AMIS FORCE COMMANDER ADAMANT ON HAVING CFC US AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001416

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: AMIS FORCE COMMANDER ADAMANT ON HAVING CFC US AND
UN OBSERVERS PRESENT WHEN MEETING WITH GOS DELGATION
CONCERNING JANJAWEED/ARMED MILITIA DISARMAMENT PLAN

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Several days before the visit of the UN Secretary
General to Darfur, the GoS announced on short notice that it
was sending out a delegation to discuss the Janjaweed/Armed
Militia Disarmament Plan in El Fasher with AMIS. Force
Commander GEN Agwai met with the Ceasefire Commission (CFC),
including its US and UN observers, to prepare for the GoS
delegation. He showed considerable political savvy and
skepticism about the GoS. When he and the CFC did meet with
the GoS delegation, the GoS delegation objected to the
presence of the US and UN observers. GEN Agwai insisted on
their presence, and the meeting was terminated.

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FORCE COMMANDER'S APPROACH
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2. (C) On 1 September, GEN Agwai met with the CFC members
(AMIS plus the US military and civilian observers, and the UN
military observer, a Norwegian LTC) to prepare for the 3
September meeting with the GoS delegation. He admitted he
was not an expert on the proposed plan nor its current state
of play. However, he felt the goal of the GoS in calling
this short-notice meeting was to show that Darfur was not as
bad as portrayed, and that the meeting was deliberately timed
to come right before the UNSG's visit. GEN Agwai's principal
concern was that the GoS was trying to set the stage so that
AMIS would be blamed for the non-implementation of the plan.


3. (C) Accordingly, he wanted to be able to respond overall
favorably to the GoS plan so that the onus would be back on
the GoS to move forward. On the other hand, he recognized
that the CFC team that had analyzed the original plan had
several serious reservations about it.


4. (C) GEN Agwai noted that the issue was a political one
as well as a military one, and wished he had more political
expertise available. S/CRS Field Off, the only civilian
present, concurred that the GoS was likely to try to blame
AMIS for any delay, and recommended anticipating GoS
criticisms and preparing rebuttals to them, ideas which Gen
Agwai suppported. (Note: Field Off later passed on GEN
Agwai's comments to the AMIS PolOff, encouraging her to start
attending CFC meetings again. End note.)

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US MIL OB KEY TO THE AMIS MEETING PREPARATION
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5. (C) The US CFC Military Observer had been part of the
team that originally evaluated the GoS initial proposed plan.
The AMIS staff have virtually no staff officer skills or
capacity, so the US Mil Ob took the initiative to help the
CFC draft a position paper and talking points for GEN Agwai,
meeting with him several times.

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GoS OBJECTS TO US AND UN OBSERVERS,
NOTHING SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSED
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6. (C) The Force Commander and CFC met with the GoS
delegation (MGEN Abdulraman, MGEN Moubarak Abdulla, and BGEN
Salah Makhwi, NFI) on 3 September. After the initial
welcoming remarks and pleasantries, the GoS delgation
objected to the presence of the US military and civilian
observers, and the UN military observer. They said that in
their 28 August letter to JSR Adada proposing this meeting,
they had specifically said that they only wanted "African
experts" present.


7. (C) GEN Agwai said he had not seen that letter, but that
AMIS had sent a letter to the GoS explaining that it intended
to have all CFC members and observers attend. The GoS
delegation said they had not seen that letter. GEN Agwai
insisted that this meeting was a CFC matter, and therefore he
needed all the members and observers present, distinguishing
it from a Force Commander-only meeting.


8. (C) At this point the meeting terminated, with both

KHARTOUM 00001416 002 OF 002


sides saying they would seek guidance from their higher
headquarters. It was not possible to meet again before the
UNSG visit, and we have no indication when there will be
another follow-up meeting, which will hopefully get to
substantive issues.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) GEN Agwai is clearly very politically savvy,
realizes the weaknesses of AMIS, but wants to protect its
reputation as much as possible. He also has no illusions
about the GoS. This is typical Sudanese regime behavior: An
emphasis on process over substance, amnd the appearance
rather than the reality of progress.


10. (C) The CFC preparation for the meeting highlights its
limited capacity and that of AMIS in general. Although some
of the AMIS CFC members had made significant substantive
contributions to the evaluation of the GoS plan, none was
prepared to draft a memorandum paper with key points for
their commander. Fortunately, the US Military Observer took
the initiative to guide them on basic staff officer work. In
addition, the basic chronology of the plan and its review by
AMIS does indicate that AMIS took up much of the time. In
fairness to AMIS, however, the GoS made assertions and
provided incomplete information, which lengthened the time
AMIS needed for its evaluation.


11. (C) This was GEN Agwai's first meeting with a GoS
military delegation in Darfur, and he demonstrated his
independence, both as the current AMIS Force Commander and as
the future hybrid commander. His strong support for touching
base with and seeking input from non-African advisers bodes
well against GoS attempts to manipulate the AMIS and hybrid
force. This will not be the last time they will try.
FERNANDEZ