GENERAL AGWAI: MONTHLY SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001588 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AS A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017 TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR AU UN SU SUBJECT: GENERAL AGWAI: MONTHLY SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES A REASON FOR UNREST Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and ( d) ¶1. (C) On October 9, CDA met with African Union (AU) force commander Lt. General Martin Agwai Also present were DATT and POLOFF (notetaker). Agwai said that problems with the MSA could spark future unrest amongst rebel forces, that he believed that the Haskanita attack may have been the result of problems with the MSA and expressed a number of issues related to planned AU-UN troop deployments. End summary. I WAS WARNED THAT A HASKANITA WOULD HAPPEN -------------- ¶2. (C) Agwai told CDA that a month ago, rebel group representatives told him that an attack like Haskanita would happen. Agwai said that only "yesterday," a number of rebel representative came to El-Fasher to hold a "peaceful demonstration" over the issue of the Monthly Subsistence Allowance (MSA). He said that he was able to pre-empt their demonstration and had a private discussion with a few key representatives over the issue, but clearly "all of their anger is directed at me and my troops." Agwai added that he planned to meet with the UN, AU and EU and inform them that this is a very contentious issue that could undermine the entire peace. Agwai warned, "you can not simply cut these payments to zero overnight. It's dangerous." He feared a "Haskanita type" attack could spread to otehr towns in Darfur. ¶3. (C) The underlying problem is the way the MSA payments were established, said Agwai. He said that the payments are distributed individually, from the African Union to the rebel representatives, but should have been given to the rebel groups as a unit. As it stands now, the individual representatives can challenge the group's leadership. "If we don't resolve the MSA issue, it could spark other problems." HASKANITA AN INSIDE JOB -------------- ¶4. (C) Agawi said that the Haskanita attack was an "inside" job. "We permitted the rebel groups representative to live with us in the AMIS camps," which allowed the attackers to know exactly where to strike. "The attackers went straight for the ammunition, fuel and vehicles. They even knew where the vehicle keys were stored." As an example of the close relationship the representatives had with AMIS soldiers, Agwai said that a captive AMIS platoon leader, about to be executed, was saved when a representative intervened. "Don't shoot him, he is my friend." ¶5. (C) Agwai said that if we can remove and resolve the MSA, once and for all, it will help the prospects for peace at Tripoli. Agwai added that other issues he wanted resolved during the talks would include: a suspension of the Ceasefire Commission, with an eye to improving the mechanism, improved SOPs for UNAMID, so that they would be able to reaction properly to belligerents. AU-UN TROOP DEPLOYMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) At the CDA's request, Agwai said that he had two concerns that should be raised with the MFA: Diplomatic clearances for incoming flights in support of the deployment of the hybrid forces, and adequate security at airfields. Agwai explained that he did not see any problems in obtaining clearances for the troop deployment as the GOS has not raised any objections to the planned deployment to date. Informed that the U.S. will offer to use U.S. military aircraft to speed up the deployment of troops in the field, Agwai opined that this would be a sensitive issue and offered to raise this matter with the GOS Secretary of Defense. Agwai took the point that GOS acceptance of U.S. deployment of African troops to Darfur would be a gesture of GOS goodwill. ¶7. (C) DLO and CDA noted that Chinese engineers will be starting to arrive on October 9 and the Chinese have expressed concern about the security situation, notably in Nyala. In addition, the approval to build on the intended three kilometer square construction area, near Nyala, has not been approved by the local Wali. Agwai said the he was aware KHARTOUM 00001588 002 OF 002 of the land approval problem and said that the government explained to him the complexity of obtaining a large parcel of land. He said the government assured him that the issue would be resolved in a few days. "The government told me they knew about the importance of having an engineering capability, especially at the logistical hub of Nyala," he said. ¶8. (C) Agwai expressed hope that UNAMID would have a highly effective force by year's end. He said he was disappointed that the offer of Thai troops was rejected by the government, given its desire to have combat troops to be all African, but noted that Bangladeshi and Nepalese troops were accepted. He noted that UNAMID successfully argued with the Sudanese Government for acceptance of Nepalese Special Forces as a Quick Reaction Force, explaining that only the Nepalese have this capability, but said he still sought to make the Nepalese SF/QRF air mobile. "It won't be truly quick reaction" if they don't have the right transport. ¶9. (C) Comment: MSAs provided to rebel commanders have been a constant source of problems with faction leaders seeing them as a continuing entitlement or bribe for good behavior. Sudan's acceptance of some international troops (Nepalese, Pakistani, Egyptian, Jordanian) for UNAMID contrasts with their rejection of others (Thai, Norwegian). End comment. FERNANDEZ