DENG ALOR: NCP-SPLM AT LOGGERHEADS ON ABYEI, SAF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001157

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN SU
SUBJECT: DENG ALOR: NCP-SPLM AT LOGGERHEADS ON ABYEI, SAF
REDEPLOYMENT

REF: A. KHARTOUM 00984


B. KHARTOUM 01150

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (U) This cable has an action request (see para. 11).


2. (C) The SPLM and the NCP have reached an impasse on the
status of Abyei and the redeployment of the Sudanese Armed
Forces from Southern Sudan, Minister of Cabinet Affairs Deng
Alor told CDA Fernandez. Following senior-level internal
consultations, the SPLM was considering three options for
resolving Abyei: Recognizing the present administration,
proposing UN administration through 2011, or calling for an
IGAD summit on the issue--all of which the NCP would oppose.
The SPLM had also considered requesting a UN force to
maintain security in the oil areas of Upper Nile and Unity
States to facilitate a SAF withdrawal. First Vice President
Salva Kiir planned to discuss Abyei and the delayed SAF
redeployment with President Bashir on July 25. CDA Fernandez
said that the NCP was "playing a dangerous game" by
obstructing positive action on implementation of the CPA and
resolution of the Darfur conflict. End summary.

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NCP-SPLM Impasse on Abyei
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3. (C) Meeting with CDA Fernandez on July 25, a somber
Minister of Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor said that the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National Congress
Party (NCP) were at loggerheads over two issue critical to
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA):
the status of Abyei and the redeployment of the Sudanese
Armed Forces (SAF) from Southern Sudan. Alor said that the
SPLM-NCP discussions on Abyei had deteriorated since his last
meeting with the CDA in June (Ref. A). While he and Vice
President Ali Osman Taha had agreed that the key issue was
oil, Taha had since rejected the SPLM proposal to share oil
revenues between the North and South. After Alor's
objections, Taha had then suggested that the Government of
Southern Sudan (GoSS) could assume control of Abyei up to the
"blue line" if it dropped demands to include Abyei in the
referendum scheduled for 2011. "This is not possible," said
Alor. Alor felt that Taha on his own would come to a
compromise on Abyei but is constrained by hardliners who want
to drag the process out.

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SPLM Game Plan
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4. (C) Following the break-down in talks on Abyei, the SPLM
senior leadership, including First Vice President Salva Kiir,
convened in Juba the week of July 16 to chart next steps.
They concluded that the SPLM had three options: 1) The GoSS
could recognize the present Abyei administration and deploy a
police force North of Abyei, while recognizing this risked a
direct confrontation with the NCP and the two SAF battalions
in the area; 2) The GoSS could ask the UN to take over
administration of Abyei according to the Abyei Border
Commission (ABC) report and to administer the area until the
2011 referendum; or 3) The GoSS could contact the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the
IGAD partners involved in the CPA negotiations and ask for a
summit on the issue. Irrespective of the future course, Alor
requested continued USG involvement in the issue given its
role in negotiating the Abyei Protocol.


5. (C) CDA Fernandez said that the U.S. would use any
opportunity to push the issue forward and would continue to
exert pressure on the NCP to resolve the Abyei dispute. He
noted that both Special Envoy Natsios' July 13 press
conference and the Embassy's July 18 statement cited the
slowness in CPA implementation. We did not want the Darfur
conflict to overshadow serious impediments to CPA
implementation, and the NCP needs to understand that we are
looking for implementation by the Sudanese Government on
Darfur and the CPA.


6. (C) Kiir planned to meet Bashir in Khartoum on July 25 to
discuss the impasse. The SPLM would then decide on its

KHARTOUM 00001157 002.2 OF 003


course of action. CDA Fernandez noted that the NCP was
opposed to an IGAD summit. He said that it appeared that the
NCP did not want a solution to Abyei and preferred to prolong
the negotiations. Alor concurred and said that the Kenyan
government had also told him during a recent visit to Nairobi
that President Bashir objected to a summit. According to
Alor, Taha has been ready for a solution but then
Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie "had turned up."
Nafie, and others in the NCP, thought they could gain more
concessions from the SPLM if they "dragged out" the
discussions. Alor believed that "there is no substitute yet
to keep negotiating with the NCP."

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SPLM May Lose Control
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7. (C) "The situation may go out of our hands," said Alor.
Senior Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) officers from
Abyei had begun resigning their commissions and returning to
Abyei. Alor said that they had complained that they had not
fought in the civil war for over 20 years to be denied the
legitimate right of administration and lamented that people
in the area had been without basic services for over three
year. They predicted that the NCP will address SPLM concerns
if they stop the flow of oil. In recent discussions with
these officers, Alor and Kiir had tried to calm tensions.
"Salva told them that we've not yet exhausted our discussions
with the National Congress and that the SPLM could not be the
first to violate the CPA."

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Possible Explosion on SAF Redeployment
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8. (C) Alor characterized the SAF's delay in redeploying its
forces from Southern to Northern Sudan as "explosive."
Rather than withdrawing its forces, Alor claimed that the SAF
had reinforced its troops in Upper Nile and Unity States from
July 7-9. Some SPLA forces had almost had skirmishes with
the SAF in these areas, and Alor had told Kiir that he should
issue orders to the SPLA troops to "restrain themselves."
The NCP was delaying the formation of the Joint Integrated
Units (JIUs) in the oil areas as a pretext for a continued
SAF presence. The SPLM was considering asking the UN Mission
in Sudan (UNMIS) to assume control of the oil areas on the
border as a means to defuse the situation, although they
doubted this is a viable solution.

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Alor Dodges Darfur "Show"
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9. (C) Alor said that he had declined to accompany President
Bashir on his recent trip to Darfur, where he held a Council
of Ministers meeting on July 22, both because his
father-in-law was ill and because he did not want to "go to
Darfur for a show" of NCP policies with which he disagreed
(Ref. B). This was partially in response to NCP public
criticism that the SPLM was "flailing around on Darfur." He
had voiced his reservations to Minister of Presidential
Affairs Bakri Hassan Salih, who had said that he would tell
Bashir only that Alor could not attend because of his
father-in-law's illness.

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NCP's "Dangerous Game"
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10. (C) CDA Fernandez said that the NCP was playing a "high
stakes, reckless game" with the international community by
not dealing constructively with the issues confronting the
North/South peace and Darfur. Alor said that Nafie and his
allies were the "real problem" in the government. Nafie had
admitted to Alor that he would rather destroy the country
than leave power or hand over Sudan to "your foreign friends
and our foreign enemies." Alor said that the SPLM was
"closer to the National Congress than any other political
party," was partners with the NCP in the peace agreement, and
wanted to cooperate on issues facing Sudan. "But they want
to do it their own way," explained Alor. "They want to
challenge everybody." Bashir had even objected to Kiir's
proposed re-shuffling of the SPLM ministers in the national
government, opposing the replacement of Foreign Minister Lam
Akol with SPLM loyalist Mansour Khalid. This is still
another bit of unfinished business between the two uneasy

KHARTOUM 00001157 003.2 OF 003


partners in the Government of National Unity (GNU).

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Action Request
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11. (C) Embassy requests that the Department find a way to
publicly mention "how closely we are following the resolution
of the Abyei issue" (without passing judgment on the two
parties) in any appropriate upcoming testimony or public
comments of the Department's senior leadership. Such an
innocuous comment, even in passing, would amplify our message
delivered repeatedly locally that we care about the CPA that
ended a bloody 50-year war with the South, just like we are
deeply concerned and engaged on Darfur.
FERNANDEZ