FM AKOL DISCUSSES UNGA, U.S.-SUDAN RELATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001472

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU US
SUBJECT: FM AKOL DISCUSSES UNGA, U.S.-SUDAN RELATIONS


Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Meeting with Foreign Minister Lam Akol, CDA
Fernandez previewed two critical issues that would be raised
during Akol's visit to New York on September 21: Sudan's
cooperation on facilitating the deployment of the UN-African
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the hold put on the
release of over 4,000 tons of U.S.-grown World Food Program
(WFP) rations for Darfur. CDA Fernandez encouraged Akol to
raise Sudan's concerns about the bilateral relationship with
the U.S. delegation in New York, noting that Washington was
interested in exploring the possibility of an improvement in
relations. Akol said that he planned to ask the U.S. for
assistance in ensuring broad rebel participation in the
Darfur peace talks scheduled for October. End summary.

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PKO "Growing Immensely"
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2. (C) In a September 18 meeting with Foreign Minister Lam
Akol, CDA Fernandez previewed two issues that he expected to
be discussion points during Akol's September 21 meeting with
Deputy Secretary Negroponte in New York: Sudan's cooperation
on facilitating the deployment of the UN-African Union
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the delay in the release of
over 4,000 tons of U.S.-grown World Food Program (WFP)
rations for Darfur. CDA Fernandez explained that the
deployment of UNAMID presented a massive administrative
challenge given the amount of equipment and personnel that
would need to enter the country. "Procedures for UNMIS and
AMIS will be in overdrive with the hybrid, in fourth gear,"
said CDA Fernandez. He predicted that some in the Sudanese
Government would "look to make trouble" by throwing up
administrative roadblocks and urged that Sudan avoid such
actions, which the international community would interpret as
official Sudanese policy.


3. (C) Akol said that Sudan was committed to UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1769. He insisted that Khartoum
was not acting under pressure from international public
opinion but because, unlike UNSCR 1706, it had been consulted
in the drafting of the resolution. The inter-agency
technical committee charged with PKO deployment and headed by
MFA Undersecretary Mutriff Siddiq had met September 12 and
had "cleared" several land issues, including one for the
UNAMID base in Zalingei, according to Akol. "We understand
the enormity of the task and the size of the equipment needs,
and we are moving," he assured the CDA. CDA asked that the
Sudanese Government expedite the movement of people and
equipment from US contractor PAE so that everything can be
made ready in time for the October 14 arrival of a new Rwanda
Battalion. This process has worked relatively well so far
but it needs to be accelerated as UNAMID deployment begins in
earnest.

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Food Rations
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4. (C) A contentious discussion ensued when CDA Fernandez
raised the issue of the 4,000 metric tons of WFP food rations
held in customs because the Sudanese Government questioned
the health impact of consuming genetically modified organisms
(GMO). The CDA said that WFP would have to cut the rations
for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Darfur in October
if the issue was not resolved--which would cause a negative
backlash against Khartoum just as the Darfur peace talks were
beginning in Libya. "This is a perfect example of what
drives people outside Sudan crazy," said the CDA.


5. (C) Unyielding, Akol said that Europe was as equally
concerned as Sudan about genetically modified products and
said that Sudan "must adhere to our standards." He then
dismissed the issue, saying that it was being handled by the
Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC). CDA Fernandez again
underscored the importance of urgently addressing the
problem, noting that the possibly incorrect perception in the
West would be that Sudan was trying to starve the people of
Darfur. Akol asked, "couldn,t you just donate ordinary
sorghum, that is what the people eat there and what you used
to donate in the past?"

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Atmosphere for Frank Discussions
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6. (C) On both the deployment of the hybrid force and the
release of the WFP rations from customs, CDA Fernandez said
that Sudan had the opportunity to change the perception in
the U.S. that Khartoum "could not be trusted." Akol said
that Sudan felt the same about the U.S. While he recognized
that Sudanese foreign policy before 2005 had antagonized the
West, Khartoum believed that a new chapter would open in the
bilateral relationship with the U.S. following the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Instead, the
U.S. had an overt bias in favor of Southern Sudan and Darfur
as a whole. Recent sanctions directed at the Northern half
of the country, coming just after Sudan had agreed to the UN
Heavy Support Package for the African Union Mission in Sudan
(AMIS),typified this policy. "I thought you were serious
about the unity of the country, but you are going to scuttle
the CPA...If the long range view like this continues with
bumpy relations, the CPA suffers, Darfur suffers, and Sudan
suffers," said Akol. Charge noted that the bilateral
environment was somewhat better than it was at last year,s
UNGA and Akol heartily agreed.


7. (C) CDA Fernandez encouraged Akol to engage the U.S.
delegation in New York to raise the "issues that really
bother Sudan, to be frank with them. There is interest in DC
to see if/if there can be an improvement in relations." The
U.S. distrusted Sudan's sincerity, and while it recognized
recent positive actions, such as agreement to UNSCR 1769 and
the release of former Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)
humanitarian coordinator Suleiman Jamous, trust needed to be
rebuilt to the point where issues such as WFP rations could
be dealt with in an "automatic way."

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Rebel Participation in Libya Essential
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8. (C) Akol said that he intended to request U.S. assistance
in ensuring the participation of all of the Darfur rebel
movements at the peace talks in Libya to begin October 27.
"Attendance is the basic thing," said Akol. "We want this
meeting to be the last one." CDA Fernandez concurred that
while "you can't force the parties to agree to an agreement,
they should attend." He said that the U.S. was concerned
that some rebels thought they could gain more by staying out
of the process. According to Akol, U.S. criticism of Sudan
empowered the more intransigent rebel elements, which
interpreted U.S. criticism as support for their cause. CDA
Fernandez highlighted the U.S. statement condemning the
recent Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)/SLA-Unity attack
in Kordofan as an example of the U.S.' balanced approach.
Akol added that Sudan does not want the talks to fail and
certainly does not want to be blamed for the rebel,s
intransigence.


9. (C) Comment: The internal contradictions which are Lam
Akol were fully on display in this relatively cordial
(despite the exchange on the GMO Food for Peace shipment)
meeting. As a renegade Southerner alienated from the SPLM and
relying on NCP support to stay in office, Akol has to be more
aggressive than any Northerner would be. The SPLM wants him
out but the NCP is convinced of his utility. Akol also
discounted any possibility of a return to war with the South,
something which deeply worries many of his Southern
colleagues. With very full briefings this week for both
Minister of State Al-Wasila and Foreign Minister Akol, the
Sudanese should certainly not be surprised by any concerns we
raise in New York. How specifically and positively they
respond to these concerns will be evidence of both their
political will and their own administrative ability and
internal decision-making process. End comment.
FERNANDEZ