U/S SIDDIQ: TRIPOLI IS THE LAST CHANCE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001497 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, AF A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KREL AU UN SU SUBJECT: U/S SIDDIQ: TRIPOLI IS THE LAST CHANCE KHARTOUM 00001497 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a September 23 meeting with CDA Fernandez, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and the Sudanese government's UNSCR 1769 implementation coordinator Dr. Mutrif Siddiq called Sudanese support for the resolution "unanimous." Any delays or question regarding UNAMID deployment were technical, not political, he said. CDA commended the Sudanese on their efforts so far to facilitate the lengthy, complicated process of bringing 26,000 troops through Khartoum and to Darfur. On the Tripoli talks, Siddiq said that they presented the "last chance" at peace negotiations. A PAE representative also sat in on the meeting. End summary. -------------- POSITIVE PREPARATIONS FOR UNAMID -------------- ¶2. (SBU) During the meeting, CDA welcomed the progress that had been made so far in implementing UNSCR 1769: "We're seeing some actions as well as words," he noted. CDA cited positive movement on issues such as flight clearances and visas for AMIS contractor Pacific Architects and Engineer's (PAE) camp expansion efforts, and also cautioned that it would be an important, yet difficult, task to keep track of all the details assoicated with UNAMID's deployment. On the issue of Antonov 124s landing in Darfur, Siddiq said that the problems were technical as the only airport capable of sustaining the plane's weight was Khartoum International. "But we've urged the Heavy Support Package engineers to expand the El Fasher airport," he said. ¶3. (SBU) The camp expansions were a "rehearsal" for UNAMID, CDA said, and the international community wanted and needed Sudan's support. "We want to recommend to Washington that Sudan is backing its words with deeds, and is making a qualitative difference." CDA added that this could be a success story for the Sudanese, and could provide an example of the Sudanese government taking a positive role in Darfur. ¶4. (SBU) The Sudanese overwhelemingly welcomed the hybrid force, Siddiq said. Echoing the sentiments of IDPs in Darfur, he said, "We want the security and development that comes with it." The Sudanese goverment was sometimes perplexed, however, by those who said African troops weren't capable of the task. The Europeans could provide experts and financial assistance, but should not "compete" with African countries in providing infantry troops. -------------- TRIPOLI IS THE "LAST CHANCE" -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Perhaps a bigger, more complicated issue than UNSCR 1769 implementation was the upcoming Tripoli meeting, CDA said. It was critical to administer the negotiations well, and to manage expectations; if talks failed, who would be blamed? Siddiq said that if rebel groups sensed that the international community was at all skeptical about the talks, they would not succeed. Many groups in Darfur were making money out of the chaos in the area, he claimed, and the Sudanese government was losing both politically and financially. While the GoS was being drained of resources by Darfur, rebel movements had every incentive to keep the pot boiling by their intransigence. Mutriff underscored the message he wanted to convey to rebel groups: if they didn't join the political process, then they would be considered as opposed to peace. Tripoli was the "last chance" at negotiations before Sudanese elections in 2009. CDA noted that the US also wanted to send the message that Darfur was for all Darfuris (and not only for Fur IDPs). -------------- CPA MISUNDERSTANDINGS -------------- ¶6. (SBU) On the CPA, Siddiq complained that few people knew the "spirit and the letter" of the agreement. The loss of SPLM leader John Garang had been a major blow, and the fact that some major SPLM negotiators like Abdulaziz Helou and Nhial Deng had left the country had weakened the SPLM's understanding of the accord. SAF redeployment from Abyei was one example where the international community was following only one side of the story, he said. The Sudanese goverment was publicly condemned for not redeploying its 3,600 remaining troops by the July 9 deadline, yet there were still JIUs in areas that should have been free of all armed forces. The SPLA had removed its troops from eastern Sudan six months KHARTOUM 00001497 002.2 OF 002 late, with reportedly 3,000 "escaped," yet the NCP had not made "a fuss" about it. The international community should treat Abyei the same way, he suggested. The SPLA had also wildly inflated the numbers of troops it still had in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile areas, and there could be a potentially tricky situation when they finally completed their withdrawal and the numbers didn't match (since the SPLA is being funded for these inflated numbers). With SAF withdrawal at almost 90 percent, he noted, surely that is an accomplishment. ¶7. (SBU) While agreeing that the SAF was closer to completing troop redeployment than the SPLA, CDA stressed that what was important now for Sudan was whether the international community could say that the country was truly a different place than it had been in 2003-2004. "Then we could look forward to expanding our partnership," he said. CDA added that while there was CPA progress, the political mood was "poisonous" and confidence between the two sides needs to be rebuilt. ¶8. (SBU) Comment: Undersecretary Siddiq's claim that the Sudanese government has no political objections to UNAMID deployment is likely exaggerated, but the government -- operating in a more than typically inefficient bureaucracy -- does seem to be taking constructive steps toward facilitating the complicated procedures involved in the force's arrival. These efforts will become necessarily more complex and intricate as preparations for UNAMID step up in the coming weeks and months, and Sudan's compliance with UNSCR 1769 needs to be carefully monitored. At the moment, however, the government seems at least to be matching some words to deeds. Key NCP insider Siddiq's "can do" attitude is a plus, though. End comment. FERNANDEZ