ON THE ROAD AHEAD, MINAWI SEES ALL DEAD ENDS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001373

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AS S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: ON THE ROAD AHEAD, MINAWI SEES ALL DEAD ENDS

REF: KHARTOUM 01337

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (S/NF) Characterizing the DPA as "dead, except to the
U.S.," predicting that the UN/AU political process will fail,
doubting that NCP policies toward Darfur can be changed
through the 2009 elections and yet convinced that a return to
war is useless, SLM leader Minni Minawi is seeking to chart a
new--yet vague--course between adherence to the DPA and a
return to armed struggle. During an August 30 meeting with
Poloff, Minawi at turns suggested military cooperation with
the SPLA and then asserted that the SLM could never form more
than an electoral coalition with the SPLM. Minawi's shift in
rhetoric comes after his August 29 return from three weeks in
Darfur, where he had stared down a revolt within the
political leadership of his movement and the UN/AU had
discouraged him from attempts to bring DPA non-signatory
factions under the SLM. Despite these frustrations, Minawi
recalled how he has weathered three previous challenges to
his leadership. Having proven himself a survivor, he was
focused on finding a path for the next "three to four years"
and welcomed dialogue with the USG as he considers the road
ahead. CDA Fernandez will meet with Minawi on September 1.
End summary.

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No DPA, No New Agreement, No War
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2. (S/NF) In an August 30 meeting with Poloff after an
extended trip to Darfur, Senior Assistant to the President
and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi
acknowledged that many, including President Bashir, had
wondered if he would return to Khartoum. Reflective after
three weeks spent throughout Darfur--and a short trip to
Southern Sudan to meet with senior officials in the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)--Minawi said that
he is seeking to chart a middle course between adherence to
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and a return to armed
struggle. "The DPA is not successful, a new agreement will
not be successful, and war will not be successful," he
explained, ironically upbeat despite the absence of any
viable options for the SLM's future.

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"DPA Dead"
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3. (S/NF) Minawi characterized the DPA as "dead, except in
the U.S." While suggesting that it was time to adjust to
this reality, he offered disjointed thoughts on his next
steps. SLM commanders in and around El Fasher and in South
Darfur were restless, often unresponsive to his leadership,
and "abusing the name of the SLM." Minawi saw two solutions:
1) provision of food to stem the need for looting among his
fighters who had no other source of support, and 2) military
training, facilitated by the SPLA, to occupy the commanders.
He said that many of the rogue fighters had no income and no
choice but to steal either food or vehicles (to sell in Chad)
to provide for themselves and their families.

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SPLA Military Cooperation, But Not on Secession
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4. (S/NF) SPLA Chief of Staff Oyai Deng had supported
SPLA-SLA cooperation during a recent meeting with Minawi in
Juba. Minawi proposed that the training could involve about
500 commanders and could benefit from U.S. assistance.
Acknowledging that it would be difficult to conduct such
training without the knowledge of the National Congress Party
(NCP),Minawi suggested that the commanders could go in
groups of "two or three" by civilian aircraft from Khartoum
to Juba. Minawi was contradictory in the ultimate aim of
military cooperation with the SPLA. While an electoral
coalition with the SPLM was possible for 2009, the SLM and
Darfur could never support the South if it chose to secede,
said Minawi--who hinted that he did not think the SPLM would
participate in elections because it is focused on secession.
However, he had come to realize that the NCP would also never

KHARTOUM 00001373 002 OF 003


allow free elections in Darfur and had lost hope in changing
Khartoum's policies toward the region through the ballot box.

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UN/AU Process Excludes Key Groups
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5. (S/NF) A successful outcome for the UN/AU political
process was also doubtful, said Minawi. At least four key
armed groups were excluded from the process: 1) A faction led
by Adam Ali Shoggar in North Darfur; 2) The largest military
wing of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by
Abdullah Banda that has split from the leadership of Khalil
Ibrahim (reftel); 3) A splinter group of former G-19
commander Adam Bakheit led by Omar Jelba and Ahmed Suleiman
in North Darfur; and 4) A loosely-allied network of "bandits"
in Jebel Marra who had split from the factions led by
Abdulwahid al Nur and Ahmed Abdulshafie. If a new agreement
were signed with only the Arusha participants, Minawi
predicted that it would suffer the same fate as the DPA.

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Eliasson, Salim Discourage Minawi's Efforts
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6. (S/NF) Minawi had raised these concerns during recent
meetings with UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed
Salim. Both envoys had brushed aside Minawi's views, saying
that the inclusion of groups who did not participate in the
early-August Arusha meeting would "create confusion." At the
request of Shoggar and Banda, Minawi had planned to travel to
North Darfur to discuss their accession to the DPA. However,
Salim had urged him not to deal with the non-signatories
outside the UN/AU process, and the AU helicopter previously
scheduled to fly Minawi North was canceled after his meeting
with Salim. In frustration, Minawi had raised his concern
about the exclusion of certain armed groups from the
political process with AU Force Commander Martin Luther
Agwai, who replied that it was not his job to interfere in
politics and that decisions on the political track (and on
the helicopter) were "out of our control." "Why are these
people punishing me?" Minawi questioned, vowing to return to
Darfur in five days to visit the commanders in North Darfur,
with or without the AU transportation.

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Unrest within the SLM
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7. (S/NF) Minawi had also stared down a leadership challenge
during the recent meeting of the SLM Revolutionary Council in
El Fasher. While Minawi was in North Darfur, SLM Secretary
General Mustafa Tirab, acting "under the table" with the NCP,
had hijacked the meeting's agenda, according to Minawi.
Tirab had steered the discussion toward removal of Minawi as
chairman of the SLM. After Minawi had arrived days later, he
had confronted the Council and offered to resign if they
cited their objections to his leadership. The delegates had
then relented and returned to the initial agenda proposed by
Minawi: increasing the size of the leadership and legislative
councils and reforming internal party organs to reflect the
political--rather than military--nature of the movement.


8. (S/NF) Confident that he had re-asserted his leadership,
Minawi recalled three previous occasions when he had
responded to unrest within the movement by offering to
resign: once during the 2004 Haskanita conference, when he
canceled a meeting with then-Deputy Secretary Zoellick to
return to Darfur and confront challenges to his position
inspired by Chadian emissaries and then-SLM humanitarian
coordinator Suleiman Jamous; later during the Abuja talks
when there was a plot to assassinate him on the Chadian
border; and finally after Abuja, when he had initially
refused the post of Senior Assistant to the President in
response to objections from Tirab and the command leadership.

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Comment
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9. (S/NF) Minawi asserts that his recent trip gave him a more
sophisticated understanding of the dynamics in the field that
he had lacked while in Khartoum. He sees "many
hands"--non-signatory movements, the NCP, opposition
political parties, and foreign governments--dividing the

KHARTOUM 00001373 003 OF 003


movements of Darfur, including his own SLM. Viewing the DPA,
the UN/AU political process, and a renewed armed struggle as
dead ends, Minawi is desperate to chart a new course,
particularly in light of the unrest within his movement and
the UN/AU's neglect of his role in the political process. He
continues to value U.S. input on his next steps while
realizing there are no great options. While USG support for
SLM military training is in direct contravention of the
sequencing of the DPA, the lack of food and basic medical
care for the SLM fighters has caused the rise of banditry and
could be addressed by a transparent and sustainable program
for non-military logistical support. End comment.
FERNANDEZ