WHAT'S IN A NAME? FOR MINAWI, EVERYTHING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001488 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU US SUBJECT: WHAT'S IN A NAME? FOR MINAWI, EVERYTHING KHARTOUM 00001488 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) While flexible on many elements of the DPA--including a willingness to renounce his position as Senior Assistant to the President--SLM leader Minni Minawi will reject a change in the agreement's name or any result from the UN/AU negotiations that ignores the "courage" his movement showed in signing the DPA. He has called on the U.S. to articulate its position on the agreement to shape the peace process rather than allowing the UN/AU to speak on behalf of the international community. His position on the UN/AU negotiations highlights the principal difficulty of the peace process: the name of the DPA--a redline for both the SLM and the non-signatories. With the non-signatories fractured and the international community pliant after the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1769, Minawi asserts that Sudan is under no military or political pressure to compromise, in essence shifting the burden for peace onto Darfurians (Minawi and the non-signatories) to compromise among themselves. Please see para. 7 for a "confidential" draft schedule for the Libya talks presented by the UN/AU to Minawi and para. 8 for an action request. End summary. -------------- Flexibility on DPA Provisions, Not Name -------------- ¶2. (C) Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi will accept changes to many elements of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) as a result of the UN/AU-led political process for Darfur provided that the name of the DPA and the name and structure of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) remain unchanged, Minawi told Poloff on September 20. He asserted that the wealth-sharing and security provisions of the DPA could be altered without alienating his constituency; power-sharing at the federal level could also be revised, including the elimination of the Senior Assistant position. ¶3. (C) "We're not using the Senior Assistant in the center," said Minawi. "It's just a political thing and has no meaning. We want to use our power in Darfur." Minawi was clear that he would resign as senior assistant and support the creation of a Darfur vice presidency slot, with or without him holding the position, if it meant bringing the DPA non-signatories to a peace agreement. He was also willing to resign as chairman of the TDRA and return to "be with his soldiers and keep their rights." While he is not opposed to re-consolidating Darfur into a single region--another key demand of the non-signatory rebel groups--he predicted it would be impossible until after a broad-based reconciliation program. -------------- "DPA Protocol?" -------------- ¶4. (C) Minawi would, however, reject any result from the UN/AU process that created a new agreement and negated the SLM's "courage" in signing the DPA, suggesting that the peace process culminate in a "Darfur Peace Agreement Protocol." "The AU (and UN) says that the modalities of the DPA must change because they're not working," said Minawi. "Who's responsible for that? The AU, the Government, and the non-signatories." Having met with representatives of the UN/AU mediation team on September 19, Minawi resented the implication that the current peace process would lead to a final agreement. "I don't like calling these new negotiations," said Minawi. "It should be called 'dialogue.'" -------------- Need for U.S. Position -------------- ¶5. (C) The U.S. should exert leadership in the political process by declaring its own position on the DPA rather than allowing UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim to speak on behalf of the international community, according to Minawi. Minawi confidant Ali Traio said that the non-signatories "had no problem with the Government. Their goal is to discredit the DPA." In response, the U.S. should KHARTOUM 00001488 002.2 OF 002 play a "vigorous role to protect the agreement." Minawi concurred, adding that the non-signatories aim only to "sack the SLM from the Abuja agreement." -------------- Sudan Under No Pressure to Compromise -------------- ¶6. (C) While concerned about the effect that the UN/AU process would have on the DPA, Minawi was pessimistic about the chances for a successful outcome from the talks scheduled to begin in Libya at the end of October. With the non-signatories fractured and the international community pliant after the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1769, he said that Sudan was under no military or political pressure to compromise. "The negotiations will last for three years," he joked. Pressed by Poloff to describe the Government's "Achilles' heel," Minawi responded, "what will kill them is elections." The non-signatories, however, did not recognize that any arrangements reached during the UN/AU process "were only for a moment" until the 2009 elections, according to Minawi. The actions that would make a tangible difference in the long-term were implementation of the DPA (meaning weath-sharing issues such as compensation and development) and disarmament of the "Janjaweed." -------------- Draft Schedule for Talks -------------- ¶7. (C) Minawi presented Poloff with a UN/AU draft schedule for the Libya talks marked "confidential," which he said that a UN/AU team had given him on September 19. The schedule describes a five-phase process, beginning with "Pre-Negotiations" from October 17 to October 26. An "Opening Session" would follow from October 27 to November 3. Workshops on security, wealth-sharing, and power-sharing would then run from November 4 to November 27. An "in situ mediation recess," to include the parties' review of their positions, would occur between November 28 and December 2. The "negotiation" phase would begin on December 3 and continue until "a time determined by the UN and AU Special Envoys." -------------- Request for USG Meetings -------------- ¶8. (C) Despite resentment toward the U.S. from the rank and file of the SLM for its perceived lack of support for the DPA, Minawi insisted that he wanted to maintain close relations and requested U.S. assistance in two areas: 1) A meeting between him and A/S Frazer in the region before the start of the Libya talks to discuss the U.S. position and cooperate on strategy, and 2) A visit of SLM party leaders (not/not Minawi) to Washington to "lobby" the SLM's position with the U.S. government and with non-governmental institutions and think tanks. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite his flexibility on much of the substance of the agreement, Minawi's position on the UN/AU negotiations highlights the principal difficulty of the peace process: the name of the DPA--a redline for both the SLM and the non-signatories. The U.S. "roadmap" for the political process anticipated this problem in May, suggesting the "shuttle diplomacy" approach. To date, however, the UN/AU has not asked Minawi for his actual positions in advance of the Libya talks. Minawi's analysis of the lack of pressure on the NCP to compromise at the negotiating table also underscores another fundamental weakness of the UN/AU peace process: a focus on obtaining commitments from the rebel groups as a test of their sincerity without boxing in the Government and regional actors (who bankroll many of the rebel groups) in a complementary way--in essence shifting the burden for peace onto Darfurians (Minawi and the non-signatories) to compromise among themselves. Mission supports Minawi's reasonable meeting requests as circumstances allow. End comment. ¶10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ