IDP camps in Darfur, Ghosh said the SAF must stop JEM and other rebel groups from sparking conflict in the camps, but promised to cooperate with the international community. On Abyei, Ghosh said "powerful forces" in the SPLM (meaning Abyei locals such as Deng Alor) are blocking a possible agreement, but that President Bashir and Salva Kiir had agreed to an interim administration for Abyei. Ghosh said the deployment of the Joint Integrated Units throughout the South, including oil fields, must occur as soon as possible. On elections, Ghosh said the NCP wants a strong partnership with the SPLM so that both parties can lead the country following the elections. On the current political crisis, Ghosh invited the assistance of the US which he said might be useful at the right moment. End summary. ¶2. (C) Special Envoy Andrew Natsios met November 2 with GOS Intelligence Services Chief Salah Ghosh. S/E Natsios thanked Ghosh for his cooperation on counter-terrorism intelligence, including in disrupting an Al-Qa'ida related plot in August ¶2007. Regarding the current NCP/SPLM political crisis and the Darfur peace talks in Sirte, Natsios made clear that the US had nothing to do with the SPLM's supposed encouragement of some Darfur rebels to stay in Juba and not to attend the talks in Sirte. S/E Natsios explained that he is putting maximum pressure on the rebels to attend and that SPLM President Kiir had promised him that the SPLM was not encouraging the rebels to boycott Sirte. The U.S. had also not prompted the SPLM walk out from the Government of National Unity on October 11. UNAMID DEPLOYMENT -------------- ¶2. (C) S/E Natsios said it would be very helpful if Sudan would accept some more non-African troops for UNAMID deployment, to ensure the technical capacity of the UN/AU forces. Although some suspect that the UN is using Sudan as a scapegoat to cover for its own slowness in deploying UNAMID, the perception that Sudan was once again obstructing was growing in New York, even though Sudan had just been helpful in rapidly moving in 800 additional Rwandan peacekeepers and their 18 APCs as part of the Heavy Support Package. In particular, he encouraged the Sudanese to accept, at least, the battalion of Thai troops. Natsios suggested that perhaps it would be useful to establish an acceptable percentage of foreign troops, such as twenty percent. Natsios explained this in the context of the impending Darfur Divestment Act, pointing out that the Administration had testified that now is not the time to impose additional punitive measures against Sudan given recent positive steps taken by the Sudanese. However, he explained that if UNAMID does not deploy rapidly as an effective force, this position would be difficult to sustain in the face of domestic pressure in the US. Natsios also pointed out that an effective UNAMID force is very much in the interests of the Sudanese government, to assist effectively with the chaotic situation in Darfur, which could very easily spiral out of control. ¶3. (C) Ghosh believed that the UN was being less than honest to the US on the challenges facing UNAMID deployment. He replied that President Al-Bashir had made a political commitment to having mostly African and Muslim UN troops deployed to Darfur. He explained that there would be trouble with domestic constituencies (such as extremist Islamic groups) if there are too many non-Africans and/or non-Muslims. He suggested that there is no need to fight about the presence of foreign troops and pointed out that there should be non-African troops only if there are not enough Africans. Nonetheless, Ghosh accepted the point about the need for qualified technical troops and said they could be non-African. He said Sudan had no objection to some Thai troops, but not a whole battalion. Ghosh said troops from Scandinavia would be unacceptable because of the furor over the cartoons about the Prophet Muhammad in Scandinavia a few years ago. Ghosh added that the NCP had spoken to KHARTOUM 00001708 002.2 OF 003 "mujahideen" forces (most likely Arab Popular Defense and militia units allied with the NCP) in Darfur to calm them down but they were very suspicious that the regime had sold them out and had agreed to western troops in Darfur. He noted that Sudan had accepted non-African units from China and Pakistan, and that they were willing to accept helicopter units from non-African countries, "including America", he joked, but the composition of infantry units is a sensitive issue because it affects President Al-Bashir's credibility in front of his own public. DARFUR IDP CAMPS -------------- ¶4. (C) S/E Natsios expressed thanks for allowing the US Air Force planes assist with the deployment of the Rwandan AMIS battalions. However, S/E Natsios pointed out that SAF actions in Haskanita and Mujaheria had cast the GOS in a very bad light (even though they were responding to a plea fo help from AMIS and retaliating to rebel attacks outside Darfur. He expressed further concern about reports of forced relocations of IDPs in Kalma camp. Ghosh explained that if there is fighting in the camps, the GOS has a responsibility to go into the camps and stop it. He claimed that Justice and Equality (JEM) fighters are starting conflicts in the camps and said the SAF must stop this, there was arms smuggling going on as different rebel factions tried to take over these dependent populations. However, Ghosh said the GOS is willing to cooperate with the international community regarding the camps. ¶5. (C) Ghosh agreed with SE Natsios that Libya was a problematic venue. He noted that the Libyans were actually arming some of the rebel factions. Sudan wanted a real solution to the problem because otherwise it could get totally out of control, "Darfur is no longer an internal issue but has become a problem for hire." Charge Fernandez noted that Sudan needs to understand that without resolving the problems of IDPs currently in the camps and getting them to return to their homes "voluntarily and in safety," the problem would not be solved. This also means removing Arab tribes who are squatting on the land of others, "without this, the problem will not be solved no matter what, if anything is agreed to in Libya." Ghosh said that the Sudanese Government fully agreed with this, without IDP return and tribal reconciliation there will be no peace no matter what a treaty may say. ABYEI NEGOTIATIONS -------------- ¶6. (C) S/E Natsios said reports from the recent UNMIS Cease-fire Joint Monitoring Commission (CJMC) were very positive, and noted that allowing the UN to fully monitor Abyei is an important step. He suggested that any agreement on Abyei should include the Misseriya Arabs in addition to the Ngok Dinka because without them there will likely be additional conflict. Natsios pointed to the recent abduction of oil workers by JEM and the Misseriya in Khordofan as an example. S/E Natsios reminded Ghosh that Abyei is an emotional issue for the Ngok Dinka and needs to be resolved quickly. Natsios reminded Ghosh US offers in the form of a possible tripartite arbitration committee that could consist of the Chinese, the Saudis, and the US, although we are not wedded to this, it is just an idea but the US wants to be helpful if we can. ¶7. (C) Ghosh said he wanted to make clear that the NCP was "comfortable" in its negotiating with the SPLM, you should think we are under pressure. He said both sides are now committed to finding a solution to the Abyei issue. He said the troops will withdraw and that the JIUs must deploy in the area. "This must happen soon," he said. Ghosh observed that powerful forces in the SPLM are "making a veto" on a possible solution to the Abyei border dispute, mentioning Deng Alor in particular. Ghosh said the problem all boiled down to the definition of one small locality in Abyei. He said Salva Kiir asked President Bashir for an interim administration for Abyei and the President had agreed. Ghosh suggested that both sides need to be flexible on Abyei and stop trying to "score goals." Ghosh noted that President Bashir would be going to South Africa the evening November 2 and that he would meet with First Vice President Salva Kiir before his departure to try to achieve a comprehensive breakthrough. The Sudanese would try to solve this crisis among themselves but KHARTOUM 00001708 003.2 OF 003 would call for international assistance if needed. CENSUS AND ELECTIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) Natsios pointed out that there is a perception that the North is slowing down the census to make the GOSS look bad. He pointed out that the money for the census had not been released, the election law had not been passed, and the border commission had not begun its work. Natsios reminded Ghosh that for the southerners, the CPA is like the Bible or the Koran, that they view it as "liberation from a past of oppression." Natsios warned that the GNU ignores the CPA at its peril. ¶9. (C) Ghosh replied that the border commission has asked for security to begin its work and that the money for the census will soon be released. Ghosh stated confidently that elections will be held and that the NCP believes it can win. He said the NCP wants a good partnership with the SPLM "so that both parties can take over." Ghosh pointed out that he is not part of the NCP. "I'm just a technical man," he chuckled, but promised to take Natsios' suggestions to the NCP. Ghosh observed that at this point "both sides are trying" and suggested that at a certain point US intervention and assistance may be useful. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Ghosh's demeanor was helpful and positive throughout the meeting. His explanation of possible Sudanese "backtracking" on UNAMID composition is plausible if unhelpful although is suspicion of UNAMID may be well placed. Ghosh is the latest Sudanese official to have nothing good to say privately about Libya's role in the Darfur peace talks. He seemed genuinely interested in the proposals tabled by S/E Natsios, particularly the suggestion of an arbitration panel on Abyei. This offer may become useful if the direct NCP/SPLM negotiations on Abyei stall. ¶11. (U) S/E Natsios did not clear this cable before he left Khartoum. FERNANDEZ