FUR SHURA COUNCIL TO S/E NATSIOS: WE NEED GUARANTEES BEFORE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001556 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL AU SU UN SUBJECT: FUR SHURA COUNCIL TO S/E NATSIOS: WE NEED GUARANTEES BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In an October 4 meeting with Special Envoy Natsios, members of the Fur Shura Council in Khartoum claimed that Darfur rebel leader Abdul Wahid Nur would attend negotiations in Libya if he had 'guarantees' that Fur rights, such as compensation, security and return, would be satisfactorily addressed during the talks. S/E said that while Libya was a problematic venue, a Fur presence was key to the talks' success. S/E suggested that a broad statement of principles would be useful before the talks and encouraged the council to press Abdul Wahid to send senior representatives to Libya if he himself would not attend. End summary. -------------- FUR PRESENCE CRUCIAL TO TALKS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In his October 4 meeting with five representatives of the Fur Shura Council in Khartoum, S/E Natsios expressed reservations about the choice of Libya as the venue for the upcoming negotiations, but stressed the need for Fur leader Abdul Wahid to attend. "Why is he so absolutely opposed to negotiations?" he asked. His long litany of pre-conditions to the talks was unrealistic, he said. The U.S. could pressure the Sudanese government to attend, but if the Fur weren't represented -- the most politically sophisticated tribe in Darfur -- negotiations could not succeed. ¶3. (SBU) Thanking the S/E for U.S. continued support for the people of Darfur in a time when they couldn't help themselves, one representative said that only a few factions on the ground in Darfur truly represented the people there; the others were manipulated by the government. The Fur, and Abdul Wahid, were not in principle opposed to negotiations, but objected to having been excluded from any planning consultations. Libyan involvement in Darfur was at the root of the conflict going back decades, he continued, and the regime was known for pitting Arab tribes against Africans. The conflict in Darfur was first and foremost an issue of land, he said, but the government had transformed it into something else. The Fur were the true, real representatives of Darfur, he insisted, and Abdul Wahid was only seeking to preserve their basic rights. Abdul Wahid was not setting pre-conditions when he said that negotiations should not take place without issues such as security, compensation and return being resolved first. "These are not pre-conditions -- these are rights!" -------------- GUARANTEES BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) CDA Fernandez pointed out that there was a difference between being present at negotiations and giving up one's rights. The U.S. wanted attendance but was not demanding acquiescence with Khartoum. While agreeing, the group said that that the Fur couldn't enter negotiations without at least guarantees that their rights would be met during the talks. But these rights were already guaranteed in the DPA, S/E countered. The problem was implementation, he said. ¶5. (SBU) Abdul Wahid's popularity increased tenfold after the "late" Abuja agreement, one representative said, and the government benefited as well. Others who cooperated with the government, like janjaweed militias and former rebels like Minni Minawi, had also profited. They were given key positions in the judiciary, the police and the army, while indigenous Darfuris were kicked out. The government was also controlling the African Union, he said. The international community had not implemented any of the UN resolutions, he continued, and not one of those who committed crimes in Darfur had been brought to justice. The Sudanese Government was hoping for agreement in Libya, as then there would no longer be any need for the hybrid, he claimed. ¶6. (SBU) UNSCR 1769 was adopted in order to implement a peace agreement, not to precede one, S/E said, and neither the presence of UN nor hybrid forces on the ground would guarantee total security in Darfur. If there were a strong statement of principles before the negotiations, S/E asked, would Abdul Wahid attend? "We will tell him to do so," the group said. ¶7. (SBU) Even the former wali of South Darfur had admitted that seventy-five percent of weapons in Darfur came from the government, a representative from Zalengei said. "We need the rule of law, not the rule of the gun." The Fur would never regain all that they'd lost in Darfur, he said; Abdul Wahid simply wanted to see guarantees. "Guarantees are our only card to play." Those Darfuris who had aligned with Minni Minawi (who he characterized as 'illiterate' and 'ignorant') had forgotten a crucial truth, he asserted: the land was named 'Dar Fur,'(Darfur means "home of the Fur") not 'Dar Zaghawa.' The only movements who really represented Darfur were JEM and SLA/Abdul Wahid, he said. The others were either aligned with the government or too weak to matter. -------------- KHARTOUM 00001556 002 OF 002 IF NO ABDUL WAHID, THEN SEND REPRESENTATIVES -------------- ¶8. (SBU) There had been an attempt to arrange an SLM strategy meeting in Mombasa with the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, S/E said, but Abdul Wahid refused to attend, fearing he'd be replaced by his own commanders. We need a political process, S/E argued, and Abdul Wahid's continued opposition was not helpful. "What will happen if IDPs stay in the camps for five or ten more years? And who will give you the guarantees you want?" CDA asked. The international community should, the group said, as they did in Navaisha after the signing of the CPA. At first arguing that the DPA itself should be abandoned, the group scaled back its position a bit and said that the DPA could be the basis for negotiations, but it must be amended, like when the flawed and failed accord with Lam Akol (the Khartoum Agreement of 1997) eventually led to the 2005 CPA. ¶9. (SBU) S/E agreed that a broad statement of principles would be useful prior to talks, but the details should be worked out during negotiations. Libya was only the beginning, he said; there would be other conferences after. If Abdul Wahid wouldn't come, he continued, then he must allow some of his trusted senior commanders and political leaders to represent him. "We will take note of this," the group said. The longer these talks continued, S/E warned, the less likely they would succeed. Success before the 2009 elections would let you vote for your own parties, he told them. Only extremists were interested in elections, one of the representatives argued; "people sitting in IDP camps have other concerns." The group had one final request of the S/E: "Put pressure on the government to accept hybrid troops from outside of Africa." ¶10. (SBU) Comment: Abdul Wahid Nur's influence reaches even into Khartoum as these Fur leaders were strongly in his corner. They were somewhat more flexible than their ostensible leader in his comfortable Paris exile but their positions underscore the need for Fur buy-in with any future agreement. With about seventy percent of IDPs belonging to the Fur, their boycott would derail any real chance of peace and reconciliation in Darfur. End comment. ¶11. (U) S/E Natsios did not clear this cable before his departure.