Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM1415
2007-09-09 10:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SAF/SPLA STAND-OFF COMES CLOSE TO EXPLODING

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS MARR MOPS EPET SU 
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VZCZCXRO2052
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1415/01 2521006
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091006Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8444
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001415 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MARR MOPS EPET SU
SUBJECT: SAF/SPLA STAND-OFF COMES CLOSE TO EXPLODING

REF: IIR 6890050207

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001415 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MARR MOPS EPET SU SUBJECT: SAF/SPLA STAND-OFF COMES CLOSE TO EXPLODING REF: IIR 6890050207 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The tank-supported SAF encirclement of an SPLA platoon in Muglad, Southern Kordofan, has reportedly been resolved. The Joint Defense Board convened an emergency session in Khartoum the morning of September 8, and the Ceasefire Political Commission met and ordered SPLA forces to immediately withdraw from the town. The SPLM claims that NCP leadership disavows directing the incident. End summary. ¶2. (C) On or about September 6, SPLA Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) Malual Majok informed the Government of Southern Sudan that he, and a platoon 50-60 SPLA senior officers and force protection elements, had been seized by SAF forces in Muglad in the vicinity of the Heglig oil fields. The platoon was encircled during the start of the confrontation by at least six SAF tanks. SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum provided Acting CG Juba, Acting P/E Chief, and visiting AF/SPG DeskOff with details of the incident on September 8. ¶3. (C) An SPLA platoon resident in Muglad (north of Abyei town in Southern Kordofan) for the last month was in the process of returning to Bentiu (Unity State) after integrating former SAF-aligned militias (commonly referred to as Other Armed Groups) and disaffected Misseriya militia and armed youth wings into the SPLA. The senior SPLA officers in question had been traveling between various &SAF militia bases8 in Southern Kordofan, finalizing recruitment. DMI Malaul Majok and the SPLA Director of Military Organization led the SPLA mission. Senior SPLA sources told ConGen DLO that Majok,s presence in the region was specifically ordered by Government of Southern Sudan President Salva Kiir Mayardit. According to Amum, SAF based in Muglad were fully aware of the SPLA activities in the region. ¶4. (C) (Note: The SPLA has been actively recruiting from Arab Misseriya communities since March 2007 for an SPLA-sponsored &police force8 in Southern Kordofan. SPLA recruitment has been complemented by SPLM membership drives within the traditionally NCP-aligned Misseriya communities in Southern Kordofan. Misseriya youth have become increasingly disaffected by the absence of Khartoum-generated peace dividends in Southern
Kordofan. SPLA recruitment, in marked contrast, has brought tangible rewards in the form of food and paychecks. End note.) ¶5. (C) On September 6, the surrounded SPLA platoon refused demands that they surrender to SAF forces, turn over their uniforms, their weapons, and meet with SAF officers in an adjoining building &for a meeting,8 and a stand-off ensued. SAF forces denied water and food to the SPLA troops and reinforced their position tanks. Amum claimed a local prominent Misseriya sheik intervened mid-way through on the first day of the stand-off and pressed the SAF to provide food and water, arguing that to not do so &would be an offense under Islam.8 ¶6. (C) On September 7, Acting CG was informed by Minister for Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng that the NCP and SPLM were actively seized with the issue, and had been in close but unproductive contact. On September 8, SPLM SG Amum told ConGen staff that the SPLM had &credible intelligence8 alleging that NISS Director Salah Ghosh was working the issue from both sides, advising players at the national-level to talk through the matter, while telling SAF forces on the ground to &shoot the SPLA if they do not surrender willingly.8 Amum was open about senior GOSS concerns about the scope of the ensuing conflict should senior SPLA forces be killed by SAF in the Abyei region. ¶7. (C) The Joint Defense Board convened an emergency session in Khartoum the morning of September 8, and the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) met later that day and ordered the SPLA troops to withdraw from Muglad. Amum described the standoff to ConGen staff in a calm but determined fashion, arguing that, even if the SPLA were in the wrong in this instance, Juba would be justified in taking similar action. Amum contended that SAF &illegally resident8 in the South in Unity state and elsewhere after the CPA-mandated July 9 redeployment date &could, and should, be surrounded by a cordon of SPLA,8 and lamented the lack of an immediate response by UNMIS to the incident. ¶8. (C) CDA Fernandez spoke to Acting Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Taye Brooke-Zerihoun on September 7 and 8 about the incident. Zerihoun noted that UNMIS had been worried about just this type of potential flashpoint KHARTOUM 00001415 002 OF 002 when it had pressed the two sides for full access in Abyei. He characterized the incident as "the SPLA being caught with its pants down" by the SAF, noting that an SPLA/SPLM misstep in the area had been exploited by SAF (or NISS) in a way that intensifies tensions within different factions of the SPLA/SPLM and underscores the relative weakness of the SPLA in comparison to the SAF. He added that while this incident was resolved, this does not bode well for the future. ¶9. (C) Comment: SPLM senior leadership openly admit that recent political activities in Southern Kordofan (membership drives and the like) have proven &politically worrisome8 to Khartoum. SPLA mid-level officers criticized their superiors, decision to send a high-profile officer to carry out this component of an SPLA recruitment campaign, given indisputable political and military tensions in the oil-rich Abyei region. GOSS leadership has routinely and recently forecast SAF provocation of a military incident in the South,s oil fields. However, this particular incident appears to have been exacerbated by SPLA failure to delegate duties to a more junior, and perhaps, more appropriate level. This incident underscores the need for continued USG support and attention to CPA implementation and especially the Abyei tinderbox. FERNANDEZ

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