WHAT'S IN A NAME? FOR MINAWI, EVERYTHING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001488

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU US
SUBJECT: WHAT'S IN A NAME? FOR MINAWI, EVERYTHING

KHARTOUM 00001488 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) While flexible on many elements of the DPA--including
a willingness to renounce his position as Senior Assistant to
the President--SLM leader Minni Minawi will reject a change
in the agreement's name or any result from the UN/AU
negotiations that ignores the "courage" his movement showed
in signing the DPA. He has called on the U.S. to articulate
its position on the agreement to shape the peace process
rather than allowing the UN/AU to speak on behalf of the
international community. His position on the UN/AU
negotiations highlights the principal difficulty of the peace
process: the name of the DPA--a redline for both the SLM and
the non-signatories. With the non-signatories fractured and
the international community pliant after the passage of UN
Security Council Resolution 1769, Minawi asserts that Sudan
is under no military or political pressure to compromise, in
essence shifting the burden for peace onto Darfurians (Minawi
and the non-signatories) to compromise among themselves.
Please see para. 7 for a "confidential" draft schedule for
the Libya talks presented by the UN/AU to Minawi and para. 8
for an action request. End summary.

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Flexibility on DPA Provisions, Not Name
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2. (C) Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan Liberation
Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi will accept changes to
many elements of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) as a result
of the UN/AU-led political process for Darfur provided that
the name of the DPA and the name and structure of the
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) remain
unchanged, Minawi told Poloff on September 20. He asserted
that the wealth-sharing and security provisions of the DPA
could be altered without alienating his constituency;
power-sharing at the federal level could also be revised,
including the elimination of the Senior Assistant position.


3. (C) "We're not using the Senior Assistant in the center,"
said Minawi. "It's just a political thing and has no
meaning. We want to use our power in Darfur." Minawi was
clear that he would resign as senior assistant and support
the creation of a Darfur vice presidency slot, with or
without him holding the position, if it meant bringing the
DPA non-signatories to a peace agreement. He was also
willing to resign as chairman of the TDRA and return to "be
with his soldiers and keep their rights." While he is not
opposed to re-consolidating Darfur into a single
region--another key demand of the non-signatory rebel
groups--he predicted it would be impossible until after a
broad-based reconciliation program.

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"DPA Protocol?"
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4. (C) Minawi would, however, reject any result from the
UN/AU process that created a new agreement and negated the
SLM's "courage" in signing the DPA, suggesting that the peace
process culminate in a "Darfur Peace Agreement Protocol."
"The AU (and UN) says that the modalities of the DPA must
change because they're not working," said Minawi. "Who's
responsible for that? The AU, the Government, and the
non-signatories." Having met with representatives of the
UN/AU mediation team on September 19, Minawi resented the
implication that the current peace process would lead to a
final agreement. "I don't like calling these new
negotiations," said Minawi. "It should be called 'dialogue.'"

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Need for U.S. Position
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5. (C) The U.S. should exert leadership in the political
process by declaring its own position on the DPA rather than
allowing UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim
to speak on behalf of the international community, according
to Minawi. Minawi confidant Ali Traio said that the
non-signatories "had no problem with the Government. Their
goal is to discredit the DPA." In response, the U.S. should

KHARTOUM 00001488 002.2 OF 002


play a "vigorous role to protect the agreement." Minawi
concurred, adding that the non-signatories aim only to "sack
the SLM from the Abuja agreement."

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Sudan Under No Pressure to Compromise
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6. (C) While concerned about the effect that the UN/AU
process would have on the DPA, Minawi was pessimistic about
the chances for a successful outcome from the talks scheduled
to begin in Libya at the end of October. With the
non-signatories fractured and the international community
pliant after the passage of UN Security Council Resolution
1769, he said that Sudan was under no military or political
pressure to compromise. "The negotiations will last for
three years," he joked. Pressed by Poloff to describe the
Government's "Achilles' heel," Minawi responded, "what will
kill them is elections." The non-signatories, however, did
not recognize that any arrangements reached during the UN/AU
process "were only for a moment" until the 2009 elections,
according to Minawi. The actions that would make a tangible
difference in the long-term were implementation of the DPA
(meaning weath-sharing issues such as compensation and
development) and disarmament of the "Janjaweed."

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Draft Schedule for Talks
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7. (C) Minawi presented Poloff with a UN/AU draft schedule
for the Libya talks marked "confidential," which he said that
a UN/AU team had given him on September 19. The schedule
describes a five-phase process, beginning with
"Pre-Negotiations" from October 17 to October 26. An
"Opening Session" would follow from October 27 to November 3.
Workshops on security, wealth-sharing, and power-sharing
would then run from November 4 to November 27. An "in situ
mediation recess," to include the parties' review of their
positions, would occur between November 28 and December 2.
The "negotiation" phase would begin on December 3 and
continue until "a time determined by the UN and AU Special
Envoys."

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Request for USG Meetings
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8. (C) Despite resentment toward the U.S. from the rank and
file of the SLM for its perceived lack of support for the
DPA, Minawi insisted that he wanted to maintain close
relations and requested U.S. assistance in two areas: 1) A
meeting between him and A/S Frazer in the region before the
start of the Libya talks to discuss the U.S. position and
cooperate on strategy, and 2) A visit of SLM party leaders
(not/not Minawi) to Washington to "lobby" the SLM's position
with the U.S. government and with non-governmental
institutions and think tanks.

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Comment
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9. (C) Despite his flexibility on much of the substance of
the agreement, Minawi's position on the UN/AU negotiations
highlights the principal difficulty of the peace process: the
name of the DPA--a redline for both the SLM and the
non-signatories. The U.S. "roadmap" for the political
process anticipated this problem in May, suggesting the
"shuttle diplomacy" approach. To date, however, the UN/AU
has not asked Minawi for his actual positions in advance of
the Libya talks. Minawi's analysis of the lack of pressure
on the NCP to compromise at the negotiating table also
underscores another fundamental weakness of the UN/AU peace
process: a focus on obtaining commitments from the rebel
groups as a test of their sincerity without boxing in the
Government and regional actors (who bankroll many of the
rebel groups) in a complementary way--in essence shifting the
burden for peace onto Darfurians (Minawi and the
non-signatories) to compromise among themselves. Mission
supports Minawi's reasonable meeting requests as
circumstances allow. End comment.


10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ