DARFUR - ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE PEACE PROCESS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001172 SIPDIS SENSITIVE AIDAC SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA AND USAID/REDSO GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU USUN FOR TMALY BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI UN SU SUBJECT: DARFUR - ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE PEACE PROCESS REF: A) KHARTOUM 1085, B) KHARTOUM 1094, C) KHARTOUM 1102, D) KHARTOUM 1119, E) KHARTOUM 1132, F) TRIPOLI 618 KHARTOUM 00001172 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Between July 12 and 19, USAID staff met with key civil society representatives in South and West Darfur to follow up on issues raised during the U.S. Special Envoy's visit to Nyala, gauge the views of civil society representatives in El Geneina, and assess possible areas of USG intervention to connect local-level peacebuilding efforts to the U.N./African Union (AU)-led negotiation process. Darfur's civil society representatives are eager to engage in and support the negotiations, and their participation will lend important credibility to any new agreements. However, they do not have adequate access to key decision-makers in the international community and their efforts are largely disconnected from the higher-level political process. End summary. -------------- -------------- SOUTH DARFUR: WHO WILL ORGANIZE IDPS AND CIVIL SOCIETY? -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Ahali Group for Darfur Salvation, led by Ahmoud Rijal, Magdoom of the Fur Tribe, has begun efforts to build consensus about the peace process among civil society stakeholders in Darfur (reftel A). The group described their plan to build on these efforts by organizing a representative process for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in all three states. The proposed process would involve elections in each IDP camp in Darfur based on proportional representation by population; training for the 200-300 individuals elected; and the formation of a 25-member steering committee to represent IDPs in future negotiations. The group is coordinating with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and believes that the SPLM will provide security and protection during this process. ¶3. (SBU) The Darfur Forum, a civil society group with representatives in Darfur and Khartoum, has also organized preliminary consensus-building workshops in Darfur (reftel A). The group would like to organize a consultative process for civil society including conferences, negotiations, and true reconciliations throughout Darfur. The proposed process would include 500 participants from the target groups in previous workshops (IDPs, women, youth, lawyers, and unions, among others, who they refer to as the "silent majority") and broader representation than is called for in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultations (DDDC). The group said that during recent DDDC consultations in Nyala, participants concluded that the DDDC process was not authentic and expressed this concern to DDDC facilitator Abdul Mohammed (reftel D). Darfur Forum members believe that the international community will be able to provide protection to them if they organize such a process. ¶4. (SBU) Comment: Although civil society groups in South Darfur have significant organizational capacity, strong commitment to peace, and represent many key stakeholders in the peace process, they seem to be disconnected from political developments at the national and international level, other than the brief consultations held by the DDDC committee (reftel C). Additionally, although some sort of representational process must be organized to lend authenticity to any future negotiations, it is not clear that Darfurians will perceive any of these groups, regardless of how representative, as possessing the legitimacy to organize such a process. End comment. -------------- -------------- WEST DARFUR: WHO WILL REPRESENT ARAB COMMUNITIES? -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) In West Darfur, there are far fewer civil society groups active in peacebuilding and political activities, and those that exist are weak or government-affiliated. In a recent meeting in El Geneina, the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) Head of Office told USAID staff that DDDC facilitator Abdul Mohammed was in El Geneina for four days in early July. Mohammed held DDDC consultative meetings with elites, civil society, and IDPs, in addition to meeting with native administration officials. UNMIS felt that the workshops were well attended and participants were happy with them. UNMIS speculated that, in contrast to South Darfur, there are fewer players in West Darfur and therefore it would be easier to get the right people around the table. KHARTOUM 00001172 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (SBU) During the DDDC consultations, security was identified as the number one concern, primarily in the northern corridor from El Geneina to Kulbus. The second concern was land occupation, and third was the role of the hybrid force. UNMIS stated that land occupation emerged as a major impediment to dialogue, but that occupation of land by Arabs from outside Sudan (reftels B and E) cannot appropriately be dealt with in the context of the DDDC. After the consultations, Mohammed met with the U.N. Country Team, which stressed the importance of consulting Arab communities, and recommended that he return for a week solely to consult Arab groups in their localities. UNMIS indicated that it is particularly important to consult Arab communities where they live, as opposed to speaking with leaders in El Geneina, as the discussions will be more authentic. ¶7. (SBU) The importance of including Arab communities in the consultation process and determining how they will be represented in negotiations was confirmed in another meeting between USAID staff and representatives of an Arab group in El Geneina. The group, which calls itself "The Reformers", comprises moderate West Darfurians of Arab background. One of the main leaders is an Arab who previously supported the government but has since joined Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/Minawi) faction, and is also a state parliamentarian. Other group members are teachers or broadcast media workers. They estimate that there are 450 individuals of Arab background who have joined the SLA, including three in the group's executive committee. Ninety percent of the members are youth, which includes ages 18-35 in Sudan. The group is trying to create a common vision among Arab communities that provides an alternative to the government and National Congress Party. ¶8. (SBU) The group said that the government and the international community have marginalized Arab communities in Darfur, politically and in terms of service provision. They said that Arab communities, especially those that have not participated in the conflict, feel isolated and angry as a result. The group would like to conduct outreach to the local and international community on the role of Arab communities in peacebuilding, drawing on influential leaders, youth, and neutral groups. The group also emphasized the need for tangible service provision in Arab communities. Comment: The views expressed by this group underline the fact that, although the Sudanese government was presumed to serve as a proxy for all Arab groups at the Abuja negotiations, this can no longer be assumed. End comment. FERNANDEZ