AMIS FORCE COMMANDER ADAMANT ON HAVING CFC US AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001416 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2017 TAGS: PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU SUBJECT: AMIS FORCE COMMANDER ADAMANT ON HAVING CFC US AND UN OBSERVERS PRESENT WHEN MEETING WITH GOS DELGATION CONCERNING JANJAWEED/ARMED MILITIA DISARMAMENT PLAN Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Several days before the visit of the UN Secretary General to Darfur, the GoS announced on short notice that it was sending out a delegation to discuss the Janjaweed/Armed Militia Disarmament Plan in El Fasher with AMIS. Force Commander GEN Agwai met with the Ceasefire Commission (CFC), including its US and UN observers, to prepare for the GoS delegation. He showed considerable political savvy and skepticism about the GoS. When he and the CFC did meet with the GoS delegation, the GoS delegation objected to the presence of the US and UN observers. GEN Agwai insisted on their presence, and the meeting was terminated. -------------- FORCE COMMANDER'S APPROACH -------------- ¶2. (C) On 1 September, GEN Agwai met with the CFC members (AMIS plus the US military and civilian observers, and the UN military observer, a Norwegian LTC) to prepare for the 3 September meeting with the GoS delegation. He admitted he was not an expert on the proposed plan nor its current state of play. However, he felt the goal of the GoS in calling this short-notice meeting was to show that Darfur was not as bad as portrayed, and that the meeting was deliberately timed to come right before the UNSG's visit. GEN Agwai's principal concern was that the GoS was trying to set the stage so that AMIS would be blamed for the non-implementation of the plan. ¶3. (C) Accordingly, he wanted to be able to respond overall favorably to the GoS plan so that the onus would be back on the GoS to move forward. On the other hand, he recognized that the CFC team that had analyzed the original plan had several serious reservations about it. ¶4. (C) GEN Agwai noted that the issue was a political one as well as a military one, and wished he had more political expertise available. S/CRS Field Off, the only civilian present, concurred that the GoS was likely to try to blame AMIS for any delay, and recommended anticipating GoS criticisms and preparing rebuttals to them, ideas which Gen Agwai suppported. (Note: Field Off later passed on GEN Agwai's comments to the AMIS PolOff, encouraging her to start attending CFC meetings again. End note.) -------------- US MIL OB KEY TO THE AMIS MEETING PREPARATION -------------- ¶5. (C) The US CFC Military Observer had been part of the team that originally evaluated the GoS initial proposed plan. The AMIS staff have virtually no staff officer skills or capacity, so the US Mil Ob took the initiative to help the CFC draft a position paper and talking points for GEN Agwai, meeting with him several times. -------------- GoS OBJECTS TO US AND UN OBSERVERS, NOTHING SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSED -------------- ¶6. (C) The Force Commander and CFC met with the GoS delegation (MGEN Abdulraman, MGEN Moubarak Abdulla, and BGEN Salah Makhwi, NFI) on 3 September. After the initial welcoming remarks and pleasantries, the GoS delgation objected to the presence of the US military and civilian observers, and the UN military observer. They said that in their 28 August letter to JSR Adada proposing this meeting, they had specifically said that they only wanted "African experts" present. ¶7. (C) GEN Agwai said he had not seen that letter, but that AMIS had sent a letter to the GoS explaining that it intended to have all CFC members and observers attend. The GoS delegation said they had not seen that letter. GEN Agwai insisted that this meeting was a CFC matter, and therefore he needed all the members and observers present, distinguishing it from a Force Commander-only meeting. ¶8. (C) At this point the meeting terminated, with both KHARTOUM 00001416 002 OF 002 sides saying they would seek guidance from their higher headquarters. It was not possible to meet again before the UNSG visit, and we have no indication when there will be another follow-up meeting, which will hopefully get to substantive issues. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) GEN Agwai is clearly very politically savvy, realizes the weaknesses of AMIS, but wants to protect its reputation as much as possible. He also has no illusions about the GoS. This is typical Sudanese regime behavior: An emphasis on process over substance, amnd the appearance rather than the reality of progress. ¶10. (C) The CFC preparation for the meeting highlights its limited capacity and that of AMIS in general. Although some of the AMIS CFC members had made significant substantive contributions to the evaluation of the GoS plan, none was prepared to draft a memorandum paper with key points for their commander. Fortunately, the US Military Observer took the initiative to guide them on basic staff officer work. In addition, the basic chronology of the plan and its review by AMIS does indicate that AMIS took up much of the time. In fairness to AMIS, however, the GoS made assertions and provided incomplete information, which lengthened the time AMIS needed for its evaluation. ¶11. (C) This was GEN Agwai's first meeting with a GoS military delegation in Darfur, and he demonstrated his independence, both as the current AMIS Force Commander and as the future hybrid commander. His strong support for touching base with and seeking input from non-African advisers bodes well against GoS attempts to manipulate the AMIS and hybrid force. This will not be the last time they will try. FERNANDEZ