SUDAN'S UNSCR 1769 COORDINATOR SIDDIQ: AMIS ASKED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001599 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AS A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2017 TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR AU UN SU SUBJECT: SUDAN'S UNSCR 1769 COORDINATOR SIDDIQ: AMIS ASKED US TO ATTACK HASKANITA REF: KHARTOUM 1587 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and ( d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In an October 9 meeting with CDA Fernandez, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Mutriff Siddiq said that AMIS asked the GoS to intervene militarily in the wake of the attack on the Haskanita MGS. On other topics, Siddiq said he would consult with the GoS on the U.S. offer to speed up deployment of AU-UN forces with possible U.S. airlift, defended the rejection of offered AU-UN troops, and expressed his concerns about Tripoli such as wanting the date to remain firm. End summary. CDA TELLS SIDDIQ THAT U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT WOULD SPEED DEPLOYMENT OF AU-UN TROOPS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On October 9, CDA met with Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and the Sudanese government's UNSCR 1769 implementation coordinator CDA Dr. Mutriff Siddiq. CDA reminded Siddiq that two battalions of Rwandan and Nigerian troops are slated to arrive in October-November as part of the force protection for the Heavy Support package (HSP). He said that the notional plans called for an estimated nine flights using IL-76 and Boeing 737 aircraft, but that the U.S. would like to deploy the African troops using U.S. military aircraft (especially to transport armored personnel carriers (APCs)). The CDA emphasized that using USAF aircraft means faster deployment of troops and a reduced number of flights (from nine flights to four or five). He added that the visual image of U.S. aircraft deploying African troops to Darfur would go a long way in sending a positive image to the world community about Sudan's committment to keeping its word. In response, Siddiq stated that he did not see a problem, but explained that he needed to consult with his government. "It is in our interest to get them there," he stated, especially in the wake of the attack on AMIS peacekeepers. ¶3. (C) Turning to the imminient deployment of Chinese troops as part of the AU-UN mission, the CDA said that this would be the first deployment of international troops as part of the hybrid force, and thus a test case with security concerns paramount. Siddiq agreed and said that they would be afforded the "utmost protection." SIDDIQ: AU ASKED THE GOVERNMENT TO INTERVENE -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Using the discussion about AU-UN force protection as a springboard, Siddiq turned to the recent attacks on AU forces in Haskanita. He said AMIS asked the GoS to intervene in Muhajeria in the wake of the attack on tha Haskanita Military Group Site (MGS). Siddiq said that SLA rebel leader Minni Minawi did not want SAF to be in the area as Minawi's rebels were active there. "Minni lost Haskinita to SLM-Unity creating instability, so we intervened at the request of the African Union." Siddiq blamed rebel groups for the Haskanita attacks. Despite CDA protestations that the U.S. is careful in assigning blame for Haskanita, Siddiq repeated that the AU felt threatened after the attack on the MGS and that the AU requested SAF action after the Haskinita attack because it feared a similar attack by rebels against the Nigerian MGS in Muhajeria. (Note: Siddiq seemed to imply that SAF actions at Haskinita and at Mujaheria were at the request of the AU. SAF intervention in Haskanita and Muhajeria, if confirmed, would constitute the Government's most significant violation of the DPA since the signing of the agreement. End Note.) CDA cautioned Siddiq about any SAF overreaction which would deeply anger the West at this sensitive time. AU-UN TROOP DEPLOYMENT CONCERNS -------------- ¶5. (C) On the subject of U.S. support for the the AU, CDA noted PAE's contract is ending and that another company, DYNCORP, will take over their activities. He noted that there had been a disgusting attack on PAE in the Sudanese paper "Al-Intibaha" which may have government support behind the scenes. CDA explained that DYNCORP, an experienced company, has been used by the State Department in many parts of the world. He asked Siddiq to alert the embassy to any KHARTOUM 00001599 002 OF 002 concerns that might arise. Siddiq accepted the announcement, saying that he had planned a meeting with PAE staff but "it did not happen." ¶6. (C) Turning to Sudan's rejection of troops from certain nations, Siddiq defended these rejections as a technical matter consistent with UNSCR 1769. "Frankly, according to the list, the rejected troops exceeded the agreed upon totals. In engineering, for example, the Chinese, the Egyptians, and the Pakistanis satisfy the agreed upon numbers - so we only need troops from these three (not the Nordic unit.)" Siddiq noted that others, the Nepalese and the Jordanians were not excluded as they brought skills and abilities that were needed, but the Thai troops were redundant. "We accepted all the Non-African troops except Norway and Thailand." WE DILUTED OUR CRITICISM OF NATSIOS -------------- ¶7. (C) Siddiq raised the issue of S/E Natsios' visit, saying that the GOS diluted criticism of Natsios. The media had zeroed in on Natsios's characterization of the current political atmosphere between Sudan's ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) as "poisonous." "The spirit of the visits and Natsios's careful remarks were not reflected in the press, so we needed to say something." He joked, "you know how bad the Sudanese press can be." TRIPOLI TALKS -------------- ¶8. (C) Siddiq said that he wanted the Tripoli talks to succeed and hoped that the start date would remain firm. He said he sought to expand the agenda to include items such as the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and wanted improved monitoring and verification procedures. He said that he had conveyed this to the Italians and Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST). He added that he sought a renewed commitment to a ceasefire and a neutralization of heavy weapons, saying that "we can not talk and fight at the same time. We can do one or the other." ¶9. (C) The problems stemming from the representation of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in the Tripoli talks are a sticky and complex issue, said Siddiq. He added that the physical presence of the IDPs at the talks could "defeat" the purpose of the conference. He pointed out that tribal balance would be a problem if the IDPs were included, pointing out that the IDPs come from the same tribes as the rebels. "How can we create a balance? It would only create a rivalry among tribes." He understood that the international community's goals were well intentioned but this could backfire and make things worse. In response to CDA rejoinder that the U.S. is not dogmatic about IDPs, but saw their voices as essential to solving the problem. Siddiq took the point adding, "we need to create a link for the IDPs but not necessarily at the table." ¶10. (C) Siddiq raised concerns about Libya hosting the talks and the numbers of participants. The CDA agreed, "We don't want it to be a circus with too many countries and people represented." He added that it would be preferable to have a single representative for an entire block: one representative for the EU, another for the Arabs and a representative for China, Russia and the U.S. ¶11. (C) Comment: Siddiq is a straight-shooter as a far as the Sudanese Government is concerned (this is probably a relative term),and he never backpedaled on his statement that AMIS asked GoS to intervene militarily in Muhajeria. If this is true, it could be a potentially disastrous step damaging the credibility of an all-African AMIS or mostly African UNAMID in the eyes of the rebels and IDPs. Despite Mutriff's comments and rumors among Minawi's SLM of an AMIS request for Government intervention, AMIS has not issued an official statement on the Muhajeria attack. POWERS