MINAWI: "WE WILL NOT BE VICTIMIZED"

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001386 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, NEA A/S WELCH NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UN AU SU SA SUBJECT: MINAWI: "WE WILL NOT BE VICTIMIZED" REF: A. KHARTOUM 01133 ¶B. KHARTOUM 01303 ¶C. KHARTOUM 01373 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) See para. 10 for recommendation. ¶2. (S/NF) In a recent meeting with CDA Fernandez, SLM leader Minni Minawi lamented the loss of international support for the DPA and warned that "we will not be victimized." While supportive of enhancing the agreement in the context of upcoming negotiations brokered by the UN/AU--"DPA Plus," for example--he vowed to oppose changing the name, a symbolic shift that would negate the SLM's status as a signatory. Minawi underscored the importance of U.S. backing for the SLM and reiterated his request for U.S. facilitation of Saudi financial support. According to Minawi, important armed rebel factions remain outside the UN/AU political process, and politicians continue to manipulate sentiment in the IDP camps. He predicted that these dynamics would doom the UN/AU peace process. Minawi described a recent visit to West Darfur as an example of the potential for Arab-African reconciliation if the security situation is stable. End summary. -------------- DPA Fades But "We Will Not Be Victimized" -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi told CDA Fernandez on September 1 that "the DPA has totally lost the support of the international community. Everyone is acting as if it's canceled, and it's negatively affecting us." When asked if he believed that he and the SLM would be the scapegoats for a "DPA II" resulting from the UN/AU political process, Minawi responded: "We will not be victimized. A 'DPA Plus' is ok, but we can't have a new name." (Note: Discussing a recent meeting between UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and Minawi in El Fasher, a UN official present at the meeting told Poloff recently that Minawi had offered to relinquish the post of Senior Assistant to the President "to make peace in Darfur" as long as the name of the DPA did not change. End note.) -------------- U.S.--and Saudi--Support Essential -------------- 
 ¶4. (S/NF) Minawi underscored the importance of U.S. support for the SLM. He said he had seen "U.S. fingers" in his late-July trip to Saudi Arabia--which had laid the foundation for successful meetings with senior Saudi officials, including King Abdullah--and asked for an update on Saudi financial support for the SLM (Refs. A and B). CDA Fernandez said that the U.S. will continue to press the Saudis and emphasized that the U.S. still views Minawi's role as essential to peace in Darfur. Minawi recalled a conversation with Vice President Ali Osman Taha when Taha had told him, "We like the Americans. The Americans always tell you (the rebels) to talk, talk, talk. The Eritreans and the Chadians say, 'talk and fight.'" (Note: Minawi recounted this same story in late March after Sudanese security forces killed 10 SLM partisans and ransacked the SLM party headquarters in Khartoum, which left much of the SLM rank and file agitating for a return to armed struggle. Minawi may now consider himself and his movement in similarly dire circumstances (Ref. C). End note.) -------------- UN/AU Process Neglects Key Groups -------------- ¶5. (C) Minawi said that the UN/AU have neglected important armed factions of the Darfur rebels, without whom the security situation will not improve and the peace process will fail. The key to a successful process was "who will be in what position," an issue that the UN/AU had not addressed. Minawi, however, is working to bring the excluded groups into political dialogue, particularly a breakaway faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Abdullah Banda. He said that the UN/AU, however, has discouraged him KHARTOUM 00001386 002 OF 003 from doing so. Responding to a question from the CDA, Minawi welcomed the impending release of former SLM humanitarian coordinator Suleiman Jamous. Though he characterized Jamous, JEM, and Sudanese Islamist Hassan al Turabi as "the same thing," he said it was better that "Jamous be free." He doubted, however, that Jamous will be able to "guide his people" into the political process under the truncated UN/AU timeline. -------------- IDP Politics -------------- ¶6. (C) Minawi described the situation in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps as "confused" and "manipulated by Sudan's politicians," for which he blamed Darfur rebel leaders, such as SLM faction head Abdulwahid al Nur; opposition parties; and the National Congress Party (NCP). Broad reconciliation within the Darfur population is impossible without "the political hands out of Darfur." The camps are fractured between people who want to return home and others who do not. Some groups concentrate on security as their priority while others focus on compensation. A third group is absorbed by "camp politics," said Minawi. -------------- Tribal Fighting Worsens -------------- ¶7. (C) Inter-tribal fighting made it less likely that a peace agreement under the current UN/AU strategy could succeed, as Arabs had been left outside the process. The Habaniya were fighting the Falata, the Maalia fighting the Zaghawa, and the Tarjum fighting the Rizeigat. Minawi attributed the violence to former South Darfur governor Al Hajj Attal Mannan's manipulation of tribal tensions. He inferred that the SLM is now too weak to fight off the Arab tribes, as it had done in the past, and said that it has relinquished its traditional hold over Haskanita. -------------- Arab, Non-Arab Reconciliation Possible -------------- ¶8. (C) Minawi said that reconciliation between Arab and non-Arab tribes is possible in areas where security has improved. Pointing to the example of West Darfur, where the security situation is more stable than that in South Darfur, he described a recent meeting with Arab and African tribal leaders in El Geneina. African tribes want to return to their land, now occupied by Arabs--who fear that the Africans will kill them if they return. Both groups had accepted Minawi's suggested compromise that the Africans trade assurances of security for a return of their land. Minawi said that such reconciliation programs could occur throughout the region as the UN-African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) deploys and can guarantee the agreements. ¶9. (S/NF) Regarding reports that Chadian Arabs were resettling in Darfur under Government sponsorship, Minawi said the migration of Arabs had been occurring since at least 1996 and that it was impossible--and irrelevent--to separate people in West Darfur by nationality as the same African and Arab tribes lived on both sides of the border. He felt that reports of highly organized, mass demographic engineering in Darfur by the Sudanese Government were far-fetched. However, Minawi said that he had heard reports of "white people in camps" in the areas of Mukhjar and Mornei during his recent visit to West Darfur and that Governor Abdulgassem Imam was investigating. He assumed they could be foreign jihadists but was not sure. (Note: UN officials and NGO workers have reported intermittent sightings of foreign Arabs in West Darfur since March. End note.) -------------- Comment and Recommendation -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) Minawi was disheartened that right after his Saudi trip, Minister of Defense Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein visited the same Saudi officials. It would be disappointing if our friends the Saudis listened more to a key regime hardliner (who in 2006 called for "jihad, victory, and martyrdom" against UN troops in Darfur) rather than a pro-Western peacemaker like Minawi. Embassy recommends that Washington (NEA and AF) keep encouraging Saudi engagement with Minawi as an excellent way for Riyadh to support peace in Darfur and an KHARTOUM 00001386 003 OF 003 improvement in Sudanese-American relations. End comment and recommendation. FERNANDEZ