UN/AU, SPLM IRONICALLY OUT OF STEP ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001411

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL UN AU SU
SUBJECT: UN/AU, SPLM IRONICALLY OUT OF STEP ON DARFUR
STRATEGY

REF: A. KHARTOUM 01359


B. KHARTOUM 01384

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) The UN/AU and the SPLM are proceeding along two
parallel tracks in their political initiatives for Darfur.
While the SPLM hopes to hold a meeting in Southern Sudan in
the next two weeks to bring unity to the SLM and prepare the
movement for negotiations, the UN/AU have positioned
themselves to hold a preparatory meeting--prior to the SPLM
event--with all of the Darfur movements to cement a single
negotiating team and an agenda for UN/AU-sponsored talks in
October. Before determining a date and venue for their
meeting, the UN/AU are awaiting the outcome of a senior SPLM
delegation's visit to Abdulwahid al Nur and a more specific
timeline and participant list for the SPLM conference.
Ironically, the SPLM's approach to facilitate SLM unity,
followed by negotiation preparation, would lay the groundwork
for UN/AU-brokered talks. However, legitimate concerns about
the SPLM's level of Darfur expertise and limited
organizational capacity make it difficult to convince the
UN/AU to more properly sequence their strategy for the next
six weeks. End summary.

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SPLM to Focus on SLM Unity...
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2. (SBU) Meeting with POLOFF and Norwegian POLOFF on
September 4, the UN/AU Joint Mediation Support Team's (JMST)
point person for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM),Vladimir Zhagora (please protect),outlined two
parallel UN/AU and SPLM initiatives for the Darfur political
process. Based on several recent conversations with the SPLM
Darfur Taskforce and Government of Southern Sudan Vice
President Riek Machar, who has emerged as the leading SPLM
official handling the Darfur initiative, Zhagora said that
the SPLM planned to concentrate on unifying the Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) and building the capacity of all of
the Darfur movements to prepare them for negotiations.
Though the SPLM had initially envisioned a meeting of all the
Darfur rebel groups--including the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM)--Zhagora said they had since "done their
homework" and were limiting an event in Southern Sudan to the
SLM. (Note: JEM has often refused to attend a meeting in
Southern Sudan. End note.)

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...But UN/AU Hedges Bet
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3. (SBU) Doubting that the SPLM will be able to organize such
an event, the UN/AU is hedging its bet and moving ahead with
a meeting of the seven "leading personalities" and the
associated Darfur rebel movements from the late-July Arusha
conference. The UN/AU intends for the meeting to take place
in mid-September before the SPLM event. The focus of this
meeting would be to determine the manner in which the Darfur
rebel factions are represented at UN/AU-sponsored talks in
October as well as an agenda for those negotiations. Zhagora
contended that all of the JEM and SLM factions could
ultimately be represented by a single negotiating team at the
October talks, commenting that political unity and the
composition of a negotiating team were parallel tracks.

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SPLM Delegation Heads to Paris
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4. (SBU) According to Zhagora, a delegation of senior SPLM
officials is traveling to Paris September 4-7 in a final
effort to secure SLM faction leader Abdulwahid al Nur's
participation in a meeting in Southern Sudan. Riek had
suggested to Zhagora that the SPLM would offer Abdulwahid the
position of "head of delegation" to represent the SLM at the
October talks as an incentive for his participation. (Note:
It is unclear how the SPLM intends to secure agreement on
such an appointment from the plethora of SLM factions. End
note.) Riek planned to return to Juba on September 7, at
which point the SPLM would finalize a schedule for their
event.

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5. (SBU) Prior to AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim's August 24
meeting with SPLM officials in Juba, the UN/AU had planned a
preparatory meeting for the Darfur movements in early
September (Ref. A). After his meeting with First Vice
President Salva Kiir, Salim gave his support for an SPLM
meeting on the condition that it occur before September 15.
To determine a date and venue for the UN/AU preparatory
meeting, the JMST is now awaiting the outcome of the SPLM's
Paris trip, the release of a schedule for the SPLM meeting,
and a list of confirmed participants, said Zhagora.

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Questions Persists on SPLM Plan
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6. (C) Zhagora acknowledged that several questions on the
SPLM's strategy, including Abdulwahid's attendance, remain
unanswered. Ahmed Diraige is "not excited" with an event in
Juba, said Zhagora, based on ill will between him and the
SPLM dating to the early 1990s and a fear that a
re-unification of the SLM would undermine his political
leverage. Eritrea's role in the SPLM initiative is also
unclear. (Note: Acting Special Representative of the UN
Secretary General told CDA Fernandez on September 1 that

SIPDIS
Asmara was using the SPLM to unite Darfur rebel commanders
with Eritrean-backed political leaders (Ref. B). End note.)
The SPLM had asked the UN/AU to provide transportation for
the participants but also intended to present the UN/AU with
a more detailed list of requirements for their event.
Zhagora predicted the SPLM would also solicit support
directly from donors, which many in the JMST view as a
negation of the UN/AU lead in the political process as
endorsed in the November 2006 Addis Ababa agreement and the
Tripoli Consensus of April.

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Comment
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7. (C) We have long maintained that the severe fractures
within the SLM will make it impossible for a limited number
of rebel leaders to represent the views--and thus gain buy-in
to the peace process--of the disparate factions without a
strategy for SLM unity prior to negotiations. It is also
unrealistic to expect that a joint JEM-SLM negotiating team
can be formed unless the SLM adopt JEM's national political
agenda--which would be a worrisome development in its own
right. Ironically, the SPLM's approach to facilitate SLM
unity, followed by negotiation preparation, would lay the
groundwork for UN/AU-brokered talks. However, legitimate
concerns about the SPLM's level of Darfur expertise and
limited organizational capacity make it difficult to convince
the UN/AU to more properly sequence their strategy for the
next six weeks. End comment.
FERNANDEZ