UN ENVOY, AU BRIEF ON DARFUR VIOLENCE, POLITICAL PROCESS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001610 SIPDIS SENSITIVE, SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN KPKO SU SUBJECT: UN ENVOY, AU BRIEF ON DARFUR VIOLENCE, POLITICAL PROCESS KHARTOUM 00001610 001.2 OF 003 REFTEL: 10/11/2007 LARSON E-MAIL TO AF/SPG AND AF/SE -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) Please see action request para. 13. ¶2. (SBU) Briefing the "Tripoli Format" on October 12, UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU officials called for "maximum restraint" among the belligerents and international condemnation as violence escalates in Darfur in advance of peace talks, with one diplomat reminding the group that "if there is no peace to be kept, there can't be a peacekeeping force." The peace negotiations will first focus on a cessation of hostilities, and Eliasson asked for the explicit endorsement of the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council before the start of negotiations. AU officials--including AMIS Force Commander Agwai and Joint Special Representative Adada--appealed to the international community to pay the arrears of the monthly subsistence allowance for Cease-fire Commission observers and then suspend the CFC in an effort to make a clean break between AMIS and UNAMID. As the UN/AU process moves forward, the negotiators and the political leaders on the ground continue to support the suspension of certain DPA provisions and call for a "new agreement." The USG needs to focus attention on articulating what degree of change to the DPA we will accept--and view as useful. End summary. -------------- Call for Maximum Restraint -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Briefing the Khartoum representatives of the "Tripoli Format" governments on October 12, UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson called for "maximum restraint" among the warring parties in Darfur to create an environment in which peace negotiations--scheduled to begin in Libya on October 27--can take place. While troubled by the recent military escalation, he said that the negotiations would proceed on schedule and that the increased violence could not be a pretext for any of the parties to avoid the Libya talks. "No one can shoot his way into negotiations, and no one can shoot his way out of negotiations," said Eliasson. ¶4. (SBU) Sam Ibok, the co-chair of the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) leading the negotiations, cited two tendencies in the lead up 
to the Libya negotiations: 1) fighting on both sides as the parties position themselves for negotiations and 2) individuals, such as Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader Abdulwahid al Nur, threatening the process by discouraging participation. "If these are not addressed, we can give up on the talks," said Ibok. Ibok criticized the international community--particularly African governments--for being "indulgent" with the parties as both the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements increase the tempo of fighting. "The sense is they can get away with anything," he said. "People forget that if there is no peace to be kept, there can't be a peacekeeping force. If anything, the situation will get worse, and we must stand against this." -------------- Mediation Strategy Finalized -------------- ¶5. (SBU) According to Eliasson, the UN and AU finalized their mediation strategy during the recent retreat in Addis Ababa. While an internal UN/AU version would remain confidential, an external draft will be circulated to the international community in the coming days. He characterized the October 10 meeting with a delegation from the "regional actors" (Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, and Libya)-which included Libya's Ali Treiki and Eritrea's Abdullah Jabr--as constructive. "Negotiations cannot be successful without the cooperation of the regional countries," said Eliasson. -------------- Participants: Those Who Affect Security -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Invitations to the negotiating parties will focus on "those who influence the (security) situation on the ground," said Eliasson. He asserted that all of the rebel factions, with the exception of the one led by Abdulwahid al Nur, plan to attend the Libya talks. (Note: We know of no rebel faction that has yet pledged to participate in the negotiations. End note.) The UN/AU are working with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to organize a meeting of Darfur's rebel factions in Juba within days and will await the outcome of this meeting to issue the KHARTOUM 00001610 002.2 OF 003 invitations. -------------- Civil Society/Tribal Leaders -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The UN/AU has also developed a strategy for including civil society and tribal representatives as "privileged observers" at the talks who will attend plenary sessions during the negotiations and be included as issues of particular concern to them are discussed. Eliasson emphasized that the UN/AU are planning for more than symbolic representation for these groups at the talks. "They will not be full fledged negotiating powers but will be listened to at various points," he said (reftel). -------------- Cessation of Hostilities, Backed by UNSC -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Echoing recent comments of other UN/AU officials, Eliasson said that the first phase of the negotiations will concentrate on achieving a "credible" cessation of hostilities. A draft of this document is being reviewed in New York and Addis Ababa. Eliasson called on the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the AU Peace and Security Cuncl (AU PSC) to "send a message of cooperation with the talks and the expectation that a cessation of hostilities must be respected." An effective monitoring mechanism will be critical to verifying compliance with the cessation of hostilities, explained Eliasson, and the UN/AU are reviewing proposals from partner governments--including the UK and France--for such a mechanism. He hoped that the UNSC and AU PSC will make clear that "there is a high political price" for breaches of the agreement. -------------- All Tripoli Format Invited, With Conditions -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Eliasson announced that the UN/AU will invite all of the countries of the Tripoli Format to attend the talks and will be sending a note verbale within days. He cautioned, however, that the relationship between the negotiators and the international community during the Abuja process had not been well-defined, which had led the parties to "forum shop" and weakened the negotiators' leverage. The UN/AU want to avoid a repetition of this problem. The international community will have access to the plenary sessions and regular briefings by the UN/AU and will be "called upon as needed." "Yes, we need you there," said Eliasson, "but in close cooperation with the mediators. The core of the negotiations will be left to the UN/AU lead." -------------- Monthly Subsistence Allowance -------------- ¶10. (SBU) AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai and Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada also briefed the Tripoli Format representatives on the ongoing dispute between AMIS and the DPA signatories on the monthly subsistence allowance (MSA). The issue wasted his "precious time," said Agwai, and put his troops at risk. He called AMIS headquarters in El Fasher "not defensible" and warned of another "Haskanita," referring to the early October attack on an AMIS camp in South Darfur that left 10 peacekeepers dead. "There are people in Darfur who are willing to kill for five dollars," said Agwai, noting that command within the SLM/Minawi has collapsed and that there is a disconnect between the movement's political and tactical leaderships. ¶11. (SBU) The UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) needs to free itself from both the political and security "baggage" of AMIS as it deploys, said Agwai. The Libya negotiations are an opportunity "for a complete break" with the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) structure that has left armed rebel groups "working and living among my troops, with the same ID cards, the same arm bands." Ibok said that his personal recommendation is to "suspend" the CFC and allow Agwai to develop "new arrangements." -------------- Agwai Proposes Pay-off, Statement -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Agwai proposed that the donors pay the arrears of the MSA at the original rate--totaling approximately 4.5 million dollars-and then issue a written statement abolishing the MSA. CDA Powers explained that paying the arrears without a more comprehensive plan KHARTOUM 00001610 003.2 OF 003 for the movements to sustain themselves into the future would not solve the problem in the long term. The French Ambassador concurred, predicting the same problems would arise again. Agwai said that the first step is "to close the door" on the MSA issue and then address the underlying problems, which could include providing support to the movement's leadership--rather to individuals--to distribute among their partisans. The group decided to review the issue with capitals, and the AU will schedule a follow-up meeting after the end of Eid al Fitr. At the request of the UK, the AU will circulate a white paper on the issue prior to the meeting. (Note: In addition to the SLM and the Declaration of Commitment signatories, the Sudanese Government's representatives to the CFC receive the MSA. End note.) -------------- Comment and Action Request -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Recent events have given the DPA non-signatories more reason to believe that a sustainable political settlement with Khartoum cannot be reached and will not be honored: 1) The recall of the SPLM's ministers from Khartoum and 2) The further weakening of the atrophied SLM led by Minni Minawi that has resulted from the blatant DPA violations in South Darfur. Nonetheless, as the UN/AU process moves forward, the negotiators and the political leaders on the ground--including Adada--continue to support the suspension of certain DPA provisions and call for a "new agreement." The USG needs to focus attention on articulating what degree of change to the DPA we will accept--and view as useful. UNSCR 1769, the Addis Ababa agreement of November 2006 and the Tripoli communiques cite the DPA as the basis for the political process. The suspension of DPA provisions, such as the CFC, has real political implications, and we should be prepared to comment on any proposals made. In addition, Post requests the Department's guidance on responding to Agwai's proposal regarding the MSA. End comment. ¶14. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. POWERS