CONSPIRACY THEORIES ABOUND ON INTENTIONS IN DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001702 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UNSC SU SUBJECT: CONSPIRACY THEORIES ABOUND ON INTENTIONS IN DARFUR REF: A. KHARTOUM 1680 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1681 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto Fernandez, reasons: 1.4 (b) an d (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Despite differences in ideologies and political platforms, leaders of Darfur groups are expressing a common level of suspicion about the Government of Sudan's (GOS) current actions with regard to Darfur. They believe the GOS is pursuing a strategy to further undermine the efficacy of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and peacekeepers and the probability of political settlement throughout the Darfur region. Representatives pointed to the October 30-31 Arab League Donors Conference for Humanitarian Aid for Darfur, the allegations of human trafficking by foreign aid workers in eastern Chad, the stalled Sirte talks, and the increased pace of "Arabization" of Darfur lands. End summary. ¶2. (U) On October 29 Poloff met with Adam Abdul Ahmed, Chairman of the Darfur Land Commission of the Darfur Transitional Regional Authority (TDRA),established by the Darfur Peace Agreement and headed by Minni Minawi. On the same day Poloff met with representatives of the Fur tribes' Shura (consultation) Council, including Secretary-General (SYG) Dr. Idriss Yusuf and Deputy SYG Amin Mohammed Osman. On October 30 Poloff followed up with Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) representative to the Darfur Ceasefire Joint Commission Ali Trayo. DONORS CONFERENCE ILLUSTRATES GOS HIDDEN AGENDA -------------- -- ¶3. (C) TDRA leaders saw no good will in Khartoum,s hosting of the Arab League Conference on humanitarian aid for Darfur (even though TDRA power Mini Minawi was prominently featured at the conference). Abdul Ahmed acknowledged TDRA resentment at having been upstaged by the GOS to spearhead this conference. During his visit to Cairo in early October, Minni Minawi accepted an AL offer to assume responsibility for this conference, only to have the AL later hand over the reins to the GOS without explanation. Ahmed complained that the conference had not been coordinated through the TDRA,s Darfur Reconstruction Fund, which he said would have ensured a transparent disbursement mechanism for the $500 million goal (Note: Actual pledges at the conference amounted to $250 million, real figures will be much less.) ¶4. (C) The absence of any oversight mechanism would enable the GOS to channel funds directly to local Sudanese NGOs, which Ahmed claimed are "99 percent pro-government," and which he claimed were established solely to delegitimize the INGO community. Ali Trayo was blistering in his contempt for GOS efforts in this regard, stating that the AL conference was convened only as a way to empower GOS-affiliated local NGOs at the expense of INGOs, which he claimed the GOS saw as "international spies" for the incoming United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In this way, Trayo explained, the conference was intended to downplay UNAMID deployment. CHADIAN COLLUSION AGAINST INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE -------------- --- ¶5. (C) According to Trayo, another calculated blow to the credibility of INGOs and international peacekeepers was the relentless publicizing in the Arabic press in Sudan of the alleged trafficking of 103 children from eastern Chad by foreign aid workers of the organization Zoe,s Ark. Trayo asserted "there was no coincidence on timing" of the breaking of that story. The conspiracy-minded Trayo did not dismiss the possibility of collaboration between Chadian President Deby and Sudanese President Bashir (and possibly Libyan leader COL Muamar Qadhafi) in inflating the incident as part of an overall campaign to discredit INGOs operating in Chad and Darfur and to stall deployment of international peacekeepers on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border. Trayo had no doubt that further foot-dragging would result, as already evidenced in Bashir,s October 30 assertion that UNAMID,s composition would remain mostly African (and therefore perpetually lacking in capacities),with Chinese and Pakistani elements permitted. GOS "EXPERT" AT DELAYING POLITICAL PROCESS -------------- KHARTOUM 00001702 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) In addition to undermining the INGOs and international peacekeepers, the GOS was succeeding in its plot to keep the rebel and non-signatory movements politically divided, according to members of the Fur Shura Council (the Council is strongly in favor of Sirte rejectionist rebel leader Abdul Wahid Nur). Idriss and Amin said Sirte had made the GOS look like the good guy in the eyes of the international community through GOS participation in preliminary talks, its declaration of a unilateral ceasefire (which the Council dismissed as lip service) and its stated "commitment" to giving non-signatories political space to reach a common negotiating position for subsequent rounds of talks. Amin interpreted this behavior as a front for active GOS conspiring against rebel and non-signatory movements, efforts toward unity in a bid to divide the groups along tribal lines. Idriss elaborated that a systematic upending of the pyramidal structure of Darfur tribes was underway by the GOS, creating an imbalance within the tribal system that was resulting in the current security situation in Darfur. Idriss went on to say that the GOS, separation of the movements, political leadership from the IDPs on the ground was marginalizing the leaders and bringing in their place at the negotiating table field commanders, who lacked the knowledge to address political questions, and tribal leaders/civil society representatives, who lacked a force on the ground to command, none of whom was a bona fide representative of the parties in Darfur. STAGE SET FOR RE-SETTLEMENT OF DARFUR -------------- ¶7. (C) Ali Trayo argued that as a result of GOS maneuvering on the political, humanitarian and peacekeeping fronts, the time was ripe for the "Arabization" of Darfur through GOS resettling of nomadic Arab tribes there. Both the TDRA and the Shura Council acknowledged that this phenomenon was not new, but Trayo noted its frequency had recently spiked (Note: Trayo added that he was compiling a "database" of this trend to track numbers of tribes and areas of "occupation" and offered to share this information with Poloff upon arrival in El Fasher.) The Fur Shura Council reps added that the GOS was becoming increasingly sophisticated in its methods of incorporating Arab tribes into the Darfur population, saying that COL Qadhafi had a big hand in the execution of these processes. Here again, Trayo did not rule out the possibility of collusion by the Chadian Government as well (seeking to eliminate a potentially disloyal Arab tribal minority inside Chad). Trayo warned that the longer the political reconciliation process in Darfur dragged on, the deeper the "war fatigue" among IDPs would become and the greater the ability of the GOS and the janjaweed to assert themselves in Darfur territory would grow. The only way to stave off this eventuality, according to Trayo, was to accelerate the political process, which he said necessitated pressure on Sudan Liberation Army faction leader Abdulwahid al-Nur. ¶8. (C) Comment: Conspiracy theories and illogical reasoning are nothing new among the political opposition, and certainly not for the TDRA, whose roadmap for Sirte talks had just been outright rejected by the UN/AU mediation. Similarly, the Fur Shura Council, with its close ties to Abdulwahid, harbors an equal if not greater amount of vitriol for the GOS. The TDRA and the Shura Council are likely to see evil in almost any action taken in Darfur by the GOS, Libya, Chad, UN, and AU. However, their common perception of a concerted push by Arab interests on all sides of the border to insulate the region from the international community,s efforts to get peacekeepers on the ground is noteworthy as an example of the deep distrust on the ground. As the international community seeks to stabilize the Darfur region, it is not unexpected that there should be a reaction from governments in the region, and we should only expect this opposition to intensify as deployment deadlines draw nearer. The level of paranoia on all sides is bound to increase. FERNANDEZ