Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM1427
2007-09-11 09:00:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

AU, UN, PARTNERS PLAN ACTION ON SECURITY

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU 
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VZCZCXRO3697
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1427/01 2540900
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 110900Z SEP 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8469
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001427 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: AU, UN, PARTNERS PLAN ACTION ON SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001427 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: AU, UN, PARTNERS PLAN ACTION ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ¶1. (SBU) The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) called a long-awaited working group meeting in Khartoum on September 4 to invigorate discussion of the ailing security provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). With the arrival of Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada and Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai, representatives from the AU, the UN, the U.S. and the UK discussed a plan of action for addressing the break-down in the DPA's security mechanisms, including the Cease-fire Commission (CFC) and the Joint Commission (JC), and the rise in banditry and attacks against AMIS and humanitarian organizations in Darfur. -------------- Breakdown in the CFC, JC -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The CFC and the Joint Commission had ceased to function, according to JC Secretary Abubakr Rufai. The majority of SLM representatives were absent from the CFC in protest of a reduction in the monthly subsistence allowance (MSA),meaning cease-fire investigations could not occur. The Sudanese Government, which the AU claimed was "quietly behind" the protest, had delayed progress on a plan for Janjaweed disarmament. The CFC could thus focus on only one component of its mandate: verification of areas of control. While the AU had completed its verification report in recent weeks, it was awaiting revisions from the DPA signatories. Meanwhile, lack of political leadership over the DPA signatory commanders--i.e. the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)/Minawi--had led to a rise of anarchy in the field, according to AU Head of DPA Implementation Sam Ibok. -------------- Freeze DPA or Fix Political Issues? -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Ibok suggested that with the arrival of Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada and Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai, the UN and AU needed to make a "clean break" from the security provisions associated with the DPA as part of the new UN/AU peace process. He said that the UN/AU Joint Mediation Support Team was studying the options for a cessation of hostilities that could be effectively monitored. While Ibok recommended a complete "freeze" of implementation of the security provisions, other participants--including some from the AU--cautioned that such an action would gi
ve the impression that the international community had abandoned the DPA. Poloff asserted that the problem with the security mechanisms was political, not structural. The focus should be on reversing the breakdown in command and control within the SLM/Minawi and providing incentives to the DPA signatories and the non-signatories to participate in effective security arrangements. -------------- Non-Military Support -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Abdul Mohammed, the head of the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC),advised that a series of confidence building measures among the SLM/Minawi commanders, AMIS, and the humanitarian organizations should be put in place. While the international community should make clear that the decision to reduce the MSA--which was not designed as a source of income for the movement's commanders--was non-negotiable, Mohammed cautioned that the SLM should "not be pushed into thinking there is no reason to be a part of the (security and political) process anymore." Referring to the recent completion of the AU report on areas of control, UN Director of Political Affairs Abidoun Bashua asked if the UN/AU could launch a program to provide non-military logistical support to meet the basic needs of the commanders and their families, which would decrease the motivation for looting and banditry. The UK representative emphasized the importance of addressing security issues with the commanders at the local level and not just in Khartoum or the Darfur state capitals. Poloff noted that the SLM had approached the U.S. and the AU regarding a proposed conference with the SLM political leadership and the field to address the threats against humanitarian operations, the MSA issue, the dysfunction in the CFC, and non-military support. Ibok was supportive of the proposal and agreed to work with Poloff to help the SLM focus its strategy. -------------- Action Points KHARTOUM 00001427 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The participants adopted three action points at the conclusion of the meeting: 1) AMIS will prepare a briefing paper on the status of funding and payment of the MSA to date, 2) AMIS and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),in consultation with the U.S. and the UK, will prepare suggestions for an interim arrangement for a cessation of hostilities and an effective monitoring capacity, and 3) AMIS will prepare a proposal to provide non-military logistical support to the DPA signatory movements. The working group agreed to meet on September 16 to review progress on the proposals, which would then be raised to the chief of mission level. FERNANDEZ

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