S/E NATSIOS, MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001569 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZIER AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITMANN AND HUDSON ADIS ABBABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS, MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR NAFIE ALI NAFIE REF: KHARTOUM 1557 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) S/E Natsios and Presidential Advisor Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie agreed that they have low expectations for the initial Darfur peace talks in Tripoli, but hope that it may start a process that will eventually bear fruit. Nafie responded defensively to S/E Natsios, proposal for a package of confidence-building measures designed to get the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) back on track (reftel), saying that the SPLM and SPLA, not the NCP or SAF, are responsible for any slow-down in CPA implementation. He then promised that Khartoum will study S/E Natsios, proposals carefully and respond in due time. He agreed that there has been a deterioration in the political environment between the two Government of National Unity (GNU) partners. -------------- Low Expectations for Tripoli Talks -------------- ¶2. (C) In an October 6 meeting, S/E Natsios told Sudanese Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie that he is concerned that the Darfur peace talks in Tripoli will not result in any meaningful progress. He is alarmed that Libyan leader Khadafi is inviting a large cast of foreign notables, including former-U.S. Presidents Carter and Clinton, and is turning the talks into a &circus.8 Nafie agreed that there already are too many negotiating participants in the process and that the additional guests in Tripoli will only complicate things further. S/E Natsios noted that Khartoum has said that these will be the last peace talks on Darfur. He urged that Sudan regard Tripoli as only the initial meeting in a series of talks. Later negotiating sessions still hold the prospect of reaching an agreement. -------------- Focus on North-South -------------- ¶4. (C) S/E Natsios said that the main purpose of his visit was to focus on North-South peace issues. He told Nafie that the United States senses that since January the atmosphere surrounding the CPA has been deteriorating. While President Bashir and FVP Salva Kiir will not sanction a return to conflict, the rhetoric among more junior officers on both sides has been growing more extreme, even violent. S/E Natsios said he is concerned that in the present atmosphere a clash between an SAF and an SPLA unit could escalate into a general conflict that would result in a conventional ) not a guerrilla * war between North and South with disastrous consequences for both. ¶5. (SBU) S/E Natsios argued that the CPA has not failed, but that the situation has begun to slide and action must be taken now to arrest this. Therefore, he proposed a series of steps to reduce tensions (see reftel for full text): -- First, following the Muglad incident in September, the SAF and SPLM have allowed a temporary UNMIS presence in Abyei. S/E Natsios suggested that this presence be maintained, as a means to dispel tensions, until the Abyei question is resolved. -- Second, he proposed a phased pullback of 25 kilometers by the SAF and the SPLA on either side of line 1156, until the border issue is resolved, with UNMIS patrolling the zone in between. -- Third, the United States, Saudi Arabia and China should work jointly to draft a compromise proposal to resolve the question of oilfield security, for consideration by the two sides. Their draft would have to be a consensus of all three, and would be a proposal only, for North and South to accept or reject. -- Finally, both sides should lower their rhetoric. ¶6. (C) All of these steps would be subject to verification. The United States is not looking to be some sort of mediator, KHARTOUM 00001569 002 OF 002 but we want to be helpful. If after three months, both sides have accepted and implemented these measures, S/E Natsios said that he would be prepared to propose that the United States take steps to begin improving relations. He cautioned that full normalization will not be possible at this time, but that Washington could be able take some initial steps in that direction that would be of interest to Khartoum although he cautioned that he had not fully consulted with Washington about this. -------------- CPA Non-Implementation Not Our Fault -------------- ¶7. (C) Nafie responded defensively that the South, not the North, is responsible for any slow-down in CPA implementation. He charged that while the vast majority of SAF forces have been withdrawn north of line 1156, SPLA units continue to operate throughout the South, outside of their garrisons, contrary to the CPA. Nafie argued that some elements in the SPLM are seeking to undermine the CPA process in order to destabilize the North. These forces realize that the SPLM can count on the South in the 2009 national elections. By destabilizing the North, they believe they will win the elections and take control of the national government in Khartoum or sow chaos and turmoil throughout the North. Nafie said that this will never happen, but the CPA might be destroyed in the process. Inspired by the "wild dreams" of "former communist" Yasir Arman and reckless and ambitious SPLM SG Pagan Amum "who wants to be a second John Garang," the South is seeking to foment conflict in the North and in Darfur. He added that the SPLA thought they could create militias and Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in the North to weaken the NCP, but "I can assure you, we don't want war but in case of war, we can do much worse to them than they do to us. I will personally make sure that no Missirriya (some have joined the SPLA) fights on their side." He aded that the SPLM/SPLA had become "ambitious ad agressive" because of U.S. support. ¶8. (C) S/E Natsios and CDA Fernandez responded that they heard many of the same charges made in Juba against the NCP. S/E Natsios said that he had presented this proposal to VP Salva Kiir, who had said the North would never except it. S/E Natsios had told Kiir not to make that assumption, but to see what happens. The proposal is intended to dispel this kind of mutual distrust. The U.S. hopes the two sides will surprise each other. ¶9. (C) On Darfur, Nafie noted that the Darfur talks will need a few people empowered to negotiate. "Too many people will spoil it" and rebel disunity may be too large a problem to overcome. -------------- We,ll Take a Look At It -------------- ¶10. (C) Nafie promised that the NCP will examine the U.S. proposal and give it full consideration. This will take some time, he added. He promised to respond to S/E Natsios when this process is complete. He said that he personally did not believe the United States could or would improve relations with Sudan. "I am quite skeptical," noting "you have your own Pagan Amuns in the U.S." ¶11. (C) Comment: Nafie was relatively unprepared for the CPA enhancement ideas as his caution made clear. His frank and balanced admittance of the problems with the CPA and the GNU was outweighed by his chilling readiness to sow mayhem the South -- should war come again. His complanits about SPLM interference in the North make one wonder about how much in control the NCP feels itself to be on its home turf. End comment. ¶12. (U) S/E Natsios did not have an opportunity to review this message before his departure. FERNANDEZ