EGYPT VERIFIES COUP PLOT, "OBJECTS" TO UNSCR,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001144 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AND NEA/ELA NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KPKO UN AU SU EG LY SUBJECT: EGYPT VERIFIES COUP PLOT, "OBJECTS" TO UNSCR, WARNS NOT TO RUSH PEACE REF: KHARTOUM 01109 KHARTOUM 00001144 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Egypt Asserts Coup Was Real -------------- ¶1. (C) Meeting with Poloff on July 22, Egyptian Deputy Chief of Mission Osama Shaltout (strictly protect) asserted that the alleged coup by Umma Reform and Renewal Party leader Mubarak Al Fadil and a group of retired military officers was a true attempt to destabilize the Sudanese Government (reftel). Alluding to intelligence reporting, Shaltout claimed that Egypt had verified the weapons caches cited by Sudan as evidence of the coup plot. He also corroborated reports that Libya had warned Sudan of the coup. Libya's intention, said Shaltout, was to pressure Khartoum by showing that it had the power to influence Sudan's internal dynamics. Shaltout said that several members of Al Fadil's Umma faction had requested meetings with him and Egyptian Ambassador Mohammed Al Shazli but that Cairo had ordered no official contact with the party members. -------------- Cairo Objects to UNSCR, Kind of -------------- ¶2. (C) Turning to the Darfur crisis, Shaltout expressed vague Egyptian "objections" to the current draft of the UN Security Council resolution to authorize the UN/AU hybrid peace-keeping force. The international community should recognize that Sudan had "made a lot of progress" in recent months. When pressed for what specific language Egypt opposed, Shaltout gave no specifics. Poloff underscored that Sudan had the opportunity to demonstrate its sincerity in accepting the UN/AU hybrid by encouraging members of the Security Council and neighboring countries to pass a resolution that would guarantee a strong and effective force, with UN command and control and a clear Chapter VII mandate, that could quickly end the violence in Darfur. (Comment: A normally candid interlocutor, Shaltout's weak defense of Sudan's efforts to dilute the UNSCR likely indicate an order from Cairo to deliver stock talking points. When Poloff explained the U.S. position, Shaltout nodded as if almost in agreement. End comment.) -------------- Can't "Rush" Political Process -------------- ¶3. (C) Egypt was leery of recent alleged statements by prominent Western officials that an agreement between the Sudanese Government and the Darfur rebel groups should be concluded by August, according to Shaltout--who mentioned Special Envoy Natsios by name. Cairo believed that such rhetoric reflected domestic political deadlines in the U.S. and that the Bush Administration wanted to "solve" Darfur before the end of the President's term. Shaltout warned that this view was unrealistic, and while bringing the Darfur rebel groups to an agreement with the Government was important, a political solution to the conflict "could not be rushed." Shaltout anticipated that the Egyptian Government would communicate a similar message to UN/AU Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada during his visit to Cairo around Aug. 4 when he would meet with Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa. Poloff said that the USG sought a lasting political agreement to end the conflict and supported theqQN05IbQQ|bring peace, with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) as the basis of negotiations. He outlined the "shuttle diplomacy" model for negotiations, which Shaltout welcomed. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶4. (C) Shaltout was an accurate conveyer of Cairo's views on the situation in Sudan. Egyptian diplomats here have consistently downplayed Khartoum's obstructionism and exaggerated "progress." According to Egyptian officials in Khartoum, their chief motivation continues to be fears of destabilizing the political situation in Sudan, which could lead to the break-up of the country and the rise of ungovernable and much more radical successor regimes poised KHARTOUM 00001144 002.2 OF 002 on Egypt's southern border. End comment. ¶4. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ