TRACK TO LIBYA TALKS FRAUGHT WITH HURDLES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001436 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU US LY SUBJECT: TRACK TO LIBYA TALKS FRAUGHT WITH HURDLES KHARTOUM 00001436 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) While the announcement of UN/AU-brokered negotiations between Sudan and Darfur's rebels is a very positive step toward ending the conflict, five hurdles obstruct the track to talks in Libya at the end of October: disunity within the rebel factions; ongoing hostilities on the ground; the Fur's continued support for intransigent rebel leader Abdulwahid Al Nur; the selection of Libya as a venue for the talks, which resulted from a lack of a joint UN/AU negotiator monitoring the situation on the ground; and unreasonable expectations for the outcome of the negotiations. These hurdles, however, present an opportunity for the U.S. to exert leadership in the next seven weeks, and throughout the negotiations, by articulating explicit positions on key issues. Though our ability to shape the UN/AU strategy may be limited to pressing for the immediate appointment of a joint UN/AU chief negotiator, Darfur's rebels--and even the Sudanese Government--view the U.S. as the guarantor of any agreement, and we should utilize this leverage to address the other hurdles. End summary. -------------- Disunity -------------- ¶2. (C) Disunity continues to plague the Darfur rebel factions. The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) remains fractured between at least eight different groups based on competing ethnic and political rivalries. The few groups with significant military strength are not allied with any political leader. A definitive rift has also opened within the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),traditionally the most cohesive of Darfur's insurgent groups. One faction, led by Khalil Ibrahim, has political clout but little military capacity. Another group, controlled by Bahar Abu Gharda (who represented JEM at the July Arusha conference sponsored by the UN and AU) and Abdallah Banda, lacks charismatic leadership but controls most of the movement's armed elements. ¶3. (C) While it may be difficult to reconcile JEM at this stage, the SLA factions continue to express an interest in coming together for an internal dialogue facilitated by outside mediators. Though this request has fallen on deaf ears in the UN and AU, the SLA cannot participate productively in negotiations without a decision-making mechanism to form positions on key issues. Beginning September 16, the UN/AU plan to hold a meeting of the seven "leading personalities" from Arusha (plus one aide) in N'djamena to bring the rebel groups to a common platform and determine an agenda for the October talks, an impossible task given the level of disunity and the limited number of participants. The absence of a more comprehensive UN/AU strategy to bring cohesion within the Darfur movements, particularly the SLA, before the start of negotiations will leave them vulnerable to the Sudanese Government, which will adeptly exploit the rebels' divisions. ¶4. (C) Recommendation: At the highest levels, the U.S. should continue to press the UN and AU to make a serious effort to consolidate the gains made in Arusha and facilitate better coordination among the rebel groups in advance of negotiations. At the same time, we should publicly state our view that the rebels must have the opportunity for internal dialogue prior to the start of negotiations. -------------- Ongoing Hostilities -------------- ¶5. (C) Combined with an expected rush among the movements to position themselves for negotiations, the rebels' political fissures are also fueling an expansion of hostilities. The recent JEM/SLA-Unity attack in Kordofan represented a bloody and cynical attempt by the militarily-weak Ibrahim to bolster his credibility in the face of Abu Gharda and Banda's defection. A UN official who met with Ibrahim on September 9 told Poloff that Ibrahim proclaimed JEM is fighting for all of the marginalized people of Sudan, including those in Kordofan. A September 10 clash between JEM/SLA-Unity and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) near Haskanita, South Darfur, which included Government aerial bombing, was related to the KHARTOUM 00001436 002.2 OF 003 earlier attack in Kordofan, according to UN and AU officials, which had led to the death of over 40 policemen. Negotiations cannot succeed in an environment of ongoing hostilities, particularly if the violence spreads from Darfur to neighboring regions of the country. Rebel support for a cessation of hostilities, however, will be difficult to achieve without a serious UN/AU-sponsored effort to bring cohesion to the rebel factions, including the field commanders. ¶6. (C) Recommendation: The U.S. should call on Sudan and the Darfur rebel groups to sign an immediate cessation of hostilities in the runup to the talks and state our intention to view violations of such an agreement as a lack of commitment to the UN/AU peace process. Rebel provocations which lead to violent responses by the SAF are counterproductive. -------------- Abdulwahid and the Fur -------------- ¶7. (C) Abdulwahid Al Nur still commands the loyalty of a broad swath of the Fur and has declared he will not attend the talks in Libya. Though some Fur leaders, such as Ahmed Diraige, have real pockets of support in Darfur, Abdulwahid has no serious rival for leadership of the Fur, either among civilians or the armed SLA fighters. The UN/AU has taken tentative steps to undermine his support by appealing to the Fur's desire for their voice to be included in the peace process. The absence of a UN/AU strategy to bring the political and military elements of the rebel groups into dialogue, however, has heightened Abdulwahid's intransigence. Even commanders allied with Abdulwahid continue to request outside assistance for internal dialogue, both to bring pressure on Abdulwahid to join the peace process and to strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis the Government prior to the talks. ¶8. (C) Recommendation: Western threats against Abdulwahid increase his popularity among the Fur. Instead, the U.S. should deliver a consistent message to the Fur that Abdulwahid's gamesmanship will not earn them greater concessions but instead alienate them from the process. Privately, Abdulwahid needs to be warned that there will be consequences to his sabotage of the peace talks. -------------- Venue -------------- ¶9. (S) The selection of Libya as a venue for talks has opened a Pandora's box. Libya has an interventionist history in Darfur, including military support for rebel groups--both directly and via Chad. SLA-Unity commander Abdullah Yehia received a massive infusion of Libyan support just prior to the Arusha conference and has been traveling Darfur dispersing newly-acquired weaponry and supplies to his forces in recent weeks, according to the UN. Tripoli is as unpredictable as it is impartial, and the UN/AU has ceded a significant amount of control over the negotiations by holding them in Libya. As one UN official told Poloff, half of the negotiations will be between Sudan and the rebels, the other half between the UN/AU and Libya. In his announcement of the venue for talks, Ban had said negotiations would "begin" in Libya, which UN officials are interpreting as an opening to shift their location if the negotiations stall. ¶10. (S) UN and AU officials admit that Eritrea is furious at the selection of Libya as host for the talks and anticipate that Asmara will take action either to undermine the process or open a separate negotiating track. One Eritrean liaison to the Darfur rebels, Abdullah Jabar, has been in N'djamena in recent days. A UN source predicted that Jabar may be attempting to lure the break-away JEM faction of Abu Gharda and Banda toward Asmara to complicate the process and create more violence and chaos. ¶11. (S) The selection of the Libyan venue also highlights the inefficiency of a joint UN/AU decision making process in the absence of a strong chief negotiator on the ground to exert leadership. Several UN and AU sources report that AU Chairman Alpha Omer Konare pushed for Libya against UN objections. President Bashir then told visiting UNSYG Ban Ki Moon that he supported Libya as well, which tipped the scales KHARTOUM 00001436 003.2 OF 003 in Tripoli's favor. National Congress Party (NCP) insider Saeed Al Khatib told CDA Fernandez on September 11, however, that Sudan was concerned about the Libyan venue and Bashir had only conceded because he could not oppose Qaddhafi without UN cover (to be reported septel). ¶12. (S) Recommendation: The UN/AU and the international community view the U.S. as the Western power with the most influence over Libya. We should consider putting Tripoli on notice that we are closely following its actions toward Darfur and expect them to be a constructive host for the negotiations. We should also engage with the UN and AU at the highest level to appoint a joint negotiator immediately to avoid similar missteps, such as occurred with the selection of the venue, as the peace process proceeds. -------------- Unreasonable Expectations -------------- ¶13. (C) Despite numerous hurdles to successful talks, expectations as to their outcome are still unreasonably high--as are expectations of the concessions that the rebels can achieve through negotiation. The rebellion in Darfur erupted to some degree as a response to a perceived exclusion from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This sentiment persists, and the rebels do not share the international community's belief that the CPA is the vehicle for democratic transformation in Sudan, which will complicate productive negotiations on power-sharing. Opposition to the DPA is even more acute, though this opposition is based more on symbolism than on disagreement with the fundamentals of the document. The UN/AU process has failed to set realistic parameters and outcomes for the negotiations and to underscore that compromise will be necessary on both sides, within the framework of both the CPA and the DPA. Progress was made in Arusha when the rebels acknowledged that both the 2004 Declaration of Principles and the DPA were important documents, but much more work remains on this issue before the start of negotiations. ¶14. (C) Recommendation: Sustainable security agreements underpin all other elements of a solution to the Darfur crisis--including reconciliation, reconstruction, and development. The U.S. can make an explicit statement that a realistic outcome for the negotiations would be an effective and sustainable set of security arrangements, coupled with adjustments to the DPA to address the reasonable grievances of the rebel groups on power and wealth-sharing. We should also underscore our view that the CPA is the vehicle for building a prosperous future for all of Sudan. ¶15. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ