Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM1359
2007-08-29 15:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

AU ENVOY: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, COMPENSATION

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3298
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1359/01 2411515
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291515Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8332
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001359 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: AU ENVOY: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, COMPENSATION
"DOABLE" AT DARFUR TALKS

REF: KHARTOUM 01337

Classified By: DCM Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001359

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: AU ENVOY: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, COMPENSATION
"DOABLE" AT DARFUR TALKS

REF: KHARTOUM 01337

Classified By: DCM Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) At the tail-end of his recent visit to Sudan, AU
Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim told the international community in
Khartoum that agreement on a cessation of hostilities and
compensation between Sudan and Darfur's rebels were "doable"
outcomes for the UN/AU-led negotiations scheduled to begin in
October. He called on Europe to "use its influence" to press
intransigent rebel leader Abdulwahid al Nur to participate in
the political process and noted that Abdulwahid's Fur
constituency shared the concerns of Darfur's other ethnic
groups: security, compensation, power-sharing, and return to
their villages. In an attempt to clear the air with the
SPLM, Salim had voiced support for their proposed meeting in
Southern Sudan to unite the fractured rebel movements.
However, UN and working-level AU officials admit privately
that Salim prematurely gave this support, given the
difficulty of uniting JEM with the SLM factions (or even
getting JEM representatives to come to Juba) and the SPLM's
questionable credibility among many of the rebel groups. End
summary.

--------------
Talks Should Focus on Security, Compensation
--------------


2. (SBU) During an August 28 briefing for the Khartoum
diplomatic corps at the end of his six-day trip to Sudan,
African Union Special Envoy for Darfur Salim Ahmed Salim said
that the AU, UN and the international community should
prioritize its goals for the outcome of the political
negotiations scheduled for October. The focus should be on
achieving a cessation of hostilities and addressing the issue
of compensation, according to Salim. While admitting that
his past experience on the Darfur file "has taught me not to
prophesize," he characterized a cessation of hostilities
between the Darfur rebel movements and the Sudanese

Government "as the first point of agreement for a successful
peace process." He said agreement on both issues was
"doable" during the upcoming talks.

--------------
Abdulwahid is Europe's Responsibility
--------------


3. (C) Responding to a question from the Rwandan Ambassador
about Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader
Abdulwahid al Nur's role in the peace process, Salim asked
for the help of European governments in preventing Abdulwahid
from "holding the process hostage" by setting impractical
conditions for his participation. "Simply use your
(Europe's) influence to encourage him to join the peace
process--and certainly not to use a European capital to mount
a campaign against it." (Note: In a meeting with Poloff on
August 29, a senior UN official suggested that international
consensus on expelling Abdulwahid from Europe if he continues
to obstruct the peace process would be a positive outcome of
the September 21 high-level meeting on Darfur preceding the
UN General Assembly. End note.)

--------------
Fur's Concerns "Identical" to Rest of Darfur
--------------


4. (SBU) Salim's recent visit to Sudan included trips to El
Geneina and Zalingei in West Darfur as part of a UN/AU
strategy to engage Darfurians allied with Abdulwahid
(reftel). While internally displaced persons (IDPs) in
Zalingei refused to meet with Salim based on a widespread
resentment toward the AU, Fur leaders were included in a
subsequent meeting in El Geneina. Salim described their
concerns as identical to those he had heard in previous
visits to North and South Darfur: security; compensation;
power-sharing to address the marginalization of Darfurians,
particularly in the central government; and the desire to
return to their villages.

--------------
Clearing the Air with the SPLM...

KHARTOUM 00001359 002 OF 003


--------------


5. (C) On August 24, Salim had also traveled to Juba to meet
with First Vice President Salva Kiir, Minister in the Office
of the President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)
Luka Biong Deng, and Vice President of the GoSS Riek
Machar--who has taken a lead role on the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement's (SPLM) initiative for Darfur. Salim
said these meetings had "cleared the air," after the SPLM had
earlier blamed the UN/AU for undermining their initiative to
prepare the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories for
negotiations.

--------------
...But SPLM Must Act Soon
--------------


6. (SBU) The SPLM had proposed a meeting of the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) and the factions of the SLM,
including Abdulwahid. Salim said he had voiced support for
the SPLM meeting--"they're free if they want to try to
organize the movements"-- provided it was held within the
next two weeks. "Otherwise we will need to look at other
options." Salim said that prior to his trip to Juba, the
UN/AU had planned to convene a meeting of the movements in
early September to organize the factions' negotiating team.
After addressing the internal fissures of the rebel groups,
the UN/AU then intended to conduct "bilateral" consultations
with the factions before the October negotiations to flesh
out their specific demands and lay a foundation for the talks.

--------------
NCP Flexible on Date, Venue for Talks
--------------


7. (SBU) The AU Envoy reiterated the UN/AU's focus on
determining a venue and start date for negotiations by early
September. Salim had met with President Bashir on August 27
and "found the President having a flexible approach to these
issues." Based on his discussion with Bashir, Salim said
that the National Congress Party (NCP) was concerned that
foreign governments were not exerting sufficient pressure on
the rebel movements to come to negotiations. Sudan feared a
repetition of the DPA, where holdout rebel factions refuse to
sign an agreement and then "are not discarded by those
outside."

--------------
No Strategy for Civil Society, IDPs
--------------


8. (SBU) The UN/AU have not yet defined the level of
participation of civil society groups, traditional leaders,
and IDPs in the talks, according to Salim, but "we have
concluded they must be involved." The Nigerian Ambassador
questioned whether it was realistic to include all of these
groups' views in the political process given the current
timeframe. While Salim acknowledged that the Government and
the rebel factions would be the primary stakeholders and that
the participation of civil society should not be "overdone,"
he said that the UN/AU wanted their role to be more than just
"symbolic." "We do not, however, have a strategy for this
yet," he explained.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) Salim's description of UN/AU plans to facilitate more
organization within the rebel factions and then convene
bilateral consultations with them prior to negotiations is
consistent with the USG-proposed "shuttle diplomacy"
approach. However, UN officials complain privately that
Salim prematurely agreed to the SPLM meeting--and later had
second thoughts about his support for it--due to the
difficulty of uniting JEM with the SLM factions, the SPLM's
questionable credibility with many of the Darfur movements,
and JEM's continued refusal to attend meetings in Southern
Sudan. The UN--and even working-level AU officials--predict
the SPLM effort will fail, having cost the mediators valuable
time to conduct shuttle diplomacy. A more realistic approach
might be for the USG to encourage the SPLM to support a
UN/AU-organized meeting outside Sudan to promote unity within
the SLM. The SPLM could play a lead role in such a meeting
by articulating their own history of disunity and the lessons

KHARTOUM 00001359 003 OF 003


learned from their years of negotiations with the NCP. The
meeting would benefit from UN/AU logistical and financial
support and might draw out Abdulwahid--who continues to list
security as a reason he cannot participate in meetings in
Sudan. End comment.
FERNANDEZ